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# PRÉCIS-WRITING

IN THREE PARTS

PART II

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# PRÉCIS-WRITING

By

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## PART II

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at the University Press  
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## PREFACE

THE series of which this is the second part, has been designed to afford instruction and practice in a course of précis-writing extending over two or three years. In length or in difficulty or in both, the exercises of Part II exceed those of Part I and are exceeded by those of Part III. Besides giving a general training in summarizing correspondence, reports and minutes, the series is intended to meet the requirements of such examinations as those of the Oxford and Cambridge Schools Examination Board, Army Entrance, Navy Clerkships, Civil Service Clerkships (Division II), Society of Arts, and others whose schemes include précis-writing. For pupils who require practice in indexing, a section thereon has been added.

The final précis of the exercises in the present part should be under 300 words. They vary in length ; but for most of them, pupils who have already worked through Part I of the series should find about  $1\frac{3}{4}$  hours ample time. Less will suffice for IX, while more will probably be required for VII and XV.

The worked examples and the exercises all come from Government Examination Papers and Government Blue-books, and are reproduced here by permission of the Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office.

W. M.

*February, 1914.*

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## INTRODUCTION

### § 1. DEFINITION OF PRÉCIS.

A précis may be defined as a summary, a concise abridgment, an abstract containing the sum and substance of a full statement. We may have, for example, a précis

- (a) of a report of a Royal Commission appointed  
to conduct some investigation ;
- (b) of a witness's evidence before a Commission ;
- (c) of a series of letters on some political crisis or incident.

Of course other kinds of documents may be summarized—a speech, an essay, a book, a mass of papers. But the report, the minutes of evidence, and the correspondence are what we are at present chiefly concerned with. For that is the type of document usually given in examination papers.

### § 2. THE PRACTICAL USE OF PRÉCIS.

It must not be imagined, however, that précis-writing is merely an examination subject—a study to be taken up because compulsory or because useful for scoring marks. Ability to produce a satisfactory précis is very important for many purposes in practical life. In Government Offices, for example, précis is constantly employed to enable the substance of a long document or a series of documents to be quickly mastered. The legal profession takes advantage of précis when much written matter has to be quickly assimilated. In the newspaper world, journalists have to produce many a précis. Examples will be found in the great newspapers. They print more

or less full accounts of speeches or events, and also short summaries of these accounts. In literature, the historian and the biographer find the art of *précis*-writing an invaluable aid ; and any author will be saved much time and trouble by his skill in *précis*-writing. Students, too, are much handicapped if they cannot easily and exactly summarize a lecture or a book.

### § 3. THE EDUCATIONAL USE OF PRÉCIS.

But, besides the utility of the subject, there is this further advantage. Practice in *précis*-writing is of distinct worth in educational training. For what processes must be gone through in making an abstract ? We must read correctly and understand exactly—things which many cannot do. We must exercise judgment in discriminating between what is worth retaining for our summary and what is to be discarded. We must possess the knack of arranging matter in a proper sequence and in due proportion. We must have skill in selecting the right words to set forth our *précis* as a continuous narrative, at once striking, concise, and readable.

### § 4. WHAT A PRÉCIS SHOULD BE.

Before we begin to consider how to make a *précis*, let us see what instructions are laid down in examinations where *précis*-writing is required. Here are three typical sets of instructions :

#### A.

“ A *Précis* of a document or series of documents is intended to enable a person to grasp on reading it the main points and the general effect of the matter summarized.

Your *Précis* should take the form of a consecutive narrative, without marginal references ; it should be lucid, succinct and omit no important point ; the actual wording of the original may sometimes be suitable for your purpose, but it is more likely to be unsuitable. The length of the *Précis* should be between 200 and 300 words.

Attention should be paid to neatness, handwriting, spelling, grammar, and style."

## B.

"You are desired to write out *in your own words* a Précis of the following letters.

The object of the Précis (which should proceed *not paragraph by paragraph*, but in the form of a narrative *without* marginal references) is that any one who had not time to read the original Correspondence might, by reading the Précis, be put in possession of all the leading features of what passed. The merits of such a Précis (which should not exceed two pages in length) are (a) to include all that is important in the Correspondence, (b) to present this in a consecutive and readable shape, expressed as distinctly as possible, and as briefly as is compatible with distinctness.

*Attention should be paid to Spelling, Handwriting, Grammar, and Style."*

## C.

"The object of the Précis is that anyone might by reading it master all the leading features of the Correspondence. The Précis should be between 300 and 400 words in length, and should contain all that is (and nothing that is not) important in the correspondence presented in the form of a consecutive narrative (without marginal references) as briefly as is consistent with perfect distinctness."

From these we gather that the précis must be :

- (1) a connected and readable narrative, not disjointed notes ;
- (2) comprehensive—containing everything of importance ;
- (3) lucid—free from ambiguity and obscurity ; and
- (4) concise, not burdened by many words.

The problem before us, then, is to examine either a mass of documents of different dates and by different writers, or the minutes of a witness's evidence, or a long report ; and, after doing so, to reduce the 2000, 4000, or even

6000 words to a connected narrative of less than 400 words, or it may be 300—a narrative which, in addition to conciseness, shall exhibit the qualities, already enumerated, of readableness, lucidity, and comprehensiveness.

## § 5. MAKING THE PRÉCIS : SELECTION AND TREATMENT OF MATERIAL.

Our first step is to discover the subject. Note exactly the heading of the printed matter. This gives the subject under discussion. Then, read rapidly a few of the letters or of the opening paragraphs of the document, in order to find a clue to the really important points. Next, re-read slowly and carefully from the beginning, keeping a vigilant outlook for everything that bears on what you have decided to be of prime interest. Since it is doubtful wisdom to trust too much to memory, it is advisable either to note down, or mark on the margin, the passages considered important. As we proceed in our reading, we often find a letter supplying a summary of a previous letter. In such a case, the second letter is sufficient by itself and the former letter may be neglected. Again, the same information may appear more than once ; as when the same question is put to a witness several times. It is enough to note one of his answers—the fullest one, if they differ. Sometimes, a series of questions on some topic may be summed up in one question. This and its answer should be carefully noted. The formal beginning and ending of letters, the acknowledging of communications, and other courtesies are to be ignored. A covering letter often summarizes an enclosure in whole or in part.

In *précis*, we regularly employ, not the writer's personal name or title, but the designation of his official position. That is, we say "The Secretary of State," "The Colonial Secretary," or "The British Ambassador," not "The Duke of Devonshire," "The Earl of Rosebery," or "Sir Edward Lawrence." At times, the personal name may be the only designation available. But, whatever designation we employ, we must keep it the same all through the *précis*. We must not put "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs" in one sentence, and in another "Sir Edward Grey." It frequently happens that the

person who gives the information is less important than the information ; and consequently the informant's name is ignored altogether. If, however, the name or the official designation adds weight, we use it. In the course of a long-continued correspondence between, say, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Governor of Malta, there may be a change of either Secretary or of Governor. This is to be left unnoticed, unless the change of official involves a change of policy in regard to the incident or crisis. ✓

The instructions say " the actual wording of the original may sometimes be suitable for your purpose, but it is more likely to be unsuitable " ; or " write in your own words " ; or something to the same effect. Now, such instructions do not mean that we are to avoid the use of all the phraseology of the original. If the documents speak of a " General Election," or of a " Native Rising in Natal," or of the " Ambulance Service of London," we must employ those terms. Even whole sentences of the original may, if suitable, appear in the *précis*. But what we are warned against is the picking out and stringing together of detached quotations from the original, as if that would result in a connected and readable narrative. Again, much of the original matter is couched in the present tense, and in the first or the second person. When we turn the gist of the whole into a narrative of what happened in the past, we use the third person and the past tense. That is, " I," " you " and " he " of the original appear as " he " in the *précis* ; " we," " you " and " they " as " they " ; " is," " are," " shall," " can " as " was," " were," " should," " could."

Spelling ought to be carefully attended to—especially the spelling of proper names. Note precisely how they are spelt in the documents. Be exact also in other points, *e.g.* dates and numbers generally.

A caution must be added here. A *précis* being a summary of what others have said, we must on no account introduce our own views or comments. For example, a witness under examination may utter something with which we do not agree ; but in summarizing we must not add any adverb of criticism, as " Witness foolishly answered." Nor ought we to designate any course of action as shameful, simply because we dislike it.

## § 6. THE ROUGH DRAFT OF THE PRÉCIS.

The passages that we have noted down, or marked on the margin, form the basis for the first draft or rough copy of our précis. In making the rough copy, pay little or no attention to its length: that is a matter for after consideration. The first draft should be full and complete; it should, while omitting all that is irrelevant to the main topic, include all that is relevant. In time, a student may be able to write the final précis direct from the notes or marginal markings; but this ability comes only after long practice, and with the help of an excellent memory and a trained judgment. At first, it is well not to omit the stepping-stone of the rough copy.

Having now the material for the first copy, let us proceed to gather it together; and here particular consideration must be paid to arrangement. In the case of a report, we simply write down our matter in the order of the original. We shall most likely do the same in regard to minutes of evidence; though often an answer or statement coming late may amplify or modify a previous one. The amplification or modification should be incorporated with the first statement or answer. Again, when statements dealing with one and the same point appear in different places, they should be brought together. With a series of letters or similar documents we proceed differently. As a rule, we shall find it best to arrange the material in order of time; and this means a scrupulous regard to dates—not merely when the documents were written, but also when they were received. For it is often important to know when the receiver of a letter became acquainted with some piece of information. Note also that the contents of a letter may be months or years anterior to the date of writing, and consequently will require an early place in the narrative. It may at times be necessary to insert in the précis something not expressed, but merely implied, in the original documents. For example, a correspondence on the political condition of Malta says that the Elected Members resumed their seats in the Legislative Council. In the précis, narrative demands, for the sake of continuity, that we shall state expressly what is only implied, viz. that the Members had previously resigned their seats.

## § 7. THE FINISHED PRÉCIS.

With our rough copy in shape, we next count the words in order to ascertain its length. Is it above or below the word limit? Most likely above; since we have aimed at including everything of importance. We now scrutinize the whole minutely to see what can be dispensed with. Here it is very necessary to view matters in their true perspective, not distorting by exaggeration or otherwise; to assign space to the various parts in proportion to their relative weight. Some statements may be cut out altogether; or the phraseology may be shortened. Two independent statements, for example, may be run together, one of them reduced to a subordinate clause or even a phrase. One word may do the work of several; and the précis-writer who is practised in using words and has a copious vocabulary, will find scope for his skill in expressing much in few words. It is often easy to substitute pronouns for long expressions like "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs" and "His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Lima." In short, all the regular devices for securing brevity should be employed. Conciseness, however, should not be carried so far as to cause ambiguity or obscurity. Neither should the curtness of telegrams be imitated. "Arrived Calcutta Monday," will not pass muster; for the words necessary to the sentence structure cannot be done without. Remember that in addition to conciseness, clearness and readableness are essential qualities.

The style should be plain and simple. Complicated sentences, vague remarks, pompous diction, elaborate figures of speech, verbiage—these and such like are forbidden.

If necessary, divide the précis into paragraphs; and to show where these begin, indent your writing clearly.

Finally, revise the précis thoroughly, to make the whole read as a unity—a narrative that is continuous and smooth, free from the jolts and jerks inherent in detached notes. That is, ragged corners must be trimmed; connecting links between sentences and between paragraphs must be inserted; and all other necessary operations must be performed as in finishing an essay or similar composition. And do not forget to prefix a suitable title, indicating briefly the subject of the précis.





## WORKED EXAMPLES

### I.

The time allowed to work the following correspondence is  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours and the instructions are :

“ A Précis of a document or series of documents is intended to enable a person to grasp on reading it the main points and the general effect of the matter summarized.

Your Précis should take the form of a consecutive narrative, without marginal references ; it should be lucid, succinct and omit no important point ; the actual wording of the original may sometimes be suitable for your purpose, but it is more likely to be unsuitable. The length of the Précis should be between 200 and 300 words.

Attention should be paid to neatness, handwriting, spelling, grammar, and style.”

A glance at the heading of the documents and a perusal of the first few show that interest centres round the flogging of the natives by the Europeans, the trial of these Europeans, and the alleged unrest among the natives.

Let us now go over the correspondence in detail and select what bears on these points. The method adopted here is to print the original documents on the left-hand page and to note or summarize the relevant passages on the right-hand page, with explanations why certain parts of the correspondence are omitted. Capital letters in brackets are added at various points for convenience of reference when we come to construct the first draft of our précis.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE FLOG-  
GING OF NATIVES BY CERTAIN EUROPEANS  
AT NAIROBI.

No. 1. "Daily Mail," *March 15, 1907.*

NATIVE PERIL IN EAST AFRICA.

RIFLES SERVED OUT TO THE WHITES AT NAIROBI.

(From Our Own Correspondent.)

NAIROBI,  
THURSDAY, *March 14.*

In consequence of their having insulted white women and gone unpunished by the authorities, three negroes have been publicly flogged in front of Nairobi Court House, in the presence of a large crowd, by Captain Grogan, president of the Colonists' Association.

(From Our Own Correspondent.)

MOMBASA,  
THURSDAY, *March 14.*

Owing to sudden unrest among the natives at Nairobi, the citizens have demanded ammunition and rifles. The Acting Commissioner has agreed to issue them, and has appointed a defence committee.

The climax has been reached, it is considered, owing to the Government's refusal to appoint white police some time ago.

Nairobi has a population of about 8000, of whom 600 are Europeans and Eurasians. The East Africa Protectorate has a total population of 4,000,000, of whom only 2,000 are European or Eurasian.

White police are to be introduced in Nairobi on April 1, but the Colonists have been agitating for their immediate appointment for some months past.

## No. 1.

Omit as a newspaper report. The authoritative account is found in No. 3. We may note Grogan's position as president of the Colonists' Association ; and that Nairobi is in British East Africa. (A)

## FLOGGING OF EAST-AFRICANS

No. 2. From the Secretary of State to the  
Acting Commissioner.

(Sent 1.15 p.m., *March 15, 1907.*)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 3.*]

March 15. According to telegrams from Nairobi appearing in "Daily Mail," three negroes, not having been punished by authorities for insult to white women, have been flogged by Grogan in front of Court House, and defence committee has been formed and you have agreed to issue arms to settlers.

Report fully on the matter by telegram.—ELGIN.

No. 3. From the Acting Commissioner to the  
Secretary of State.

(Received 5.25 p.m., *March 16, 1907.*)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 4.*]

No. 36. With reference to your telegram of March 15\*, there is absolutely no foundation for report of native rising.

On Thursday morning Grogan, Russell, Bowker, and another flogged three Kikuyu natives in front of the Court House, having collected upwards of 100 Europeans, of whom many were armed, as supporters and witnesses. They disregarded attempted intervention by European police officer and magistrate. Natives were alleged to have insulted two European ladies whom they were pulling in rickshaw. Details very vague, but insult was apparently not of a serious nature and at most did not amount to more than rudeness and disobedience. Culprits were not taken to the police, but were taken down to the town and treated as arrested. Flogging was carried out in a most brutal manner. Majority of spectators were led by ringleaders to believe that the insults offered to the ladies had been of a gross nature.

Immediately after the flogging Grogan and a so-called committee of about 30 persons made their way to my office and formally gave me his version of the occurrence,

## No. 2.

Omit. It merely asks for information. N.B. the heading [*Answered by No. 3*].

## No. 3.

Omit first paragraph as unnecessary to précis ; first sentence of paragraph five ; and last sentence of paragraph six. The gist of what remains might be put thus :

“On the 14th March, 1907, three Kikuyu natives were flogged in front of the Court House, in presence of over 100 Europeans, by Grogan and others. The natives were pulling two European ladies in rickshaw, to whom they were rude and disobedient. The majority of the spectators were led to believe that the ladies had been grossly insulted. Flogging was brutally carried out.

Immediately after the flogging Grogan and a deputation of Europeans reported the affair to the Acting Commissioner. They declared that the Europeans feared a native rising, and demanded from Government means of self-protection.

The Acting Commissioner said the idea of a native rising had no foundation ; but to allay their fears, he offered a loan of ammunition to persons in isolated positions. There was no eagerness to take advantage of this.

He urged on the Secretary of State for the Colonies the immediate appointment of European police, a measure already contemplated by Parliament ; and reported that the natives were perfectly quiet.” (B)

of which I was previously in complete ignorance, and asserted that Europeans of Nairobi were much alarmed at the prospect of a native rising, and that their excitement could be allayed only by means of self-protection being given to them by the Government.

In order to calm these excited and hysterical people and avert what might have led to a serious fracas in the town, I consented to a loan of ammunition being made on certain conditions to persons whose isolated position rendered them in their own opinion insecure. At the same time I pointed out that the Government did not share their apprehension, and was, in fact, convinced that there was no foundation for the idea of a native rising. I have published a Notice to the effect in to-day's "Gazette." Up to the present only one man has applied for any ammunition.

I regard the whole incident as deliberately engineered and planned by Grogan, Burn, Fichat, Low, and others with a view to bringing the Administration, and more particularly the Judicial and Police Departments, into contempt, and I consider the matter serious in view of the fact that all our available forces are native and cannot be used against this gang of European lawbreakers. I would urge the immediate appointment of the European police force asked for in the Estimates if sanction has been given.

I have made careful enquiries and am convinced that there is absolutely no feeling of unrest among the natives. They are perfectly quiet at present. Whether they will remain so if incidents like that of Thursday are repeated is another matter, but personally I am of opinion that it would take a great deal to rouse them.—JACKSON.

No. 4. From the Secretary of State to the Acting Commissioner.

(Sent 6.40 p.m., *March* 18, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

March 18. I have received the news contained in your telegram, No. 36\*, with regret. I presume that legal proceedings have been taken against ringleaders.

\* No. 3.

No. 4.

The second paragraph alone is important for our purpose. (C)



A reduction from thirty to twenty has been made in the strength of the European Police Force in the Estimates. Twenty may be appointed at once.

Will the force which you will then have be sufficient to bring the ringleaders to justice?—ELGIN.

No. 5. From the Acting Commissioner to the Secretary of State.

(Received at 8.20 p.m., *March* 19, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 39. I hope to be able to engage twenty constables as sanctioned in your telegram of to-day\*.

Summonses have been issued against Grogan, Bowker, Bennett, Fichat, Burn, Low, and others for holding an unlawful meeting, and Grogan and Bowker will be charged with resisting the police. Case will be heard March 25th. If committed to Sessions they will be tried about April 5th, on which day flagship arrives.

I am considering the question of selecting Mombasa as the place of trial, as it may be impossible to obtain an unbiassed jury here. Should accused refuse to proceed to Mombasa, I shall attempt to raise force of special constables. I have warned Admiral that I may require assistance. May I detain ship of war if necessary?

It is stated that over 100 settlers have sworn to release Grogan if he is sentenced to imprisonment.

Natives report slight unrest in Kikuyu due to Grogan's action and to rumoured threat which has reached them that the white men intend to kill them.—JACKSON.

No. 6. From the Acting Commissioner to the Secretary of State.

(Received 2.32 p.m., *April* 19, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 58. My telegram, No. 36, of the 16th of March†. Considerable capital is being made by the local Press and the Colonists' Association out of the statement made by

\* No. 4.

† No. 3.

No. 5.

The important points are first sentence of paragraph two, and the last two paragraphs. (D)

No. 6.

Omit. We have the gist in No. 7.

Your Lordship in the House of Lords that many of the participators in the flogging incident were armed, because this was not proved at the trial.

Reports received at the time justified the statement in my telegram. As, however, evidence could only be procured against Bowker and Grogan, the charges under the 144th Section of the Indian Penal Code were not proceeded with.—JACKSON.

No. 7. From the Acting Commissioner to the Secretary of State.

(Received 2.44 p.m., *April* 23, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 62. Have been asked to forward following. Charges in connection with transmission have been paid :

Colonists' Association of British East Africa contends that Local Administration turned flogging incident into most unscrupulous political prosecution. Your Lordship's statement in House Lords of April 11th, as reported referring to a hundred Europeans, many of whom were armed, an unwitting but gross libel on this community at large, and we request that Board of Enquiry be appointed from home to enquire into this and other pressing grievances.

JACKSON.

No. 8. From the Acting Commissioner to the Secretary of State.

(Received *April* 30, 1907.)

[*Answered by No. 11.*]

COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,

NAIROBI, *April* 9, 1907.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the file of evidence\* and judgment in the case of the Crown *versus* Grogan and others, which terminated on the 2nd instant.

2. The sentences were quietly received and the prisoners offered no resistance. Later in the day, however, a mass meeting was held and telegrams were in

\* Not printed.

## No. 7.

The whole of the Association's contention is important. (E)

## No. 8.

Only the fourth paragraph need detain us. The rest either occurs elsewhere, as in paragraph two of No. 7 ; or is unimportant detail, as paragraph six. (F)

consequence despatched to Your Lordship and to the Premiers of the various South African Colonies.

3. A deputation also waited upon me to ask that the prisoners might be incarcerated in a place where their disgrace might not be witnessed by native convicts.

4. In view of the fact that the gaol has been medically condemned as insanitary for Europeans, and is, besides, very ill fitted for their accommodation, I acceded to the request of the deputation, and ordered the transfer of the prisoners to a building on Nairobi Hill, where they are confined under the surveillance of the police.

5. I was somewhat reluctant to do this, as the moral effect would, I consider, have been greater if the sentence had been carried out in the regular prison, but, having regard to the strictures passed on the Mombasa gaol in the Wehner case, I thought it better not to give any opportunity for adverse criticism. I trust, however, that ere long we shall have a building in which malefactors of every kind can be confined, irrespective of race and colour.

6. The sentences, which in view of the gravity of the offences committed, cannot be reasonably regarded as other than lenient, have, nevertheless, provoked a considerable amount of vituperation in the local press, as an instance of which I have the honour to enclose a copy of the "Times of East Africa" of the 6th instant\*. Such expressions of opinion are only to be expected from the persons who are known to be the authors of them.

7. The trial and its result have, as far as I am aware, produced no effect whatever on the native mind, which is far too unintelligent and ignorant to take any interest in such proceedings, unless their scope and meaning were very carefully explained.

8. It is at any rate certain that the knowledge that they can only be punished in accordance with law is unlikely to have a disquieting effect on the Kikuyu. If they were led to understand that they could be flogged by Europeans whenever the latter thought fit it certainly might disturb their tranquillity.

I have, &c.,

F. J. JACKSON,  
*Acting Commissioner.*

\* Not printed.



Enclosure in No. 8.

JUDGMENT. (Extract)

*April 2, 1907.*

In this case the accused, Grogan, Bowker, Gray, Fichat, and Low, are summoned for being members of an unlawful assembly.

\* \* \* \* \*

I sentence Fichat to 14 days' and Low to 7 days' simple imprisonment.

With regard to the accused, Bowker and Gray.....

\* \* \* \* \*

I convict them both, and sentence each to 14 days' simple imprisonment, and (each) to pay a fine of Rs. 250, in default 14 days' simple imprisonment additional. The worst case of all is that of E. S. Grogan, who originated the whole affair.

\* \* \* \* \*

The order of this Court is that he be imprisoned for one month simple imprisonment, and pay a fine of Rs. 500, in default one month simple imprisonment additional.

\* \* \* \* \*

H. O. DOLBEY.

No. 9. From the Secretary of State to the Acting Commissioner.

(Sent 10.20 a.m., *May 1, 1907.*)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 10.*]

Referring to your despatch, April 9\*, did natives receive serious injuries? What was exact nature of insult for which they were flogged?—ELGIN.

Enclosure in No. 8.

The whole is important. (G)

No. 9.

Omit. It is answered by No. 10.



No. 10. From the Acting Commissioner to the  
Secretary of State.

(Received 3.10 p.m., *May* 3, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 68. Your Lordship's telegram of 1st May\*. Medical officer certifies that two of the natives received simple hurt and one severe hurt nearly amounting to grievous hurt. Last mentioned was in hospital considerable period.

Exact nature of insult, according to statement of Miss Macdonell, one of two ladies said to have been insulted, was impertinence and shaking shafts of rickshaw.—JACKSON.

No. 11. From the Secretary of State to the  
Governor.

DOWNING STREET, *June* 18, 1907.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr Jackson's despatch of the 9th of April†, forwarding a report of the trial and conviction of Captain Grogan and Messrs Bowker, Gray, Fichat, and Low, on charges arising out of the flogging of natives in Nairobi on the 14th of March. I have also received Mr Jackson's telegram of the 23rd of April‡, transmitting a message from the Colonists' Association complaining of the action of the local administration and of a statement reported to have been made by me in the House of Lords and asking that a Commission might be appointed to enquire into these and other alleged grievances.

2. The report shows that the offenders had a fair and full trial, and that there was little dispute as to the facts. The contention of the defendants—with the exception of Low, who claimed that he was a mere spectator—was that the flogging was justified because the natives had been guilty of insulting white women; *e.g.* the defendant Bowker expressed himself as follows:—  
“As it has always been the first principle with me to flog

\* No. 9.

† No. 8.

‡ No. 7.

## EXERCISES

## I.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RELATING  
TO AFFAIRS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

No. 1. From General Lord Kitchener to  
Mr Brodrick.

(Received *June 23, 1902.*)

ARMY HEAD-QUARTERS, SOUTH AFRICA,  
PRETORIA, *June 1, 1902.*

SIR,

I have the honour to forward herewith the Terms of Peace granted by His Majesty's Government to the Burghers of the late Republics duly signed by their representatives as well as by Lord Milner and myself.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. Hamilton, D.S.O., and Captain R. J. Marker, D.S.O., will personally hand you this document.

I have, &c.,

KITCHENER, General.  
*Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.*

Enclosure in No. 1.

ARMY HEAD-QUARTERS, SOUTH AFRICA.

General Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, Commanding-in-Chief, and his Excellency Lord Milner, High Commissioner, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs S. W. Burger, F. W. Reitz, Louis Botha, J. H. De la Rey, L. J. Meyer, and J. C. Krogh, acting as the Government of the South African Republic, and Messrs C. R. de Wet, W. J. C. Brebner, J. B. M. Hertzog, and C. H. Olivier, acting as the Government of the Orange Free State, on behalf of their respective burghers, desirous to terminate the present hostilities, agree on the following Articles :

1. The Burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and

munitions of war, in their possession or under their control, and desist from any further resistance ~~to the authority of His Majesty King Edward VII, whom they recognize as their lawful Sovereign.~~

The manner and details of this surrender will be arranged between Lord Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, Assistant Commandant-General De la Rey, and Chief Commandant De Wet.

2. Burghers in the field outside the limits of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present outside South Africa who are burghers, will, on duly declaring their acceptance of the position of subjects of His Majesty King Edward VII, be gradually brought back to their homes as soon as transport can be provided and their means of subsistence ensured.

3. The burghers so surrendering or so returning will not be deprived of their personal liberty or their property.

4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any of the burghers so surrendering or so returning for any acts in connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this clause will not extend to certain acts contrary to the usage of war which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the Boer Generals, and which shall be tried by Court-Martial immediately after the close of hostilities.

5. The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony where the parents of the children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when necessary for the better and more effectual administration of justice.

6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony to persons requiring them for their protection, on taking out a license according to law.

7. Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by civil government, and, as soon as circumstances permit, representative institutions, leading up to self-government, will be introduced.

8. The question of granting the franchise to natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.

9. No special tax will be imposed on landed property in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the war.

10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the presidency of a magistrate or other official, for the purpose of assisting the restoration of the people to their homes and supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide for themselves, with food, shelter, and the necessary amount of seed, stock, implements, &c., indispensable to the resumption of their normal conditions.

His Majesty's Government will place at the disposal of these Commissions a sum of three million pounds sterling for the above purposes, and will allow all notes, issued under Law No. 1 of 1900, of the Government of the South African Republic, and all receipts given by the Officers in the field of the late Republics or under their orders, to be presented to a Judicial Commission which will be appointed by the Government, and if such notes and receipts are found by this Commission to have been duly issued in return for valuable consideration, they will be received by the first-named Commissions as evidence of war losses suffered by the persons to whom they were originally given. In addition to the above-named free grant of three million pounds, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to make advances as loans for the same purpose, free of interest for two years, and afterwards repayable over a period of years with three per cent. interest. No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the benefit of this Clause.

Signed at Pretoria this thirty-first day of May in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and two.

KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM.  
MILNER.

S. W. BURGER.  
F. W. REITZ.  
LOUIS BOTHA.  
J. H. DE LA REY.  
L. J. MEYER.

J. C. KROGH.  
C. R. DE WET.  
J. B. M. HERTZOG.  
W. J. C. BREBNER.  
C. H. OLIVIER.

## SOUTH-AFRICAN PEACE

No. 2. From High Commissioner Lord Milner to  
Mr Chamberlain.

(Received *June 28, 1902.*)

HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,

JOHANNESBURG, *June 6, 1902.*

SIR,

I have the honour to inclose for your information a copy of an open letter which was addressed by Mr Schalk Burger and General Botha to the Burghers of the late South African Republic still in arms, communicating the terms of surrender, and the declaration of His Majesty's Government on the subject of treatment of rebels. I also enclose a copy of the Resolution of the Burgher Assembly at Vereeniging, empowering the Delegates to sign the terms of surrender.

Translations of the open letter and of the Resolution are attached.

I have, &c.,

MILNER,  
*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

(Translation.)

OPEN LETTER.

To all Officers, Officials, and Burghers of the South African Republic who have faithfully done their duty to Land and People.

BROTHERS AND FELLOW COUNTRYMEN,

We feel it our duty to address to you a word of thanks and farewell on the ending of our struggle.

It is our duty to give you notice that peace has now been concluded in the manner and on the terms set out in the Agreement to be signed by both Governments,

and for the reasons set out in the Resolution passed to-day by the National Assembly at Vereeniging.

We heartily thank you for your heroic courage, for your sacrifice of so much that was dear and precious to you, for your obedience, and for your faithful fulfilment of your duty, all of which tends to the honour and glory of the Africander People.

We recommend you to acquiesce in that peace and to conduct yourselves peaceably and quietly, and to obey and respect the new Government.

Further, we give you notice that a Head-Committee has been appointed by the representatives of both countries, with the object of obtaining money and means to provide as far as possible for the needs of the Widows and Orphans, whose husbands and fathers have given their lives in the struggle for freedom and right, but whose memory will continue to live in our history. We take this opportunity to express our sincere sympathy with these mourners, praying that the Lord may strengthen them in accordance with their need.

We must also say a word of praise and thanks to our Women and Children, who have borne the bitterest sacrifices with heroic fortitude.

There is now peace, and though not such a peace as we desired, let us be content with the way into which God has led us. We can declare with a clear conscience that our People has for two and a half years carried on a struggle in a manner almost unknown to history.

Let us now join hands for the other great struggle which lies in front of us, for the safety and welfare of our People in spiritual and social matters, laying aside all feeling of bitterness, and let us learn to forget and to forgive so that the deep wounds inflicted in this war may be healed.

S. W. BURGER.  
LOUIS BOTHA.

VEREENIGING, *May 31, 1902.*

## Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Resolution of the National Congress at Vereeniging,  
passed on Saturday, May 31, 1902.

(Translation.)

This Assembly of National Representatives of both the South African Republic and the Orange Free State held at Vereeniging from May 15th to May 31st, 1902, has received with regret the proposal, made by His Majesty's Government in connection with ending the present hostilities, and the intimation that this proposal must be accepted or rejected without modification. It (this Assembly) deplors the fact that His Majesty's Government has absolutely refused to negotiate with the Government of the Republics on the basis of our independence or to permit our Governments to come into communication with our Deputation. Our Nation has ever considered that, not only on grounds of justice, but also on the ground of the great material and personal sacrifices made for its independence, it has a reasonable claim to such independence.

This Assembly has taken the condition of our country and Nation into serious consideration, and has had special regard to the following facts:

1. That the War-policy followed by the British Military authorities has led to the territory of both Republics being completely laid waste, including the burning of farms and towns, the destruction of all means of subsistence, and the exhaustion of all resources necessary for the support of our families, the existence of our armies and the continuance of the war.

2. That the placing of our captured families in the Concentration Camps has led to an unheard of amount of suffering and disease, so that in a comparatively short time nearly 20,000 of our dear ones have died in them, and the terrible prospect presents itself that if the war is continued our whole race may be exterminated in this way.

3. That the Kafir tribes outside and inside the boundaries of both Republics have been almost all armed,

and are taking part in the war against us, and by the commission of murders and the perpetration of atrocities of every sort have produced an intolerable condition of affairs in many districts of both Republics, as has been recently shown in the Vryheid district, where 56 burghers were on one occasion cruelly murdered and mutilated.

4. That, by Proclamations of our enemies to which they have already begun to give effect, the burghers still in the field are threatened with the loss of all their movable and immovable property, and thus with complete material ruin.

5. That by the circumstances of the war it has since long become impossible to retain the many thousands of prisoners of war captured by our armies, and that we can thus do comparatively little damage to the British armies, while the burghers, who are captured by the British armies are sent out of the country ; and that after the war has been raging for nearly three years only a small portion remains of the forces with which we commenced the war.

6. That this remnant still in the field, which forms but a small minority of our whole nation, has to contend with an overwhelming force of the enemy, and further has to undergo actual hunger, and is without the necessities of life, and that, in spite of our utmost efforts, and the sacrifices of all that was dear and precious to us, we cannot reasonably look forward to ultimate victory.

This Assembly is thus of opinion that there is no reasonable ground for expecting that the continuance of the war will result in the retention of the national independence, and consider that in the circumstances the nation is not justified in continuing the war, as such can only tend to the social and material ruin not only of ourselves but also of our posterity.

Feeling the force of the above-stated circumstances and motives, this Assembly charges both Governments to accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government, and to sign the same on behalf of the people of both Republics.

This Assembly of Representatives expresses its confidence that the conditions called into being by accepting the proposal of His Majesty's Government may soon be



so improved that our Nation will attain the enjoyment of those privileges which it considers itself justly entitled to claim.

This Assembly has noted with satisfaction the Resolution of His Majesty's Government to grant a considerable measure of Amnesty to those British subjects who have taken up arms on our side, and to whom we are bound by ties of blood and honour, and expresses the wish that it may please His Majesty further to extend this Amnesty.

## II.

### CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT IN TURKEY.

No. 1. From Mr G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *August 4.*)

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 26, 1908.*

SIR,

With reference to my telegram of the 24th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Serres, giving a detailed account of recent events in that town in connection with the Young Turkish movement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 1.

From Vice-Consul Greig to Mr G. Barclay.

SIR,

In order that a more detailed account of events at Serres, described in my two telegrams of to-day's date may be submitted to your Excellency as early as possible, I venture on this occasion to report directly as follows :

Early in the afternoon of the 22nd instant a delegation composed of officers of Young Turkish sympathies and priests entered the Konak, placed guards before the doors of the several Chanceries, and required all the employés

to take a solemn oath of fidelity to the cause of constitutional government. To this they all consented. I am, moreover, informed that the President of the Bulgarian Committee, who happened to be in the Konak at the time, swore at the instance of the delegation to influence his countrymen so far as possible in favour of the Young Turkish movement.

Meanwhile at cafés near the Konak similar oaths were administered by other parties of officers to persons whom they met in the streets and conducted thither. The General Commanding the Division at Serres also accepted the oath, and it has become the general belief here that the army, officers and men, is unanimously in favour of the movement.

The same evening the Chief of the Correspondence Bureau (Tahrir Mudiri) was dispatched to bring the Mutesarîf back from Petrich, whither he had gone for a few days.

On his arrival here this morning he was met at the station by a number of officers in full uniform and conducted to the Konak, where he too accepted the oath.

By midday a considerable crowd had assembled outside the Konak; the street in that neighbourhood was lined with troops—all arms being represented—and a military band played. On the steps of the Konak the Mutessarîf, the Officers Commanding the Nizam Division and the Redifs respectively, the Khoja of the Chief Mosque, the Muftis, the President of the Bulgarian Committee, the Greek Archbishop, many leading Jews, and a number of other officers and Notables were gathered together.

The proclamation of the decision to demand a Constitution was read by the Khoja and greeted with shouts of "Milletimiz chok yashasun!" Nachid Bey, a Notable, spoke next. Finally, the Mutessarîf, Reshid Pasha, announced that a telegram was to be sent to the Palace demanding His Majesty's immediate grant of a Constitution, and proceeded to transmit it from the telegraph office, which is opposite the Konak.

The crowd, which then showed an inclination to disperse, was ordered to remain until His Majesty's answer should arrive. It accordingly remained until

sunset, when the Mutessarif dismissed it from the balcony of the telegraph office, saying that the sanjak will enjoy constitutional government to-morrow, His Majesty having been allowed twenty-four hours in which to answer.

About the same time the Officer Commanding the Redifs addressed the officers and troops outside the telegraph office exhorting them to set a civilized example and avoid bloodshed.

I am further informed on good authority that the leaders in Serres this evening received a telegram from their superintending Committee in Salonica ordering them to communicate no further with the Palace, but to apply to them for guidance.

It is thought that, if the Constitution is refused, a provisional Constitution will be proclaimed in accordance with that of 1876.

The march of the foregoing events has been singularly peaceful, not one case of bloodshed being reported, excepting the case of Mustapha Bey, reported in my telegram of the 20th instant. He was probably regarded as a spy.

The leaders of the movement have informed the shopkeepers they need have no fear in keeping their shops open, and are believed to have ordered the Greek Archbishop to restrain his flock from acts likely to provoke disturbance. Indeed they appear extremely anxious to avoid disorders.

In conclusion, it appears from reliable information that events similar to those in this town have to-day taken place at Nevrocop, Petrich, and Melnik, but I have no positive information regarding Dzumaja and Razluk, although persistent rumour has it that the same is true of them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. A. GREIG.

No. 2. From Mr G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *August 4.*)

Therapia, *July 28, 1908.*

SIR,

I have the honour to forward to you herewith a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's

Consul-General at Salonica, inclosing a communication from the Young Turk party, in which they describe their aims as being the establishment of freedom, equality, and justice throughout the Empire, without distinction of race or creed, and the abolition of those tyrannical agents who up to the present have intervened between the Sultan and his people.

In forwarding this document, Mr Lamb points out that the Young Turkish movement is not directed against the reforms. Being, however, strongly nationalist, the party is naturally opposed to foreign intervention.

Mr Lamb also notes that, although the Young Turkish party thinks that the Powers have met with inevitable failure in their efforts at reform, it recognizes the disinterestedness and sincerity of His Majesty's Government at least and hopes for their support.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 2.

From Consul-General Lamb to Mr G. Barclay.

SALONICA, *July 21, 1908.*

SIR,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Memorandum which has been addressed to the Consuls of the Great Powers by the Salonica branch of the Ottoman Committee of Progress and Union.

This document may appear somewhat grandiloquent in view of the restricted number of "Constitutionalists" who have hitherto taken the field, but there is nothing whatever, either in the conduct hitherto observed by these few or in the openly expressed opinions of the great mass of their sympathizers, who are avowedly only awaiting the opportunity for declaring themselves, that can be said to be in the least inconsistent with it.

Telegrams have appeared in the European press to the effect that the Young Turkish movement is directed, not against the Government of the Sultan, but against the reforms, which is manifestly absurd. The movement

is directed primarily against arbitrary government by camarilla, but being strongly nationalist in tone it is naturally opposed to foreign intervention. The attitude of the Young Turks towards the reforming efforts of the Powers is that they may have been well meant, but that they have necessarily failed in their object, owing partly to a want of comprehension of the real source of the evils it was desired to remove and partly to the "tiraillements" of the Powers themselves, who were not all equally sincere in their endeavours. It is satisfactory to note that in this respect England stands first in their consideration. In spite of our supposed partiality towards Bulgaria, they recognize the greater disinterestedness and sincerity of His Majesty's Government and hope for its support in the near future, for no doubt appears to exist in their minds as to the ultimate success of their movement, provided that there is no armed intervention on the part of the neighbouring Powers.

It is significant of the rapid and complete change that has taken place in the political atmosphere since the "pronunciamiento" of Resna that, whereas when the former Memorandum was deposited at this Consulate on the 25th May last I thought it preferable to transmit it to you privately so as to take no risk of attracting attention to the bearers, in the present case it has been a matter of public notoriety for three days past that this Memorandum was being prepared for distribution, and no concealment appears to have been thought necessary.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARRY H. LAMB.

No. 3. From Mr G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *August 4.*)

*THERAPIA, July 28, 1908.*

SIR,

I have the honour to transmit copies of two despatches from Colonel Bonham describing the outbreak of the Young Turkish movement at Drama and subsequent events.

Although the Porte assures me that the arrangements

with the Powers concerning reform in Macedonia will be duly observed, it is evident that they do not exclude the idea of a modification of these arrangements by agreement between the Ottoman Government and the Powers concerned, and it is already obvious that there will be great difficulty in reconciling the existing régime in Macedonia with the nationalist views of the Young Turkish party, which thinks strongly that Turkey should be allowed to work out her own salvation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

From Lieutenant-Colonel Bonham to Mr G. Barclay.

DRAMA, *July 23, 1908.*

SIR,

I have the honour to report, in confirmation of my telegram of this evening, that the town and Government of Drama are in the hands of a detachment of soldiers commanded by officers belonging to the Young Turkey party, to which the garrison of the town has gone over, and which has been received with open arms by all the principal Turkish Beys and Notables, and whose demands have been subscribed to from various motives by practically the whole Turkish and Greek population of the town.

Some such event was, by people who knew, not altogether unexpected to happen for some time, but it nevertheless came to-day as a complete surprise to all except the most initiated, and to none more so than to the Mutessarif of Drama himself.

Put in the briefest terms, what actually happened was this :

By the usual train from Salonica there arrived at Drama at or about 1.30 p.m. 100 soldiers and twenty officers commanded by a young staff officer named Rushen Bey, a Kolaghassi (Vice-Major in the army). On arrival the detachment was paraded, rifles were loaded and bayonets fixed, and Rushen Bey proceeded

to deliver a speech in which, as I am informed by people who heard this, he dilated upon the iniquities of the present Government, laid great stress on the brotherhood of all nationalities under the Ottoman flag, on the absolute necessity of establishing a constitutional Government if the Turkish Empire was to be saved from utter ruin, on the abolition of the distinction between race and creed under the Ottoman Government, and gave the words "*La patrie, liberté, égalité, fraternité*" as their new motto. He then turned to the soldiers, and said: "You are now going into the town to proclaim a constitutional Government; any one who resists, no matter what his rank or position, is to be shot dead and the body left until the evening where it falls."

The party then marched off, preceded by a military band, Rushen Bey at its head, the other officers and the troops following, waving a broad banner specially made in Paris for the Young Turkey party, amidst cries of "*Vive la nation!*" to the Konak.

About 2 p.m. two of our interpreters came up to the British officers here in a state of considerable excitement and alarm, saying that a body of fifty Turkish troops had arrived by the train, and were marching towards the Konak with loud shouts, waving a large flag and calling on the population to join them. In consequence the Greeks were in a great panic, had shut their shops and fled to their houses awaiting a general massacre. I at once collected the British officers at Drama at the moment—Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell, Major Nye, and Captain D. Stephen—and rode down to the Konak, which, besides being the seat of Government, also contains the gendarmerie officers, as quickly as possible, arriving there about 2.25 p.m. I found a considerable concourse of people assembled, but everything quiet, orderly and calm. I asked the officer commanding gendarmerie battalion what had happened, and he told me substantially the story as related above, and said that he was quite powerless to do anything, as the garrison had gone over to the Constitutional party. I then went with him to his office, where I found a number of army officers. I told them that it was not my business to criticize or comment on the step that they had taken, but that it

would be my duty to watch and report upon the manner in which they conducted themselves, and in which the movement they had apparently entered upon was carried out.

At this point Rushen Bey, the director of the enterprise, came into the room, and, treating me with the utmost punctilio, explained in French the ulterior aims of his party and the reasons which had driven them to this action. I replied to him in the same terms as I had to his comrades, and told him that I could only be of service to him if I clearly understood what he and the Young Turkey party wanted to do, and, in particular, what were his immediate plans.

Putting on one side for the moment the ulterior objects of his party, which I had an opportunity of ascertaining later, he informed me that he was going to send to the Mutessarif and ask him to come and, if necessary, bring him to the Konak, where, at 4 p.m., the Constitution would be sworn to, signed, and promulgated, and telegrams sent to the Sultan to say that if he did not give a reply favourable to the party within twenty-four hours the IIIrd Army Corps would march on Constantinople. I thanked him for this information, and telling him again that, while I could offer no comments, he could rely on me to be strictly impartial in my reports on his action, I left the room. I must not omit to state that he gave me clearly though politely to understand that one of the first things his party would insist on would be the removal of all foreign officials from Macedonia.

I then sent Major Nye and Captain Stephen to patrol the town, to see any Greeks they could, to reassure them as to their personal safety, and to explain what was actually in progress, while I went to the house of the Mutessarif to ascertain his attitude, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell.

To my astonishment the Mutessarif appeared to be in complete ignorance of what was happening. I had seen him some hours before with reference to my recent tour in Pravishta and some gendarmerie matters, and from his behaviour then and when Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell and I called on him I am convinced he had no idea that anything out of the ordinary was to be apprehended



in Drama. Before, however, he had really grasped the situation from our explanations a party of military and gendarmerie officers and an escort of soldiers appeared at his front door, which was visible from the window at which we were sitting. The Mutessarif was visibly perturbed, and when a few seconds later several officers appeared and respectfully but firmly told him he was wanted at the Konak at once by order of the people, he appeared absolutely nonplussed.

I immediately withdrew with Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell, but, before going, said that I should be glad to accompany him to the Konak if he wished it. He replied, "It is not necessary," and we accordingly went, leaving him apparently demurring at obeying this irregular summons.

The Mutessarif's house is next door to that occupied by the British officers, and I was therefore able to notice that not three minutes later he left his door at the head of the party of officers and soldiers that had come to fetch him. I at once followed, both to watch events and to make sure as far as possible that no harm came to him.

Meanwhile in the Konak, in the mosque, and in the Greek church, the great majority of the population, both Greek and Mussulman, had been swearing fidelity to the Constitution, and this process continued most of the afternoon. The Mufti was sworn, the Colonel Commandant de Place marched in at the head of his ragged soldiery and was sworn, practically all the Drama Beys and many prominent Greeks took the oath to join in the demand for representative government, and to refuse to obey the order of the actual Government, and to devote themselves to the cause of "La patrie, liberté, égalité, fraternité."

I have taken particular pains to discover if the word "égalité" was found to be in the oath, and I am informed that it was, but that there is no idea of a Republic in the minds of the organizers of the movement, nor any desire to depose the Sultan, provided he will give way as to a Constitutional Assembly.

The proceedings were marked at times by applause and shouts of "Vive la nation!" when different Notables and detachments came in but were extremely orderly.

Finally at 4 p.m. it was proclaimed that the Constitution was accepted, and telegrams were sent to the Sultan, signed greatly against his will by Zia Pasha, the Mutes-sarif. I am informed that the latter was told that if he did not swear to be faithful to the new régime he would be shot off-hand, and I have no doubt whatever that this would have been done.

It is difficult to prophesy how far this movement will go, but there can be no doubt whatever in the mind of anyone who saw what I did to-day that it is thoroughly earnest and thoroughly well organized, and, what is more, that it has the thorough support, in the provinces at all events, of any Turk, old or young, who loves his country and is utterly disgusted with the present régime.

One thing is certain, that if there are many officers of the calibre of Rushen Bey engaged in this movement it will go far. He is the true type of the revolutionary, a leader of men, eloquent, feverishly energetic, blind to any difficulties there may be in the way of the cause which is his existence.

In a conversation with him this evening at which no other officers but some of the leading Turks and Greeks were present, he explained to me at length the policy of the Young Turkey organization, which consists of insistence on constitutional government; death to all, race, creed, and position apart, who oppose the movement; scrupulous respect for the lives, property, and honour of all Christians, and the exercise of every possible means to induce them to join in the national movement; great insistence on the brotherhood of all nationalities under the Ottoman flag; instant punishment of all crime and misdemeanour against inoffensive people; finally, the march on Constantinople if the Sultan refuses concessions.

He further said that they would prove themselves worthy by their conduct of the esteem of the Great Powers, and intended to gain their sympathy for what was a true and genuine movement for reform from within. At the same time, he intimated plainly that the Powers would be requested to withdraw all their officials in this country.

Finally, he stated that every step had been carefully

calculated; their plans very thoroughly worked out, and that success was certain. "If, however, we do not succeed, we are not going to be made ridiculous in the eyes of Europe; no Christian blood will be shed; but we will all die rather than accept a renewal of the old régime."

The movement of which this young officer—he is only 28 or 29 years of age—is so fervent an apostle originated in Paris a year or more ago, when the more ardent spirits wished to commence operations of a wild description immediately. Sager counsels, however, prevailed and it was decided, and, as events have turned out very rightly decided, that the first condition of success, especially to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, was to get control of the army.

In eleven months the organization has practically got complete control of the IIIrd Army Corps, and the loyalty of the IVth is more than doubtful.

I shall see the Mutessarif and Rushen Bey again to-morrow, and will report further.

I am informed that Serres yesterday threw in its lot with the Party of Union and Progress, and that Salonica has done so to-day. Deputations have been sent to Cavalla and Pravishta to secure those places. These statements are probably true.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. LIONEL BONHAM,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, British Staff Officer.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

From Lieutenant-Colonel Bonham to Mr. G Barclay.

DRAMA, July 25, 1908.

SIR,

I have the honour, in continuation of my despatch of the 23rd instant, to report that early on Friday, the 24th instant, news was received here that the Constitution of 1876 had been accepted by the Sultan, and the fact was formally announced from the steps of

the Konak. The same evening the Constitution was proclaimed at Cavalla and Pravishta and yesterday at Pressochan. So far, to the extent to which they have come under my own observation, the plans of the Young Turkey party have worked without a hitch and without bloodshed. To-day a party of officers, commanded by Rushen Bey, has gone off to Xanthi, returning to-night, the main object of this step being, as far as I can see, to definitely establish relations with the II<sup>nd</sup> Army Corps, a step the importance of which is obvious.

The representatives of the Young Turkey party here, particularly the leader of the proceedings, Rushen Bey, have been at pains to show to the public that they are sincere as to their proclamations as regards the equality of races and their determination to punish any one to whom this idea is either unpalatable or incomprehensible. It may be worth while to quote some instances :

After the proclamation of the acceptance of the Constitution yesterday two policemen who, in a state of intoxication, had beaten a Christian the night before, were produced before the crowd, and after Rushen Bey had announced that the Committee had condemned them to death, but did not wish to dishonour the day of the liberty of the people with so vile a sacrifice, they were publicly degraded with all the proper ceremonial, their buttons, badges, and stripes being cut off with a pocket-knife, and they were then imprisoned and a telegram sent to Hilmi Pasha asking for power to inflict punishment upon them not as yet allowed by the law.

After this a certain priest (Hodja) was produced, who, with a revolver at his head, was forced to declare that he had been a spy for fifteen years, and to confess on oath many crimes of which he had been guilty. Which ceremony finished, Rushen Bey kissed him, and accepted him again as a priest amidst much applause. Rushen Bey then proceeded to read sentence of death on him, but commuted it on the ground that it was the people's day, and they did not wish to shed blood.

Last night a Turk called a Christian a " pig " in a café in which a number of the revolutionary officers were present. They immediately rushed for him and took him to prison.

## 56 CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT IN TURKEY

The Mutessarif is entirely in the hands of the revolutionists, and they do not hesitate to make use of him in every way.

Rushen Bey and his party from Xanthi return to Drama during the night. To-morrow they expect to see all the Komitadjis, Greek and Bulgarian, within the immediate vicinity of Drama.

I am informed that the more important bandits, such as Sandanski and Pannitza, do not intend to come in until they have seen all the Proclamations, telegrams, of the Young Turkey party.

Here, before taking any further steps beyond sending detachments to the small towns and villages to explain the situation and obtain the oaths of fidelity to the Constitution from the inhabitants the organization is waiting the Sultan's answer to the claim for the amnesty of all political prisoners and exiles throughout the Empire, which has not as yet been answered by him.

They declare that they have 500,000 men ready to march on Constantinople to overpower all opposition.

The revolution, which is what it really represents, is a cheerful one and popular on the whole among all classes.

I am on very amicable terms with the authorities, who, without exception, have subscribed to the movement, and with Rushen Bey, the leader, in the Drama Sanjak.

Perfect tranquillity prevails.

I enclose—

Translation of the Proclamation.

Translation of the Telegram to the Sultan asking for a Constitution.

Translation of the reply from the Grand Vizier.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

G. LIONEL BONHAM,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, British Staff Officer.*

## III.

CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE IMPERIAL  
RAILWAY OF NORTH CHINA.

No. 1. From British and Chinese Corporation to  
Foreign Office.  
(Received *July 14.*)

3, LOMBARD STREET, LONDON,  
*July 14, 1900.*

SIR,

I have the honour to submit, for your information, the annexed translation of a telegram which we have received through the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. KESWICK, *Chairman.*

Enclosure in No. 1.

Telegram received from SHANGHAI, dated *July 13, 1900.*

Tien-tsin Agency writes 8th July: Russians seized railway, turned out C. W. Kinder and staff. Recommend you to request Foreign Office to remind Russian Government railway is already mortgaged British bondholders.

No. 2. From the Marquess of Salisbury to Consul Carles.  
(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 15, 1900.*

Northern Railways.

The Tien-tsin Office have written to Shanghai on the 8th instant that the Russians had seized railway, and turned out Mr Kinder and staff.

Report the exact circumstances under which this took place.

- No. 3. From Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour to Admiralty.  
(Communicated by Admiralty, *July 18.*)

(Telegraphic.)

TAKU, viâ CHEFOO, *July 17, 1900.*

At a Council of Admirals on 16th July it was decided by majority that the railway between Taku and Tien-tsin should be managed and guarded by Russians, who are now in possession of it, but there was a stipulation that the railway should be given over to the former Administration as soon as military circumstances admit.

- No. 4. From Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.  
(Received *July 20.*)

(Telegraphic.)

TIEN-TSIN, *July 17,*  
viâ CHEFOO, *July 20, 1900.*

It was agreed at a Conference of Admirals at Taku, British and Americans alone opposing, to leave railway between Tongku and Tien-tsin in the hands of the Russians.

An exclusive control over line has of late been exercised by the Russians.

- No. 5. From Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.  
(Received *July 24.*)

(Telegraphic.)

TIEN-TSIN, viâ CHEFOO, *July 20, 1900.*

In reply to your Lordship's telegram of 15th July, I have to report that since Kinder left Tongshan on 17th June his staff has not been engaged on railway work. Since that date the line from Tongku to Tien-tsin has been in hands of the military.

Other Powers assisted at first in repairing line, but Russia has had sole charge latterly.

No. 6. From the Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.  
(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 25, 1900.*

A telegram has been received from Admiral Seymour stating that it was decided by a majority, at a Council of Admirals held on the 16th July, that the railway between Tien-tsin and Taku should be guarded and managed by the Russian forces.

You should inform the Russian Government that at present no objection is raised by Her Majesty's Government to this arrangement, as it may be considered the most convenient one in the circumstances, but the line is mortgaged to British bondholders, and it must be clearly understood that the railway will revert to its former management on the termination of the present hostilities.

No. 7. From Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.  
(Received *July 30.*)

ST PETERSBURGH, *July 26, 1900.*

MY LORD,

I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of a note which I have addressed to Count Lamsdorff, in compliance with the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram of yesterday's date, in consequence of the decision of the Council of Admirals that Russian forces should guard and manage the line of railway between Tien-tsin and Taku.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

Enclosure in No. 7.

From Sir C. Scott to Count Lamsdorff.

ST PETERSBURGH, *July 13 (26), 1900.*

M. LE COMTE,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, according to a telegraphic report received by Her



Majesty's Government from Admiral Seymour, it appears that it was decided by a majority in a Council of Admirals, held on the 16th instant, that Russian forces should guard and manage the line of railway between Taku and Tien-tsin.

The Marquess of Salisbury has instructed me to inform the Imperial Government that Her Majesty's Government have no desire to raise any objection at present to this arrangement, which may have recommended itself as the most convenient for adoption in the present circumstances, but I am desired to add that, as this line of railway is mortgaged to British bondholders, it is necessary that there should be a clear understanding that the line will revert to its former management on the termination of the present hostilities.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

No. 8. From Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.  
(Received *August 2.*)

(Telegraphic.)

ST PETERSBURGH, *August 2*, 1900.

Referring to your Lordship's telegram of the 25th July and to my despatch of the 26th July respecting the railway between Tien-tsin and Taku :

I have just received a reply from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He says that Russian Government has no objection on its side to the understanding, but that, on reversion of line, the question of repaying expenditure incurred in repairing and managing must be taken into consideration.

I am sending by post translation of Russian text of note.

Count Lamsdorff said to me yesterday that on the termination of hostilities the line would naturally revert to former management, but that the Company would have to be responsible for the expenditure incurred in repairing the line, which had been almost entirely destroyed.

No. 9. From Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.  
(Received *August 7.*)

ST PETERSBURGH, *August 3, 1900.*

MY LORD,

With reference to my despatch of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy, in translation, of a note which I have received from Count Lamsdorff on the subject of the handing over to the Russian military authorities of the Taku-Tien-tsin railway line.

His Excellency states that the Imperial Government agree that the above line shall revert to its former Administration on the termination of the present disturbances, it being understood that the question of the expenses incurred in the repair and maintenance of the line shall be taken into account in due season.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

Enclosure in No. 9.

From Count Lamsdorff to Sir C. Scott.

(Translation.)

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

1ST DEPARTMENT,

ST PETERSBURGH,

*July 19 (August), 1900.*

M. L'AMBASSADEUR,

In the note of 13th (26th) July, your Excellency stated that the British Government, while offering no objection to the decision arrived at in the Council of the Commanders of the international forces held at Tien-tsin on the 3rd (16th) July as to handing over to the Russian Military authorities the Taku-Tien-tsin railway line, considered it necessary, however, that the above line should, after the termination of the present disturbances, revert to the former Administration with a view to securing the interests of the British holders of the bonds of the railway.

I have the honour to inform you, in reply to the above note, that the Imperial Government does not, on its side, encounter any difficulty in placing the present matter on such a basis, it being understood, however, at the same time that the question of the expenses incurred in repairing and maintaining the Taku-Tien-tsin railway line shall, in due season, be taken into account and subjected to proper consideration.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) COUNT LAMSDORFF.

No. 10. From Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.

(Received *August 16.*)

(Telegraphic.)

SHANGHAE, *August 16, 1900.*

The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation have addressed me on behalf of the bondholders of the Chinese Railway Loan, 1898, on the subject of the present control of the railway by the Russian troops, and they request that, both in their own interest and that of British influence in the north of China, Her Majesty's Government be moved to make such representations as will ensure the rendition of the line immediately on the cessation of hostilities. They call attention to the facts that Russian engineers have shipped railway tools and appliances to Port Arthur, and that the railway offices and archives at Tien-tsin were destroyed by the Russians, which facts they cite in justification of their apprehension that their interests will be gravely prejudiced unless Her Majesty's Government takes action.

No. 11. From Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour to Admiralty.  
(Communicated by Admiralty, *August 19.*)

(Telegraphic.)

SHANGHAE, *August 19, 1900.*

Referring to my telegram of the 17th ultimo, I have information Russians claim right to continue railway

from Tien-tsin on to Peking, stating the whole of line was turned over to them by the Council of Admirals on 16th July. This was not so, but only the Taku-Tien-tsin section, I and American Admiral opposing it.

No. 12. From the Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.  
(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 20, 1900.*

Taku-Tien-tsin Railway.

With reference to your telegram of the 2nd instant, it is stated by representatives of the bondholders that railway tools and appliances have been shipped to Port Arthur by Russian engineers, and that Russian troops destroyed railway offices and archives at Tien-tsin.

No. 13. From the Marquess of Salisbury to Acting  
Consul-General Warren.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 20, 1900.*

Taku-Tien-tsin Railway.

The Russian Government have stated, in reply to representation from Her Majesty's Government of the 25th July, that on cessation of hostilities the Taku-Tien-tsin Railway will naturally revert to former management, but that, as regards the expenditure incurred in repairing the line, the Company will have to be responsible.

No. 14. From Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.  
(Received, via CHEFOO, *August 22.*)

(Telegraphic.)

TIENTSIN, *August 9, 1900.*

Russian engineers are now repairing line north of Tien-tsin. As this portion of line is outside that provided for at Admirals' Conference, General Dorward wrote offering to assist; no definite answer has been returned to his letter.

No. 15. From the Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 23, 1900.*

Peking-Tien-tsin Railway.

With reference to your telegram of the 2nd instant, the Admiral at Shanghai hears that a claim to the right of guarding and managing the whole line from Tien-tsin on to Peking has been put forward by the Russians. They affirm that the Council of Admirals on the 16th July turned over the whole line to them.

Admiral Seymour denies that this was so, and states that it is only of the Taku-Tien-tsin section that it is true.

The Rear-Admiral and the General have been informed by Admiral Seymour that the Russians derive no right to hold the line from any decision of the Council above mentioned.

No. 16. From British and Chinese Corporation to the Marquess of Salisbury.

(Received *September 14.*)

3, LOMBARD STREET, LONDON,

*September 13, 1900.*

MY LORD,

The advices received from Tien-tsin indicate that the Russian occupation of the Northern Railway is progressing rapidly, and in a manner to give rise to the most serious apprehension that there is a design to make the line a Russian possession.

A few days ago we were informed that the sections Taku to Tien-tsin, and Tien-tsin to Yang-tsun were in Russian hands, and now we are told that they have also occupied the Peking terminus.

The section Yang-tsun to Peking is heavily damaged, and will require about six months to repair. Section Tongshan to Shanhaikwan is in good order, in Chinese hands and worked by them.

The repairs to the section so seriously damaged between Yang-tsun and Peking, we consider, should be

made by the Railway Company and not by the Russian Government. Mr Kinder is on the spot and available to expeditiously carry out the work. There are funds belonging to the Railway Company which might be applied to meet the cost if the outlay were sanctioned, and Her Majesty's Government guaranteed the protection of the line, and provided also that Her Majesty's Government undertook to include the expenditure in the general indemnity recoverable from the Chinese Government. Such recovery would be necessary in order to refund the money which is part of the produce of the Railway Loan, and held specifically for construction (not repairs).

The situation created by events is calculated to develop complications unless immediate recognition is given to the ground fact that the line is a security for money raised in England for the express purpose of constructing the railway.

For these reasons we would urge that attention be given at the earliest possible moment to the whole line being brought, if practicable, under the control of the Railway Company, but if for general military purposes the sections from Taku to Tien-tsin and Tien-tsin to Yang-tsun must be administered for a time longer, as at present, then that all the other parts should be treated and protected as we have pointed out.

We have, &c.

(*Per* the British and Chinese Banking  
Corporation, Limited),

(Signed) W. KESWICK, *Chairman*.

No. 17. From Foreign Office to India Office.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 17, 1900.*

SIR,

I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you, to be laid before Lord G. Hamilton, copy of a letter from the British and Chinese Corporation\*, urging the adoption by Her Majesty's Government

\* No. 16.

of certain measures with a view to the protection of British interests in the Imperial Chinese Northern Railway, which they state are prejudicially affected by the occupation of the lines by the Russian military authorities.

Lord Salisbury will be glad if Lord George Hamilton will cause inquiries to be made of the British military authorities in North China as to the extent of the Russian control now exercised over the railways.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 18. From Foreign Office to British and Chinese Corporation.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 17, 1900.*

SIR,

I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, urging the adoption by Her Majesty's Government of certain measures with a view to the protection of British interests in the Imperial Chinese Northern Railways which you state are being prejudicially affected by the Russian occupation of part of the railways.

I am to state in reply that Her Majesty's Government cannot give any undertaking that the expenditure that may be incurred by the Railway Company in carrying out repairs on the line will be included in the indemnity to be demanded from the Chinese Government, but inquiry will be made of the British military authorities as to the extent of Russian control at present prevailing over the line, and an endeavour will be made to come to an arrangement with the Russians—if the facts are as is believed by the Company—to substitute an international for a Russian control during the military operations.

The railway will, in accordance with the general assurances received from the Russian Government revert, after the military operations, to its former legitimate management.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 19. From General Sir A. Gaselee to  
Lord G. Hamilton.

(Communicated by India Office, *September 23.*)

(Telegraphic.)

*September 20, 1900.*

Fêngtai railway junction was occupied by us on the 30th August. Since then, by friendly arrangement with the villagers in the vicinity, we have been successful in collecting railway plant, and have begun laying down rails. A Russian detachment posted itself south of, and close to, Fêngtai two days ago; and Russian General now sends formal protest against our occupation, requesting our withdrawal on the ground that whole line of railway, Tongku-Peking, was handed over to Russians by agreement of the Admirals. I have told him that that agreement applies only to the line up to Nabend; that the question of the future management of the line of railway is one for our respective Governments to settle; but that, in the meantime, I shall continue the reconstruction on which I am engaged unless I get orders to the contrary.

#### IV.

### CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA.

No. 1. From Count Lamsdorff to Russian Chargé  
d'Affaires in London.

(Communicated *July 13, 1900.*)

(Translation.)

On the 11th June our Minister at Tôkiô informed us that the Japanese Government had declared their readiness, in consideration of the perilous situation at Peking, to send their troops to China with a view to saving, conjointly with the other States, the Representatives of the Powers who were besieged in Peking, and to rescuing the



foreigners resident in the Empire, among whom are many Japanese subjects. Any co-operation, anything tending to the attainment of the objects indicated, could only meet with the most sympathetic reception from all the Powers. Moreover, Japan, being able, thanks to geographical conditions, by the dispatch of a considerable contingent, to facilitate essentially the task of the international detachments already at Tien-tsin, we hastened to inform the Cabinet at Tôkiô that we saw no reason to interfere with their liberty of action in this respect, especially as they have expressed their firm resolution of acting in complete harmony with the other Powers. The decision taken by the Japanese Government, under the above-mentioned conditions, was a very natural one, in consideration of the danger which menaced their Representatives at Peking, as well as their numerous subjects resident in China ; but, from our point of view, the accomplishment of this task could not confer the right to an independent solution of matters at Peking, or other privileges, with the exception, perhaps, of a larger pecuniary indemnity, should the Powers consider it necessary, later on, to demand one.

We received almost simultaneously a communication on this subject from the Cabinet of London, which had reference, not to a spontaneous decision on the part of the Cabinet at Tôkiô to participate in the collective action of the Powers, but to a mission given by Europe to Japan, to send considerable forces to China, not only to save the Legations and the foreign subjects, but with a view to the suppression of the insurrectionary movement provoked by the Boxers and the re-establishment of order at Peking and Tien-tsin.

This way of putting the question might, in our opinion, to a certain extent encroach on the fundamental principles which had already been accepted by the majority of the Powers as the bases of their policy relative to events in China, that is to say, the maintenance of the union between the Powers ; the maintenance of the existing system of government in China ; the exclusion of anything which might lead to the partition of the Empire ; finally, the re-establishment by common effort of a legitimate central Power, itself capable of assuring order and

security to the country. The firm establishment and strict observance of these fundamental principles are, in our opinion, absolutely indispensable to the attainment of the chief object: the maintenance of a lasting peace in the Far East.

The Imperial Government considers that, in view of the threatening events in China, which concern the vital interests of the Powers, it is urgently necessary to avoid any misunderstanding or omission which might have still more dangerous consequences.

No. 2. From the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott\*.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 3, 1901.*

Report what you can ascertain in regard to an alleged Agreement between Russia and China dealing with Southern Manchuria, the substance of which was given by the Peking correspondent of the "Times" in a telegram dated the 31st December, which appeared in its issue of the 3rd January. It involves the resumption of civil government by the Chinese under what is virtually a Russian Protectorate.

No. 3. From the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 3, 1901.*

SIR,

I telegraphed to you to-day with regard to a statement in the "Times" as to an alleged Agreement between Russia and China dealing with Southern Manchuria.

I enclose the extract from the "Times" for convenience of reference.

I am, &c.

(Signed)      LANSDOWNE.

\* Also to Sir E. Satow.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Extract from the "Times" *January 3, 1901.*

PEKING, *December 31, 1900.*

An Agreement has been concluded between Russia and China regarding the Russian military occupation of Feng-tien, the southern and most important province of Manchuria, and the resumption of Chinese civil administration under Russian protection. The Agreement was signed by a representative of Tseng, the Tartar General at Mukden, and General Korostovitch, representing Admiral Alexeieff, the Russian Commander-in-chief. Russia consents to allow the Tartar General and the Chinese officials to resume the civil government of Mukden and Feng-tien province, on the following conditions :

1. The Tartar General Tseng undertakes to protect the province and pacify it, and to assist in the construction of the railroad.

2. He must treat kindly the Russians in military occupation, protecting the railway and pacifying the province, and provide them with lodging and provisions.

3. He must disarm and disband the Chinese soldiery, delivering in their entirety to the Russian military officials all munitions of war in the arsenals not already occupied by the Russians.

4. All forts and defences in Feng-tien not occupied by the Russians, and all powder magazines not required by the Russians, must be dismantled in the presence of Russian officials.

5. Newchwang and other places now occupied by the Russians shall be restored to the Chinese civil administration when the Russian Government is satisfied that the pacification of the province is complete.

6. The Chinese shall maintain law and order by local police under the Tartar General.

7. A Russian Political Resident, with general powers of control, shall be stationed at Mukden, to whom the Tartar General must give all information respecting any important measure.

8. Should the local police be insufficient in any emergency, the Tartar General will communicate with the Russian Resident at Mukden and invite Russia to dispatch reinforcements.

9. The Russian text shall be the standard.

The functions given to the Russian Resident are similar to those of the Russian Resident at Bokhara, or of the British Residents in the native States in India.

The Agreement will necessarily be followed by similar Agreements with reference to the other two provinces, and then Manchuria will be a *de facto* Russian Protectorate, Russia by a pre-existing Agreement having already the right to maintain all necessary troops for the protection of the railway.

No. 4. From Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne.  
(Received *January 5.*)

(Telegraphic.)

ST PETERSBURGH, *January 5, 1901.*

With reference to your telegram of the 3rd instant, it is impossible to ascertain facts with accuracy as yet, but it seems to be generally believed here that some provisional Agreement, such as that indicated, has been concluded by Russia with the local authorities in Manchuria, and that she may eventually acquire by Treaty the right to finish building the railway line through Manchuria to Port Arthur, and to protect it herself, the rights of the Russo-Chinese Company being transferred to the Russian Government.

No. 5. From Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.  
(Received *January 5.*)

(Telegraphic.)

PEKING, *January 4, 1901.*

Your Lordship's telegram of yesterday.

It is believed that the report as telegraphed to the "Times" is authentic. Delegates of Tsêng Ch'i, the Tartar General, and of Admiral Alexeieff, the Russian Commander-in-chief, appear to have signed it on the 22nd November.

The Convention is said to be now in Peking awaiting confirmation. This confirmation is not likely to take place, I learn from Chinese sources, because the Chinese Delegate who signed at Port Arthur did so without being duly authorized. Any information obtainable will be telegraphed to your Lordship.

No. 6. From the Marquess of Lansdowne to  
Sir C. MacDonald.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 12, 1901.*

SIR,

The Japanese Minister called here to-day and informed Mr Bertie that his Government had inquired of the Russian Government whether it was true, as reported, that arrangements had been made between the Russian Government and the Chinese authorities for negotiations with the Chinese Minister at St Petersburg in regard to a settlement of affairs in Manchuria, and, if so, what was the nature of the proposed arrangements for making this communication. Baron Hayashi stated that it would be for the interests of both Great Britain and Japan to obtain all the information possible on the subject, and that he was instructed to suggest that the action taken by the Japanese Government in the matter would probably be attended with a more satisfactory result if similar inquiries were also made by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 7. From the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 15, 1901.*

SIR,

The Chinese Minister told me to-day that it was not the case that an agreement, as stated in the newspapers, had been arrived at between the Chinese and Russian Governments for the occupation of the Province of Manchuria by the latter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 8. From the Marquess of Lansdowne to  
Sir C. MacDonald.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 5, 1901.*

SIR,

The Japanese Minister informed me this afternoon that his Government had learnt from a reliable source that the Russian Government was pressing the Chinese Government to ratify the Agreement which had been concluded between Admiral Alexeieff and the Chinese General Commanding in Manchuria in regard to that province.

The Japanese Government had authorized him to say that they proposed to inform the Chinese Minister at Tôkiô that in the opinion of the Japanese Government the conclusion of any such Agreement would be "a source of danger" to the Chinese Government, and that no arrangement affecting territorial rights in the Chinese Empire ought to be concluded between the Chinese Government and any one of the Powers.

Baron Hayashi suggested to me that a similar intimation should be made by His Majesty's Government to the Chinese Minister in London.

He said that, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, the only safety for China lay in coming to terms with the whole of the Powers.

Baron Hayashi also informed me that the Chinese Government, if left to itself, would like to repudiate the Manchurian Agreement, and punish the Tartar General who had concluded it. But he doubted their having sufficient strength of mind to act in this manner, unless they received moral support from some of the Powers.

I promised to consider Baron Hayashi's suggestion.

I am, &c.

(Signed)      LANSDOWNE.

No. 9. Memorandum given to Baron Eckardstein by the Marquess of Lansdowne, *February 7, 1901.*

His Majesty's Government understand that the Russian Government are pressing the Chinese Government to ratify the Agreement concluded between Admiral Alexeieff and the Chinese General Commanding in Manchuria in regard to that province.

They also understand that the Chinese Government would like, if encouraged by foreign Powers, to repudiate the Agreement, and punish the Tartar General who concluded it.

In these circumstances, the Japanese Government propose to inform the Chinese Minister at Tôkiô that the conclusion of any such Agreement would be a source of danger to the Chinese Government, and that no arrangement affecting territorial rights in the Chinese Empire ought to be concluded between the Chinese Government and any one of the Powers.

His Majesty's Government are disposed to make a similar communication to the Chinese Minister in London.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 7, 1901.*

No. 10. From the Marquess of Lansdowne to Viscount Gough.

(Extract)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 7, 1901.*

I repeated to Baron Eckardstein to-day the substance of my conversation with Baron Hayashi in regard to the alleged agreement between Russia and China as to Manchuria. (See my despatch to Sir C. MacDonald of the 5th February.)

I told Baron Eckardstein that it seemed to me advisable to give to the Chinese Government some indication of our views as that suggested by Baron Hayashi.

I handed to Baron Eckardstein a Memorandum, of which a copy is attached to this despatch\*, and he promised that he would let me know as soon as possible the decision of his Government.

\* No. 9.

No. 11. From Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne.  
(Received *February* 11.)

ST PETERSBURGH, *February* 6, 1901.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report that I found an opportunity to-day, whilst avoiding any appearance of asking explanations of Russia's proceedings in Manchuria, to ascertain from Count Lamsdorff what might be stated as the actual facts with regard to the alleged agreement between Russia and China as to Southern Manchuria in case interpellations were addressed to His Majesty's Government in Parliament on this subject.

Count Lamsdorff gave me the true version of what had taken place very readily.

He said that as far as he had read the allegations in the press which would probably give rise to questions in Parliament, they had asserted that Russia had concluded, or was engaged in concluding with China, a Convention or permanent arrangement which would give Russia new rights and a virtual Protectorate in Southern Manchuria.

This was quite untrue, and the only ground for the rumour must have been the fact that the Russian military authorities who had been engaged in the temporary occupation and pacification of that province had been directed, when reinstating the Chinese authorities in their former posts, to arrange with the local civil authorities the terms of a *modus vivendi* between them for the duration of the simultaneous presence of Russian and Chinese authorities in Southern Manchuria, the object being to prevent the recurrence of disturbances in the vicinity of the Russian frontier, and to protect the railway from the Russian frontier to Port Arthur.

Some of the details of the proposed *modus vivendi* had been sent for consideration to St Petersburg, but no Convention or arrangement with the Central Government of China of a permanent character had been concluded with regard to Manchuria, nor had the Emperor any intention of departing in any way from the assurances which he



had publicly given that Manchuria would be entirely restored to its former condition in the Chinese Empire as soon as circumstances admitted of it.

Russia was in the same position with regard to fixing a final date for evacuating Manchuria as the allies found themselves in with regard to the evacuation of Peking and the Province of Pechili.

When it came to the final and complete evacuation of Manchuria the Russian Government would be obliged to obtain from the Central Government of China an effective guarantee against the recurrence of the recent attack on her frontier and the destruction of her railway, but had no intention of seeking this guarantee in any acquisition of territory or of an actual or virtual Protectorate over Manchuria, the object being to simply guarantee the faithful observance in the future by China of the terms of the Agreement, which she had been unable to fulfil during the disturbances.

The terms of this guarantee might possibly form the subject of conversation here between Count Lamsdorff and the Chinese Minister or be left for discussion at Peking.

Meanwhile, it might be confidently stated that any arrangements which may have given rise to the allegations in the press were purely of the temporary character of a *modus vivendi* between the Russian military authorities and the local civil authorities in Southern Manchuria, that no Convention or arrangement had been concluded with the Central Government of China, in contemplation of any alteration of the former international status of that province, which would be restored to China when all the temporary measures taken by the Russian military authorities would cease, and everything at Newchwang and elsewhere be replaced in its former position.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

V.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE REMOVAL OF CERTAIN NATIVE PRISONERS FROM NATAL.

No. 1. From the Governor of St Helena to the Secretary of State.

(Received 12.19 p.m., *March* 19, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

[*See No. 6.*]

I have this day telegraphed to Governor, Natal, to the following effect :

St Helena willing to receive Zulu prisoners provided that War Office will permit use of part of barracks as prison. Cost will not exceed £20 per man per annum.

Please ascertain whether War Office consents.—GALLWEY.

No. 2. From the Governor to the Secretary of State.  
(Received 4.45 p.m., *March* 19, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

March 19. No. 1. Referring to telegram\* from Governor, St Helena, of this date which has been repeated to you, Ministers are quite satisfied, and would ask you to fix up with War Office and also to issue orders with as little delay as possible. Until the eve of embarkation action will be kept secret.—McCALLUM.

No. 3. From the Governor to the Secretary of State.  
(Received 1.20 p.m., *April* 3, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

[*See No. 6.*]

(Extract)

April 3. The situation is improving. The atmosphere will be much cleared by transportation of ring-leaders. Ministers inquire when they may expect your authority for their removal.—McCALLUM.

No. 4. From the Governor to the Secretary of State.  
(Received 4.15 p.m., *April* 16, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

[*See No. 5.*]

April 16. Referring to my telegram of 3rd April\*  
I have received following Minute from Ministers :

Ministers would respectfully urge upon the Secretary of State necessity for giving immediate authority for the removal to Saint Helena of the native ringleaders concerned in recent rebellion. It is now over three months since the proposal for the deportation of these natives from the Colony was originally made, and the great delay which has taken place through unforeseen circumstances has been unfortunate and embarrassing. Ministers deprecate any further delay, and will be obliged if your Excellency will at once cable to the Secretary of State urging him to accelerate settlement.

-McCALLUM.

No. 5. From the Governor of St Helena to the  
Secretary of State.  
(Received *April* 18, 1907.)

THE CASTLE, ST HELENA,  
*March* 21, 1907.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I received a telegraphic despatch from the Governor of Natal on the 16th instant asking me whether St Helena would receive twenty-five rebel ringleaders sentenced to various terms of penal servitude, using a portion of empty barracks as a prison ; and, if so, on what terms. Sir Henry McCallum informed me that owing to an outbreak of beri-beri in the Mauritius prisons the arrangement made to send the prisoners to that Colony had fallen through. He further informed me that the Mauritius Government had agreed to take the twenty-five prisoners at a cost of

£20 per man per annum, provided the Natal Government sent two European warders with the men.

2. I discussed the matter in Council on the 18th instant, when it was unanimously decided to receive the prisoners provided the War Office consented to the use of Ladder Hill Barracks as a prison. I accordingly telegraphed to this effect to the Governor of Natal, adding that the cost per man would not exceed £20 a year, but that the Natal Government must pay actual cost. I made this latter stipulation as this Government has no wish to make money out of the Natal Government whilst being unable to risk the smallest loss under the transaction. I am writing to Sir Henry McCallum fully explaining matters. My despatch should reach Pietermaritzburg about the 4th proximo, and so allow the prisoners to be sent here by the steamer due to leave Cape Town on or about the 29th proximo.

3. On the 19th instant I telegraphed to Your Lordship\* giving you the drift of my reply to the Governor of Natal and requesting Your Lordship would ascertain whether the War Office would allow the use of part of the barracks as a prison. My object in not repeating to Your Lordship my telegram to Natal verbatim was to save unnecessary expense, the telegram being a long one.

4. The actual feeding of the prisoners, including fuel, will not exceed £10 a year per man—consequently the traders and farmers will benefit only to a very small extent. Every little helps, however, in these hard times.

I have, &c.,

H. L. GALLWEY,  
*Governor and Commander-in-Chief.*

No. 6. From the Secretary of State to the Governor.

(Sent 5.30 p.m., April 20, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 8.*]

April 20. No. 1. Referring to your telegram 9th March, warrants required under the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act, Section 6, must be signed by

\* No. 1.

Secretary of State for the Colonies and by Governor of St Helena as well as by Governor of Natal before prisoners can leave Natal. Warrants will be forwarded to Governor of St Helena duly signed by me by the next mail, which leaves on 3rd May, and he has been instructed by telegraph to sign them and forward to you by the same steamer. I have informed your Prime Minister accordingly. We regret the delay but it is inevitable.

The War Office require that any necessary repairs to the barracks and other expenditure shall be met by the Colony. I presume that your Ministers agree to paying. The amount will probably be small. The correspondence will be sent by next mail.—ELGIN.

No. 7. From the Secretary of State to the Governor of St Helena.

(Sent 5.45 p.m., *April* 20, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

Referring to your telegram of 8th April\*, War Office agree to use of barracks on conditions which I have accepted.

Warrant required by Section 6 of the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act must be signed by Secretary of State for the Colonies and Governor, St Helena, as well as Governor, Natal, before prisoners can be removed from Natal. I am therefore sending out to you by mail steamer sailing on 3rd May twenty-five warrants signed by me. You should make arrangements to sign warrants and forward them to Governor, Natal, by the same steamer. Your signature is sufficient without seal or witness. I am informing Governor, Natal, by telegraph.—ELGIN.

No. 8. From the Governor to the Secretary of State.  
(Received 12.42 p.m., *April* 23, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

(Extract)

April 23. Your telegram of 20th April, No. 1†. Ministers now understand cause of delay. They are prepared to pay for repairs to barracks and other incidental expenses.—McCALLUM.

\* Not printed ; see No. 5.

† No. 6.

No. 9. From the Secretary of State to the Governor.

(Sent 4.20 p.m., *April* 26, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 10.*]

April 26. No. 1. Your telegram of 23rd April\*. I assume that your Ministers will ascertain from Governor, St Helena, what guards will be required for prisoners, and make due provision accordingly.—ELGIN.

No. 10. From the Governor to the Secretary of State.

(Received 12.13 p.m., *April* 27, 1907.)

TELEGRAM.

April 27. No. 1. Referring to your telegram of 26th April, No. 1†, arrangements with respect to guards already made. Despatch follows by mail to-day.—McCALLUM.

No. 11. From the Governor to the Secretary of State.

(Received *May* 18, 1907.)

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,

PIETERMARITZBURG, NATAL,

*April* 25, 1907.

MY LORD,

With reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the deportation from this Colony of native rebel ringleaders, I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a despatch which I have received from the Governor of St Helena, together with a copy of the reply which I have sent thereto.

2. Ministers desire me to thank your Lordship for the support you have given them in this important matter.

I have, &c.,

HENRY McCALLUM.

\* No. 8.

† No. 9.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

From Governor, St Helena, to Governor, Natal.

THE CASTLE, ST HELENA,

*March 22, 1907.*

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that on the 14th instant I received a telegram from Your Excellency which I was unable to decipher.

2. On the 16th March Your Excellency repeated your telegram of the 14th instant, which was to the effect that as an outbreak of beri-beri had occurred in the Mauritius prisons, an arrangement to send twenty-five rebel ringleaders, sentenced to various terms of penal servitude, to that Colony had fallen through. Your Excellency wished to know whether this Government would receive the prisoners, and, if so, on what terms—suggesting that part of the empty barracks might be used as a prison. Your Excellency further informed me that the terms under which the Mauritius Government had agreed to take the prisoners was at the rate of £20 per man per annum, provided your Government sent two European warders with the men. You also stated that the prisoners were a docile lot.

3. On the 17th instant, in reply to a telegram I dispatched to Your Excellency the previous day, you informed me that the following was the prisoners' diet :

Breakfast.—12 ounces mealie meal.

Supper.—12 ounces mealie meal.

Dinner.—16 ounces mealie meal, or 2 lbs. potatoes. Eight ounces fresh meat and four ounces fresh vegetables twice a week. One ounce of salt daily. Your Excellency further stated that if mealies were not obtainable in this Colony that you would send supplies thereof periodically. I may say at once that mealies are obtainable here. I take it that the prisoners themselves make the meal.

4. On the 19th instant I sent you a telegram to the effect that St Helena was willing to receive the prisoners provided the War Office consented to a portion of the empty barracks being used as a prison. That the cost per head would not exceed £20 per annum, but that

Your Excellency's Government should pay actual cost. I made this stipulation as this Colony has no wish to make money out of the Natal Government whilst, owing to its slender finances, it cannot take any risk of loss. I further informed your Excellency that a despatch explaining matters would reach you about the 4th proximo, and so allow the prisoners being sent here by the steamer due to leave Cape Town about the 29th proximo. I ended my telegram by stating that I was repeating it to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

5. On the same date I telegraphed the drift of my reply to you to Lord Elgin, and requested His Lordship to ascertain whether the War Office would consent to the barracks being used as a prison.

6. As regards the cost of feeding the prisoners, I calculate that according to the diet laid down by Your Excellency this will not exceed £10 per man per annum, including fuel. The cost of feeding a prisoner in the gaol here is roughly, including fuel, 1s. a day. The diet allowed, however, is quite different to the scale laid down for your prisoners. I take it that the two European warders will find themselves in everything but quarters, and the usual barrack furniture.

7. I am not aware as to what furniture, if any, is required for the prisoners. There is a large swimming bath close by to where they will be confined with a continual flow of water passing through. I presume the prisoners do their own cooking. Should cooking and eating utensils and bedding be purchased? I must apologise for troubling Your Excellency with questions of these minor details, but I had no knowledge of the Zulu nor the way he is treated when a prisoner.

8. There will be certain small preliminary expenses to be met by your Government, such as cost of landing the prisoners, purchase of washing tubs, weighing machine, buckets, lamps, &c. The chief recurrent expenditure as apart from the cost of provisions and fuel would be :

(a) Medical attendance and cost of drugs. There is only one doctor in the Colony (the Colonial Surgeon), who is already fully occupied in tending to the wants of the entire population of the Island. It is only reasonable to expect that he should receive some remuneration for his



attendance on the prisoners and warders. It is taken for granted that the warders will either not bring their families with them or are unmarried. I would suggest, for Your Excellency's consideration, that £50 a year would be a reasonable allowance to the Colonial Surgeon. Drugs would be paid for as used, and would probably cost very little during the year. If a prisoner was admitted to hospital, the usual charge of 1s. a day would be made. This would, however, be only resorted to in a case of very serious illness, as there is plenty of room in the barracks to provide for a sick ward. I would add that the barracks it is proposed to use stand clear of Jamestown at a height of 600 feet above the sea. They are consequently some distance from the scene of the Colonial Surgeon's official duties. This official, too, would have to give careful attention to the sanitary state of the prisoners' quarters.

(b) I do not know how many warders will be required in addition to the two sent by you. I can engage suitable men for this work at 3s. each a day to cover everything.

(c) Water rate. The water supply at Ladder Hill Barracks is a very good one, and extends to the closet system. Careful supervision is necessary to maintain the supply in a satisfactory state, and I propose calculating the water rate at roughly 3s. per man per annum for 27 men.

9. Your Excellency will see that £20 per man a year should more than cover the recurrent expenditure necessary to keep the prisoners. We have the following items with their approximate cost per annum :

Food and fuel	..	..	..	£250
Medical attendance	..	..	..	50
Medicines	..	..	..	6
Three warders at £55	..	..	..	165
Oil, wick, and matches	..	..	..	5
Soap and cleaning materials	..	..	..	5
Water rate	..	..	..	4
Contingencies	..	..	..	5
Total				£490

I have allowed for three extra warders as there will have to be a man continually on duty day and night, owing to the nature of the buildings in which the prisoners will be confined. This Government can lend rifles for the warders' use if necessary. I take it that the prisoners do not receive anything in the way of tea, coffee, or other groceries with the exception of salt? I ask this question as the Zulus who were interned in this Colony ten years ago received coffee, sugar, and other groceries. In fact, they appear to have been given anything they asked for.

10. I would be much obliged if Your Excellency would inform me when I may expect the prisoners and enlighten me as to the several points raised above. I would mention that there are no iron bars to the windows where the prisoners will be confined. These, however, could be furnished and fixed locally if necessary, the cost being defrayed by your Government. There will be no objection, I suppose, to placing three or four men in one room? I would add that there is plenty of room for the prisoners to take exercise. I should like to be informed what work the prisoners should do. Can they be used on the roads, or should they not leave the confines of the prison yard?

11. In conclusion I would state that any monies expended on the maintenance of the prisoners will be treated as an advance to Your Excellency's Government, and be adjusted in the usual manner through the Crown Agents for the Colonies.

I have, &c.,

H. L. GALLWEY,  
*Governor and Commander-in-Chief.*

His Excellency

Sir Henry E. McCallum, R.E., G.C.M.G., A.D.C.  
*Governor of Natal,*  
Pietermaritzburg.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

From Governor, Natal, to Governor, St Helena.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NATAL,

*April 21, 1907.*

SIR,

With reference to your despatch of the 22nd ultimo I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a minute which I have received from the Acting Prime Minister dealing with the points raised by you.

I would further confirm my telegram to you, No. 1, of to-day's date, wherein I state that I have been informed by the Secretary of State that it will not be possible to move the prisoners from Natal until about the end of May. Lord Elgin informs me that he has sent you for signature the warrants required under Section 6 of the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act, with a request that you will sign and forward them to me by the same steamer. In this connection I should feel obliged if, when dispatching the warrants, you will give directions that they be forwarded from Cape Town overland, as this will avoid a delay of three or four days.

Ministers propose to send the prisoners under special arrangement by direct steamer from Durban, and as soon as the details are settled I will apprise you by telegram of the date of their departure, and the probable date of their arrival at St Helena.

In conclusion, I would express to you the warm thanks of my Ministers and myself for the assistance you have afforded us in this matter.

I have, &c.,

HENRY MCCALLUM.

His Excellency

*The Governor, &c., &c., &c.,*

St Helena.

From Acting Prime Minister to Governor.

Minute.

HIS EXCELLENCY,

In reply to the points raised in His Excellency the Governor of St Helena's despatch, dated the

22nd ultimo, Ministers will be obliged if Your Excellency will inform Lieutenant-Colonel Gallwey as follows :—The queries in the despatch are dealt with seriatim :

Paragraph 6.—The two European warders will either find themselves in all necessaries after arrival (except quarters and the usual barrack furniture, which will be provided) or arrangements in regard thereto will be made later on with the Government of St Helena.

Paragraph 7.—As the natives sleep on the ground, no furniture will be required.

They will do their own cooking.

Cooking and eating utensils the prisoners will take with them ; also blankets, which form the only bedding required.

Paragraph 8.—Government is prepared to meet the small preliminary expenses referred to, and

- (a) In regard to medical attendance and cost of drugs, the remuneration to the doctor suggested, viz. £50, is agreed to ; drugs will also be paid for as used.

The proposed hospital charge of 1s. per day is accepted.

The warders will not be accompanied by families.

- (b) Ministers are of opinion that extra warders beyond those provided for in paragraph 9 will not be required, but liberty is left to the Governor of St Helena to provide additional warders on such special occasions as it may appear to His Excellency to be desirable to do so.

- (c) The water rate of 3s. per man per annum is agreed to.

Paragraph 9.—Ministers consider the estimated cost of £490 per annum is reasonable, and if three extra warders are necessary for day and night duty at the prison buildings, Government agrees to their employment at the rate of £55 each per annum, as provided for in the £490 before mentioned.

Ministers are obliged for the information that rifles will be lent to the warders if found to be necessary.

No other groceries except salt are received by the prisoners.

Paragraph 10.—Ministers note from the subsequent despatch from the Governor of St Helena, dated 25th March, that it will not be necessary to incur any expenditure in regard to fixing iron bars to the windows of the buildings where the prisoners will be confined, as rooms with windows already so fitted are available if required.

There will be no objection to placing three or four men in one room.

In the matter of work the prisoners may be employed on sweeping, scrubbing, cooking, weeding, road maintenance, and other forms of light labour.

Paragraph 11.—Ministers concur in any moneys expended in the maintenance of the prisoners being treated as an advance to this Government, and the amount being adjusted in the usual manner, through the Crown Agents for the Colonies.

C. O'GRADY GUBBINS,  
*Acting Prime Minister.*

*April 8, 1907.*

No. 12. From the Governor to the Secretary  
of State.

(Received 7 p.m., *June 1, 1907.*)

TELEGRAM.

June 1. No. 1. Rebel ringleaders left Natal to-day by steamship "Inyati," which proceeds direct to St Helena.

I have requested Ministers consider in a month's time desirability of releasing on ticket-of-leave rank and file ordinary rebels in such batches at one time as can be dealt with by Administration. Any move in that direction before then would be attributed by natives to Dinizulu's visit to Pietermaritzburg, which is undesirable.

I hold meeting Monday of important native Chiefs who have come to take leave of me, including Manzolwandhle, Umciteki, who is Regent of Amandhlakazi tribe in Usibepu's place, and Khambi, who is Dinizulu's cousin.

I believe that recommendations of the Native Affairs Commission with respect to removal of *bonâ fide* grievances will be adopted and that I am leaving Colony with native matters fairly flattened out.—McCALLUM.

## VI.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE  
AFFAIRS OF PERSIA.

No. 1. From Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *January 2.*)

(Telegraphic.)

TEHRAN, *January 2, 1907.*

Yesterday the Grand Vizier handed to the Assembly the Constitution, ratified by both the Shah and the Valiahd\*. It provides that control of the finances, including loans, should be in the hands of the Assembly.

No. 2. From Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *January 9.*)

(Telegraphic.)

TEHRAN, *January 8, 1907.*

The Shah died to-night between 10 and 11.

No. 3. From Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *January 12.*)

(Telegraphic.)

ST PETERSBURGH, *January 12, 1907.*

I have received an *aide-mémoire* respecting the Persian succession from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he states that the Russian Minister at Tehran has been instructed to announce, in concert with Sir C. Spring-Rice, that the two Governments recognize as Heir Apparent the second son of the Shah.

\* *i.e.* Heir Apparent.

Would you wish me to inform M. Isvolsky of your concurrence, whilst thanking him for his communication?

He adds that the Agreement between the two Powers in regard to Persia, of which the bases are now being so happily established, will, he does not doubt, be further strengthened by this common action.

No. 4. From Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.  
(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 14, 1907.*

Your telegram of the 12th instant: recognition of Shah's second son as Valiahd.

We concur in the course proposed by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has been instructed accordingly.

You may inform his Excellency, and thank him for his communication.

No. 5. From Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *January 21.*)

TEHRAN, *January 3, 1907.*

SIR,

I have the honour to state that His Imperial Majesty the Valiahd arrived in Tehran on the 16th ultimo. For some time intrigues had been carried on in the Palace, to prevent his departure from Tabreez. The intriguers had not, however, money enough to pay the troops, and were unable, owing to the resistance of the Sadr-i-Azam\*, to obtain possession of the proposed advance promised by England and Russia, and moreover the unpopularity of the intriguers eclipsed even that of the Valiahd, who on his part did not fail to send conciliatory messages to the popular leaders. It was also known that the English and Russian Legations would refuse their support to any reactionary movement, and had already acknowledged the Valiahd as the legitimate successor of the Shah.

As a consequence, when the Shah's illness took a more serious turn, and the hopes which the arrival of the German doctor had given rise to gave place to the conviction that His Majesty's days were numbered, the

\* *i.e.* Treasurer.

intriguers' party collapsed, and the Shah was induced to order the Valiahd to proceed to Tehran.

As soon as possible after receiving the Shah's orders the Valiahd started for Tehran, leaving Tabreez on the 4th December. He took with him all the armed horse-men he could collect, 400 in number, and most of his Persian suite. Of the foreign members of it, only M. Cavré, the French veterinary surgeon, accompanied the Prince.

The Russian Minister applied for an audience on the Valiahd's arrival, and His Imperial Highness instructed the Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform the heads of Missions that he would receive them separately with their staffs according to their diplomatic precedence.

The Valiahd's language to myself and to the members of His Majesty's Legation was most friendly. I studiously avoided politics, but his Imperial Highness of his own accord made two very friendly allusions to the new Assembly and the Parliamentary régime which his father had sanctioned.

With regard to the Valiahd's attitude towards the constitutional movement, he has been careful to express his sympathy in the most open and formal manner, and although it is generally believed he is opposed in heart to popular liberties, he has certainly done all in his power to counteract this impression by accepting the Constitution without demur. I am informed that he is convinced that, for the present at any rate, a good understanding with his people is the only alternative, and I am inclined to believe that the wise and temperate advice of the Russian Minister has also contributed to the peaceful solution of what at one time threatened to be a dangerous conflict.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

No. 6. From Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *January 21.*)

TEHRAN, *January 3, 1907.*

SIR,

The Persian National Assembly is not fully constituted, as only a few of the provincial Members have



arrived. There is a good deal of opposition among the local Governors, and, in some cases, reluctance on the part of the electors or the Delegates.

Up till now there have been no regular rules or orders of the day. The Members sit on the floor in a circle, the President at the end of the room before a low desk ; the great Mujteheds\*, who are always present and take an active part, though not Members, sitting opposite. Any Member may speak on any subject, and a conclusion is rarely arrived at. The public are admitted into the room where the debates are held, and are allowed to interrupt and even to speak. This inconvenience, however, is being gradually diminished. On the whole, order is well maintained, and the proceedings are quiet and dignified.

The chief subjects of discussion have been the Bank Charter and the Constitution. As the first action taken by the Assembly was to prohibit the foreign loan, it became its duty to provide funds for the Government. This it was proposed to arrange for by the establishment of a national bank, for which popular subscriptions were invited. The subscriptions which are promised cannot be converted into cash without some definite security, which it is hoped to provide by means of a Charter. On this subject discussions with the Government are still proceeding. Owing to the Concession for the issue of bank-notes possessed by the Imperial Bank of Persia, this resource is not available, and in its place it is proposed that the bank should have the right to collect and receive the interior revenues, or " maliat." The Government is still negotiating with the principal merchants, and the question is still unsettled.

A more important question was that of the Constitution. Until the Constitution was formally accepted by the Government nothing definite could be done, and there was a constant fear of disorder. It was rumoured that the Valiahd was hostile, and it was certain that the Court party would do all in its power to prevent the Shah from giving his signature. It was consequently a great relief when one of the principal Mujteheds read a letter from His Imperial Highness denying in the most formal manner the sinister intentions attributed to him. On his arrival

\* *i.e.* Ecclesiastical dignitaries.

at Tehran a deputation of the Members waited on him and reported that his language was most conciliatory. He was now Regent, and appointed a Committee to represent the Government and discuss with a Committee nominated by the Assembly the whole question of the Constitution. An agreement was arrived at and made known to the Assembly. When, however, it appeared that there was to be a second House, of which the Government had the power to nominate the majority, there was a great outcry, in which the Saad-ed-Dowleh took a leading part. The President was insulted and hardly accorded a hearing, and, with some of his friends, retired from the Assembly, and expressed his intention of resigning.

It was believed, and I think with some reason, that certain persons who were interested in the break-up of the Assembly had freely expended money to insure that result, and their tactics were for some time successful. But an appeal was made with success to the patriotism of the Members, and the President was induced to withdraw his resignation. A compromise was at last arrived at, and on the 1st January the Sadr-i-Azam appeared in the Assembly with the Constitution in his hands, signed by the Shah, the Valiahd, and himself, which, amid a scene of great enthusiasm, was solemnly read to the Assembly and the public.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

No. 7. From Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Telegraphic.)

TEHRAN, *February 6, 1907.*

Although a revolutionary movement no doubt exists here, and although there is, I think, a strong movement against the Government, against the Belgian Customs Administration, against foreign loans and Concessions, and against foreign political influence in general, so far there does not appear to be any general anti-Christian and anti-foreign movement likely to endanger person or property. But though not dangerous at present, the anti-foreign movement may become so if foreign Governments take an active part in internal politics.

My advice would be that such interference should be avoided by His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government as long as possible (though Russia's position, owing to the Caucasus, differs from ours), but that both Powers should have plans ready on paper for financial or military measures in case the defence of European lives and property should render such measures absolutely necessary.

No. 8. From Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 10, 1907.*

Sir C. Spring-Rice's telegram of the 6th instant.

We entirely concur with Sir C. Spring-Rice in deprecating intervention in the internal affairs of Persia, and you may so inform the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The view held by His Majesty's Government is that any proposals for measures of a military nature would be opposed to the principle of non-intervention.

No. 9. From Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received *January 12.*)

(Telegraphic.)

ST PETERSBURGH, *February 12, 1907.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the following is the policy of the Russian Government. Abstention from all interference in the internal affairs of Persia; not to have recourse to military measures unless they are rendered absolutely necessary, and to keep them within the narrowest possible limits should such a contingency become unavoidable; to act generally in close harmony with His Majesty's Government, and to do nothing without previous consultation with them. He expressed a hope that His Majesty's Government would reciprocally observe such an attitude, and I gave him assurances that he need entertain no doubts that that would be our line of conduct.

No. 10. From Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.  
(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 13, 1907.*

Express to M. Isvolsky our satisfaction at the statement of Russian policy contained in your telegram of yesterday, which meets with the entire concurrence of His Majesty's Government, and will be faithfully observed by them.

No. 11. From Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *February 14.*)  
(Telegraphic.)

TEHRAN, *February 14, 1907.*

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, and explained to him that there would be no interference on the part of either Power unless their nationals were attacked. I begged that he would inform the leaders of the Popular party of this, and make it clear to them. Both the Russian Minister and I have constantly expressed ourselves in this sense, and I think the leaders understand it.

No. 12. From Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *February 18.*)

TEHRAN, *January 27, 1907.*

SIR,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the Persian Constitution which has been prepared by Mr Churchill.

It provides for a National Assembly, composed of from 160 to 200 Members, chosen by popular election, and of a Senate of sixty Members, half of whom are elected and half nominated by the Government.

The Assembly is elected for two years, and the Shah, by a separate Rescript, has promised not to dissolve it before the expiration of its first term. After the first term it can be dissolved on a motion passed by two-thirds of the Senate and approved by the Shah.

The Members take oath, "so long as the rights of the

Assembly are respected, to be loyal to the Sovereign and the rights of the nation."

The Ministers, who are appointed by the Sovereign, can be summoned before the Assembly to give explanations as to their conduct of affairs, and are made responsible to the Assembly for any derogation of the powers or infraction of the laws. They can address the Assembly on the invitation of the President, and have the right of proposing bills in person.

The Assembly must give its consent before any concession is granted, or loan foreign or internal is concluded, and must be consulted as to any Treaty with a foreign Power, except such arrangements as, in the opinion of the Government, should be kept secret in the public interest. It has control of all financial matters, and must give its consent before the Budget is passed or any new tax is instituted. The Senate has concurrent legislative power, except in financial matters, on which, however, it appears to have the right of veto.

In case of disagreement between the two Houses, a joint Committee is appointed, and if an agreement is not arrived at, the Senate can by two-thirds majority require the dissolution of the Assembly, provided that this does not take place more than once in the two years' term.

General powers of examination into the conduct of affairs by the Government and of direct access to the Shah are provided for. The Members are inviolable, and the proceedings are public, with certain reservations as to the proceedings of secret Committees.

Full liberty of reporting proceedings and of comment, provided this is not of a libellous character, is accorded to the press.

It will be seen that, if the Constitution is carried into effect, the Persian Government is now a limited Monarchy, the Ministers, however, although responsible for their conduct to the Assembly, being nominated by the Sovereign, and not elected Members. The powers of the Assembly include financial control, and no loan can be made by the Government without its consent.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

No. 13. From Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *February* 18.)

(Extract)

TEHRAN, *January* 30, 1907.

I regret to state that the prospects of a good understanding between the Shah and the Popular party are still remote. The *entourage* of the Shah, especially his father-in-law, the Naib-es-Sultaneh\*, is personally interested in the continuance of the existing abuses; and their influence has certainly made itself felt to a regrettable extent, and has led to increasing agitation against the Shah himself.

On the other hand the action of the popular Assembly has not been such as to lead to conciliation. The Members seem bent on raising every sort of difficulty, and they do not appear to desire to lighten the task of the Government or provide funds for carrying on their administration of the country. The Government, on its side, adopts a hostile or reserved attitude towards the Assembly, and in consequence the relations between the two parties have steadily become worse.

The information which reaches me is conflicting. The older men, who have long been connected with the Government, maintain that a conflict is inevitable. Members of the Parliamentary party assure me that an attempt on the State's part to overthrow the Assembly will result in a general strike, and in all probability in serious disorders. They do not, however, believe that the troops will take an active part against the people. There is no doubt that there is some agitation in the bazaars, and a pronounced anti-dynastic and revolutionary movement in some parts of the country, especially Tabreez and Resht. Local Assemblies have been organized in the chief capitals which are giving the Government a good deal of anxiety, for they appear to aim at a sort of local autonomy, and the Governors are powerless to deal with them.

The alternatives which are now before us appear to be—

\* Deputy of the Shah.

1. An agreement between Shah and people resulting in practical reforms.
2. A conflict.

I have already called your attention to the growth of an anti-foreign feeling. This takes the form of a strongly developed fear of both England and Russia, and especially of the two combined. Any accentuation of this combination, or any overt sign of co-operation, is regarded as aimed directly at the independence of Persia.

No. 14. From Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *March* 18.)

TEHRAN, *February* 24, 1907.

SIR,

A year ago the popular movement against the Belgian Customs Administration, and especially against M. Naus, assumed such serious proportions that M. Naus considered that it would be unsafe to remain in the country, and he accordingly left on a mission to Constantinople. On his return last autumn, the popular movement was directed more especially against the Sadr-i-Azam and the existing state of the Government, and, though his removal was made one of the popular demands, it was not considered so important or so urgent as the other parts of the reform programme. He was able to obtain the exile of his principal enemy, the Saad-ed-Dowleh, and he was invited to St Petersburg to assist in the loan negotiations which were to take place there in September. The Persian Government, however, refused to intrust him with the negotiations, and he remained in Persia.

The Saad-ed-Dowleh was allowed to return to Tehran, and, as soon as the new Assembly was formed, he renewed the agitation against the Belgian Customs Administration.

The leader of the Moderate party, the President of the Assembly, did his best to put a stop to the agitation, and, indeed, threatened at one time to resign his post if the Assembly persisted in its demands. The popular feeling, however, was so strong that, although the majority of the

Assembly were probably in their hearts of the President's opinion, they were forced to yield.

The first question at issue was whether or not M. Naus was a responsible Minister. There was no doubt that he had been intrusted by the late Grand Vizier with the general financial control of the Empire. He had been made Controller of the Sanduk, or Imperial Treasury, into which all public funds were payable, and, in addition to his autocratic management of the Customs Administration—for which he was only responsible to the Sadr-i-Azam—he had also control of the Posts and the Mint. When, however, the Assembly demanded from the Government a reply to their request for information as to the general conduct of affairs—especially financial affairs—by the Shah's Ministers, M. Naus did not appear before the Assembly. The Finance Minister, the Nasr-ul-Mulk, stated, in reply to the Assembly's questions, that he had no powers of control, but was simply an accountant. M. Naus, he said, was not responsible to him, and, indeed, had not even provided him with the accounts of the Customs Administration for the last three years.

The Assembly was accordingly placed in an embarrassing position. It demanded information, and the person responsible for the principal paying Administration of the Empire was out of its reach. It accordingly asked to be supplied with a list of responsible Ministers. The Sadr-i-Azam sent the list, and it did not contain the name of M. Naus. The Assembly accordingly demanded that if M. Naus was not a responsible Minister he should be deprived of the title which he had assumed and of the powers of control, to which, according to the Constitution, he had no right.

After some days of hesitation, during which the popular excitement reached a dangerous height, the Shah yielded, and issued a Decree removing M. Naus and M. Priem from their posts of Minister and Director-General of the Customs. The popular delight found expression in loyal addresses and manifestations of triumph.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.



No. 15. From Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *March* 18.)

TEHRAN, *February* 27, 1907.

SIR,

In the course of the last month the Assembly has tried conclusions with the Sovereign, and has been markedly successful. It demanded the dismissal of M. Naus and M. Priem, the two principal Belgian employés of the Government, and the formal recognition of the fact that the Persian Monarchy was "constitutional" and "limited." Both demands were complied with.

I understand that the Shah was induced to yield by the alarming news which reached him from all quarters—especially from Tabreez—as to the probable consequences of a refusal on his part. It is also stated that His Majesty has received warnings to the effect that an association of "fedavi," or "devoted persons," exists with the avowed object of imitating the policy of the ancient Persian sect of assassins.

The Assembly showed much determination. The Members waited all day, mostly in silence, for the Shah's answer, and refused to allow any one to leave the House until its arrival, which did not take place till late in the evening. In the garden outside the House a crowd of about 3000 persons waited all day in perfect order, and on the arrival of the Shah's messenger burst into prolonged cheers. The merchants were prepared to close the bazaars, and constant telegraphic communication was kept up with the popular leaders in the provinces. The arrival of the Deputies from Tabreez was the signal for a great popular manifestation, and they were given almost royal honours. I am told by an eye-witness that the approaches of their lodgings were crowded with an eager throng waiting for the opportunity of kissing their garments.

The great Mujteheds, although their popular sympathies are supposed to be lukewarm, have also played their part, and sermons have been preached in the mosques appealing to the patriotism of the Persian people.

It is clear that a national movement of a semi-political and semi-religious character does exist and is spreading. The great Mujteheds of Kerbela are now entering on the scene, and delegates are being sent out from the capital to the provinces to preach the principles of liberty.

Patriotism, of a distinctive Persian type, has always been the characteristic of the Shiite believers. The present Shah of Persia has no religious status, and, in the view of the religious leaders, no fundamental right to the allegiance of the Persians, whose real chief is no living King, but the twelfth Imam, the coming Messiah, even now present on the earth, though unseen. The patriotism of the Shiite does not therefore centre in the person of the Kaliph, but is, or can be, of a highly revolutionary character.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CECIL SPRING-RICE.

## VII.

### CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS IN ST VINCENT AND MARTINIQUE, IN MAY, 1902.

No. 1. From Governor Sir R. B. Llewelyn (at St Vincent) to Mr Chamberlain.  
(Received 2.15 p.m., May 7, 1902.)

#### TELEGRAM.

(Delayed in transit.)

[*Answered by No. 5.*]

Slight earthquakes have been of frequent occurrence to the north of St Vincent for the last week. To-day, at 3 p.m., it is reported that a dense cloud of steam arose from Soufrière.

- No. 2. From Governor Sir R. B. Llewelyn (at St Vincent) to Mr Chamberlain.  
(Received 5.58 p.m., *May 7, 1902.*)

## TELEGRAM.

Referring to my telegram of yesterday\*, confirm report of eruption Soufrière. Four outbursts since 3 p.m. yesterday; inhabitants much alarmed in the surrounding country are swarming into Chateaubelair; 300 fed last night. Disturbance not felt Kingstown.

- No. 3. From Governor Sir R. B. Llewelyn (at St Lucia) to Mr Chamberlain.  
(Received 10.50 p.m., *May 7, 1902.*)

## TELEGRAM.

Arrived. Fear eruption Soufrière, St Vincent, very serious from what I saw passing on passage to St Lucia. Cables broken to Grenada and St Vincent.

- No. 4. From Governor Sir R. B. Llewelyn (at St Lucia) to Mr Chamberlain.  
(Received 8 a.m., *May 9, 1902.*)

[*Answered by No. 5.*]

British steamer "Roddam" returned here, 17 crew dead; reports St Pierre, Martinique completely destroyed. No news from St Vincent; send assistance St Lucia; inform French Government; cables still broken.

- No. 5. From Mr Chamberlain to Governor Sir R. B. Llewelyn (at St Lucia).  
(Sent 4.45 p.m., *May 9, 1902.*)

## TELEGRAM.

Have received with regret your telegrams† as to eruption St Vincent. Admiralty asked to send ship if possible and facilitate your movements. I shall be glad if you can return to St Vincent as soon as possible and furnish me by earliest opportunity with full particulars. You are authorized to expend St Vincent such sums as are absolutely necessary in case of immediate and urgent distress.

\* No. 1.

† Nos. 1 to 4.

No. 6. From Colonial Office to Admiralty.

[See No. 12.]

DOWNING STREET, *May 9, 1902.*

SIR,

I am directed by Mr Secretary Chamberlain<sup>¶</sup> to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the accompanying copies of telegrams\* which have been received from the Governor of the Windward Islands reporting the occurrence of volcanic eruptions at St Vincent and Martinique. The first two telegrams were sent from St Vincent, and the last two from St Lucia, the Governor having gone to that island on the 7th inst. Telegraphic communication as their lordships are, no doubt, aware is not interrupted with Jamaica and St Lucia.

2. Mr Chamberlain would be glad if their Lordships would give directions for one of His Majesty's Ships to proceed as soon as possible to St Vincent, carrying if possible an extra supply of such provisions and stores as are thought likely to be of use, and if they would also take any steps which may be in their power to facilitate the movements of the Governor (who is being instructed to return to St Vincent as soon as possible) and to restore regular communication between St Lucia and St Vincent.

3. It is also desirable that a visit should be paid as soon as possible to Dominica, to ascertain whether any serious eruption has taken place there, and to afford such relief as may be to hand if required. Mr Chamberlain would further suggest that the Admiral on the station should be requested to do all in his power to render assistance at Martinique should the French authorities desire it, and should the necessities of the British Islands admit of his doing so.

I am, &c.,

C. P. LUCAS.

\* Nos. 1 to 4.

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No. 7. From Administrator Bell (Dominica) to  
Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 9.10 p.m., *May* 9, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 10.*]

Terrible eruption Martinique volcano. Great distress.  
With approval of Executive Council sending immediately  
£100 value provisions. All safe here.

No. 8. From Governor Sir R. B. Llewelyn  
(at St Lucia) to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 7.50 a.m., *May* 10, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

Received news from St Vincent this evening 30 deaths  
reported ; information incomplete ; eruption still pro-  
ceeding. I am endeavouring to get back to St Vincent.

No. 9. From Governor Sir F. M. Hodgson  
(Barbados) to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 8 a.m., *May* 10, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by Nos. 11 and 31.*]

May 8. Soufrière, St Vincent, erupted violently yester-  
day ; loud reports resembling artillery fire heard Barbados  
3 o'clock in the afternoon ; at 5 o'clock in the afternoon  
darkness and thunder accompanied by steady downpour  
dust continued to night-time ; Barbados covered inches  
thick this morning ; have sent telegram to Governor-in-  
Chief, Windward Islands, offering every assistance.

No. 10. From Mr Chamberlain to Administrator  
Bell (Dominica).

(Sent 12 (noon) *May* 10, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram\* received ; vote approved. Telegraph  
any further information received.

\* No. 7.

No. 11. From Mr Chamberlain to Governor  
Sir F. M. Hodgson (Barbados).  
(Sent 12.15 p.m., *May* 10, 1902.)

## TELEGRAM.

Your telegram received\*. Send any further particulars.

No. 12. From Admiralty to Colonial Office.  
(Received *May* 10, 1902.)  
(Extract)

ADMIRALTY, *May* 10, 1902.

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, copy of a telegram, dated 9th instant, to the Commander-in-Chief on the North American and West Indies Station, together with his reply.

On receipt of your letter† a further telegram, copy of which is enclosed, was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, North America  
and West Indies.

## TELEGRAM.

*May* 10, 1902. Serious volcanic disturbances occurring in St Vincent, and Colonial Office asks that Governor of Windward Islands, now at St Lucia, may be conveyed thence to St Vincent in Man-of-War. What can you arrange? Ship selected should take extra stores and provisions, as great distress among inhabitants of area affected is anticipated. Cable between St Lucia and St Vincent broken.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

From the Commander-in-Chief on the North American  
West Indies Station to Admiralty.

## TELEGRAM.

Bermuda. *May* 9. "Indefatigable" has been ordered by telegraph to proceed to St Lucia to convey Governor of Windwards to St Vincent (and) render all possible assistance.

\* No. 9.

† No. 6.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

From Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, North  
America and West Indies.

TELEGRAM.

May 10, 1902. With reference to your telegram, Colonial Office further asks that should necessities of British Islands admit, you will render such assistance at Martinique as may be possible if French Authorities desire it.

No. 13. From Governor Sir R. B. Llewelyn  
(at St Lucia) to Mr Chamberlain.  
(Received 4.42 p.m., *May 10*, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

[*See No. 18.*]

Leaving at once St Vincent; eruption continues. Break in cable continues. Again urge request for man-of-war.

No. 14. From Governor Sir R. B. Llewelyn  
(at St Lucia) to Mr Chamberlain.  
(Received 9 a.m., *May 11*, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

In continuation of my telegram of this morning\*, my intention was to go over to St Vincent in a small coasting steamer, but I was strongly advised not to attempt to, as it narrowly escaped being wrecked yesterday; weather looking very bad in that direction; island invisible; dense black fog of cinders and sand; very anxiously awaiting arrival of man-of-war, but I have received no information.

No. 15. From Administrator Bell (Dominica) to  
Mr Chamberlain.  
(Received 9 a.m., *May 11*, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 32.*]

Saint Pierre, Martinique, completely destroyed by shower redhot scoriae; 40,000 persons reported perished;

\* No. 13.

also nineteen ships, including American steamship "Roraima," and cables ship "Grappler"; large area of island covered by ashes; acute distress; eruption still continues. All safe here.

No. 16. From Commander-in-Chief, North America and West Indies, to Admiralty.

(Received at the Admiralty 8.30 p.m., *May* 10.)

(Received in Colonial Office 3.45 p.m., *May* 11, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

Bermuda, 10th May. Orders have now been given for His Majesty's Ship "Pallas" to proceed with supplies from Jamaica to St Vincent, and directions have been given to the Senior Naval Officer at Barbados to communicate with the island of Martinique.

No. 17. From Governor Sir F. M. Hodgson (Barbados) to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 7.15 p.m., *May* 11, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by Nos. 23 and 31.*]

In view of latest intelligence from Martinique Government Barbados sending immediately food supplies, also two medical officers with medical and surgical equipment. They are being taken by Royal Mail Steamer "Solent," kindly placed at disposal of Government of Barbados by superintendent. Colonial Secretary accompanies expedition in charge, but will return by Royal Mail Steamer 12th May, leaving medical officer and superintending clerk at Martinique, if necessary.

No. 18. From Governor Sir R. B. Llewelyn (at St Lucia) to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 9.23 p.m., *May* 11, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by Nos. 25 and 30.*]

By latest reports St Vincent damage confined to the north of the Island. Deaths estimated at five hundred; I leave on "Indefatigable" this morning.



No. 19. From Administrator Bell (Dominica) to  
Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 2.20 a.m., *May* 12, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by Nos. 22 and 32.*]

(Extract)

Martinique catastrophe appears even more terrible than at first reported ; refugees arriving this morning North end Island state new craters opening many directions ; rivers overflowing banks ; large areas North side Island submerged ; other districts crowded survivors ; almost total darkness continues ; do not believe Guadeloupe can adequately relieve stupendous distress.

No. 20. From Governor the Earl of Ranfurly (New Zealand) to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 7.25 a.m., *May* 12, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

Government of New Zealand expresses sympathy with French Government disaster Martinique.

[Colonial Office Note.—A copy of the above telegram was duly transmitted to the Foreign Office for communication to the French Government.]

No. 21. From Governor Sir C. Bruce (Mauritius) to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 3.24 p.m., *May* 12, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

After the cyclone, 1892, Martinique sent Mauritius generous contribution in aid of sufferers. In view of recent appalling calamity, would you be good enough to convey to French authorities an expression of sympathy on behalf of Mauritius, and my confident assurance that this Colony will not be less generous in contributing to the relief of the sufferers in Martinique.

[Colonial Office Note.—A copy of the above telegram was duly transmitted to the Foreign Office for communication to the French Government.]

No. 22. From Mr Chamberlain to Administrator  
Bell (Dominica).

(Sent 3.40 p.m., *May* 12, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

In answer to your telegram\*, Governor, Barbados, telegraphs† supplies and medical assistance being sent from Barbados to Martinique.

No. 23. From Mr Chamberlain to Governor  
Sir F. M. Hodgson (Barbados).

(Sent 3.40 p.m., *May* 12, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

In answer to your telegram of 10th May†, your action fully approved. Report further.

No. 24. From Mr Chamberlain to Governor  
Sir R. B. Llewelyn.

(Sent 4.46 p.m., *May* 12, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

I am commanded by His Majesty the King to express his deep regret at the calamity which has befallen the island of St Vincent, and his sympathy with the sufferers and the bereaved in that Colony.

No. 25. From Mr Chamberlain to Governor  
Sir R. B. Llewelyn.

(Sent 4.35 p.m., *May* 12, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

Your telegram of May 11‡. Please express my sympathy with people of St Vincent and deep regret at loss of life. Referring to my telegram of May 9§, you may draw upon Crown Agents for £1000 at once, and, if necessary, for more. Report carefully by telegraph and by mail after full consideration probable needs and expenditure. If amongst the killed or injured any prominent residents with relatives in this country telegraph names.

\* No. 19.

† No. 17.

‡ No. 18.

§ No. 5.

No. 26. From Governor Sir G. S. Clarke (Victoria)  
to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 11.5 a.m., *May* 13, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

If you please forward following message to President  
of Republic of France :

Government and people of Victoria offer warm  
sympathy with French Government and people  
in their sorrow for the terrible loss of life in the  
Colony of Martinique.

[Colonial Office Note.—A copy of the above telegram  
was duly transmitted to the Foreign Office for communi-  
cation to the French Government.]

No. 27. From Acting-Governor Sir C. C. Knollys  
(Trinidad) to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 3.25 p.m., *May* 13, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

“ Kennet,” local steamer, started directly for Martin-  
ique May 10th, conveying stores, medical comforts, two  
medical officers.

No. 28. From Governor Sir C. Bruce (Mauritius)  
to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 3.27 p.m., *May* 13, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

Referring to my telegram of 12th May\*, on receipt of  
further news to-day Council of Government desire to  
convey to St Vincent expression of sympathy and promise  
of immediate grant in aid of victims of calamity.

\* No. 21.

No. 29. From Governor Sir F. M. Hodgson (Barbados)  
to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 6.15 p.m., *May* 13, 1902.)

TELEGRAM.

Colonial Secretary and party just returned from Martinique report as follows :

La Pelée began erupting 3rd May, became very active 6th May, and Governor next day proceeded to St Pierre for purpose of reassuring people, no danger being apprehended. About 7.30, 8th May, as far as can be ascertained, tremendous outbreak occurred, accompanied by sudden explosion of ignited matter, which might be compared with burning sealing wax ; this matter in short time completely destroyed town, shipping, everything within an area of ten miles by six. Governor and wife perished, and no one within the area escaped. Façade town hall stands, and clock stopped at 7.50. Burnt corpses lie in every direction. Persons from northern side of island took refuge in Fort de France where relief arrangements are being organized.

French man-of-war "Suchet" engaged in carrying refugees and getting food supplies. Acting Governor Lhuerre and people very grateful for food supplies, which were urgently required ; services of medical officers not required ; there were not any wounded. In addition to persons named in my telegram of 10th May\*, two Majors, Royal Army Medical Corps, and five men accompanied expedition.

It is estimated that 2,000,000 tons of dust in connection with St Vincent eruption fell on Barbados.

No. 30. From Mr Chamberlain to Governor  
Sir R. B. Llewelyn.

DOWNING STREET, *May* 13, 1902.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your several telegrams reporting the eruption of the Soufrière in St Vincent.

2. You will have received His Majesty's gracious message of sympathy\* with the suffering and loss which has been incurred, and though St Vincent—it is hoped and believed—has escaped the terrible destruction of life and property which has befallen Martinique you may be well assured that the feeling of regret at this additional misfortune to a British Colony, which has already suffered so much, is deeply and widely felt.

3. At the time of writing, I have not received any particulars, as you have not been in a position to send them, but in my telegram of the 9th instant†, I authorized you to expend such sums as might be necessary to relieve immediate and urgent distress, and on the 12th instant I telegraphed to you‡ that you might draw upon the Crown Agents at once for £1000, and for more if it should be necessary.

4. I shall await with anxiety the detailed reports which you will send in due course as to the nature and extent of the disaster, the steps to be taken, and the expenditure to be incurred, in order to give adequate relief.

I have, &c.,

J. CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 31. From Mr Chamberlain to Governor  
Sir F. M. Hodgson (Barbados).

DOWNING STREET, *May 13, 1902.*

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt on the 10th instant, of your telegram of the 8th inst.§, relating to the volcanic eruption in St Vincent. I have also received your telegram of the 11th inst.|| reporting that you had sent the Colonial Secretary and two medical officers to Martinique with supplies of food and medical equipment.

2. I fully approve of the prompt action which you have taken to relieve the distress caused by the terrible calamity which has befallen that island.

I have, &c.,

J. CHAMBERLAIN.

\* No. 24.

§ No. 9.

† No. 5.

|| No. 17.

‡ No. 25.

No. 32. From Mr Chamberlain to Administrator Bell  
(Dominica).

DOWNING STREET, *May 13, 1902.*

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your two telegrams\* relating to the destruction of St Pierre in Martinique by a volcanic eruption.

2. I have already telegraphed to you† my approval of your action in sending provisions to the value of £100 to that Island, and I have informed you‡ that further supplies and medical assistance are being sent from Barbados.

3. I appreciate the readiness of Dominica to render all possible assistance to the inhabitants of Martinique in the terrible calamity which has befallen them, and I am assured that you will spare no effort in that direction.

I have, &c.,

J. CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 33. From Colonial Office to War Office.

DOWNING STREET, *May 13, 1902.*

SIR,

I am directed by Mr Secretary Chamberlain to request you to bring to the notice of Mr Secretary Brodrick that in the Island of Saint Vincent, in consequence of the disaster caused by the eruption of the Soufrière, there may probably be urgent and immediate need of medical aid, and of assistance in distributing relief, providing shelter, clearing communications in the devastated districts, &c.

2. Mr Chamberlain has not yet received any details of what has occurred, but, in order to provide as far as possible for the needs which are likely to arise, he would be glad if Mr Secretary Brodrick could see his way to give telegraphic instructions to the Officers Commanding the Troops at Barbados and Saint Lucia to comply, so far as it may be in their power to do so, with any application for assistance which may be received from the Governor of the Windward Islands.

\* Nos. 15 and 19.

† No. 10.

‡ No. 22.

3. On learning that such instructions have been given, Mr Chamberlain will so inform Sir R. Llewelyn by telegraph, and since the need, if it exists, will no doubt be felt most acutely at first, Mr Chamberlain would request to be favoured with a reply to this letter at the earliest possible moment.

I am, &c.,

C. P. LUCAS.

No. 34. From Governor Sir G. T. Carter (Bahamas)  
to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 9.0 p.m., *May* 13, 1902.)

# TELEGRAM.

Resolution passed by house of Assembly as follows :  
With the wish that it may be forwarded to President of French Republic :

Resolved : That this House has heard with deep dismay and regret of the terrible catastrophe that has befallen the island of Martinique and begs to tender to the French nation the expression of its profound sympathy in the dreadful disaster which has overwhelmed the people of that island.

[Colonial Office Note.—A copy of the above telegram was duly transmitted to the Foreign Office for communication to the French Government.]

No. 35. From Acting Governor Sir G. Melville  
(Leeward Islands) to Mr Chamberlain.

(Received 10 p.m., *May* 13, 1902.)

# TELEGRAM.

Following telegram received from Administrator, St Kitts-Nevis :

*Telegram begins :* Representative meeting members of Executive and Legislative Councils and leading men urge strongly authority for Government assistance to Martinique £100 foodstuffs. *Telegram ends.*

Have I authority to instruct Administrator take vote? Foodstuffs will be sent from here to Martinique and St Vincent by public subscription.

No. 36. From Governor Sir R. B. Llewelyn (at St Vincent) to Mr Chamberlain.  
(Received 11.20 p.m., May 13, 1902.)

#### TELEGRAM.

Arrived yesterday, and found state of affairs much worse than given in reports forwarded by Administrator. Country on East Coast between Robin Rock and Georgetown apparently struck and devastated similarly to St Pierre, and I fear that practically all living things within that radius have been killed, probably 1600; exact number never will be known; managers and overseers of estates with their families and several better class people killed. One thousand bodies found and buried, 160 sent into hospital in Georgetown, probably 6 may recover; details too harrowing to describe. I have got the coasting steamer from St Lucia running up and down Leeward Coast with water and provisions, 2200 received relief. I have asked Governor, Trinidad, to lend me medical officer and ordered one from Grenada. "Indefatigable" remains. All neighbouring British Colonies giving assistance generously. The awful calamity is now realized, and every effort is being made to grapple with it. All the best sugar estates in the Carib country are devastated and the cattle dead. Eruption continues, but it is apparently moderating. Anxiety still felt. All officers and residents co-operating with me, and ladies making articles of clothing.



## VIII.

CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE ATTACK  
ON BRITISH OFFICERS AT DENSHAWAI.

Memorandum by the Earl of Cromer.

I do not think I need deal with the details of the Denshawai incident. They are fully described in Mr Findlay's despatch of the 1st July and its enclosures. All I need say is that I concur generally in Mr Findlay's remarks, and that, had I remained in Egypt, I should in every respect have adopted the same course as that which he pursued. The prisoners had a perfectly fair trial, by a very well constituted Court, all the members of which spoke Arabic, in which language most of the proceedings were conducted. I consider that the sentences, though severe, were just and necessary. I can see nothing reprehensible in the manner in which they were executed. I may remark that Mr Machell, who was in charge of the proceedings, is a singularly humane man, and is very popular amongst the natives of Egypt by reason of the great sympathy he has always shown for them.

I propose, however, to make a few remarks on the general question of the maintenance of public order in Egypt, and more especially upon what has occurred since 1883 in respect to the use of the whip. I shall also dwell on the reasons for instituting the Special Tribunal to try offences against the army of occupation, and on the question of whether the Decree of 1895 requires any alterations.

It is no exaggeration to say that in the time of Ismail Pasha and his predecessors Egypt was governed almost entirely by the use of the whip, or, to use the term usually employed in Egypt, the "courbash." This instrument was used not only as a means of punishment, but also as one of numerous methods of torture to extract confessions of guilt, and to oblige payment of the very heavy taxes which then burdened the country. Upon Ismail Pasha's abdication in 1879, the use of the "courbash" was, under the influence exerted by the European Controllers, practically abolished as an instrument for the collection of taxes, but little or no change was made in other respects.

The matter naturally attracted Lord Dufferin's attention. On the 26th January, 1883, he addressed Lord Granville in the following terms :

"The most painful characteristic which strikes a traveller on visiting Egypt is the universal use of the 'courbash,' or lash, administered with great severity on the most trivial occasions at the caprice of petty officers, clothed with however brief authority. The new Minister of the Interior, Ismaïl Eyoub Pasha, has signalized his entry into office by peremptorily forbidding the application of this instrument of personal chastisement. I cannot but regard such an act as significant of the introduction of a more humane and civilized spirit into the civil administration of the country."

Lord Dufferin inclosed a copy of the circular issued by Ismaïl Eyoub Pasha, the full text of which is given in "Egypt No. 6 of 1883," p. 36. It is a highly characteristic document. It spoke of the "reprehensible use of the bastinado," and expressed regret that, in spite of the repeated orders of the Government, certain of its agents still resorted to this "horrible and infamous punishment." It pointed out that the infliction of this punishment was "absolutely useless," as the Government had instituted Tribunals to deal with all litigious affairs, and that all interested could apply to those Tribunals in order to obtain justice. It left it to be inferred that repeated efforts had been made by the Government to stop the use of the "courbash." It may be that instructions in this sense were occasionally issued, but no one paid any attention to them, and it was a notorious fact that, up to the time the Circular of 1883 was issued, the use of the "courbash" had been encouraged, and indeed ordered, by the highest authorities in the country. As regards the Tribunals to which the Ministry of the Interior alluded, Lord Dufferin, in his Report, which is dated the 6th February, 1883, stated :

"At this moment there is no real justice in this country. What passes under that name is a mockery, both as regards the Tribunals themselves, and the *corpus juris* they pretend to administer."

It was, however, fully understood in Egypt that the Circular issued in 1883 by the Ministry of the Interior

differed widely from previous orders. It had been issued at the instigation of the British Commissioner, who had both the power and the will to enforce obedience to its terms. I well remember, shortly after this time, that Sir Claude MacDonald, now Ambassador at Tôkiô, and then attached to the British Agency, was present on one occasion when a Moudir was inquiring into some offences alleged to have been committed by a fellah. As the man would not confess, the appliances generally used when flogging was administered were produced. The man was, however, undismayed. He said: "You do not dare to flog me, now that the British are here." So bold an answer was probably due to the presence of a British officer; nevertheless, the fact that it should have been given at all showed that a very different spirit was abroad from that which had heretofore existed.

Lord Dufferin's despatch of the 26th January, 1883, and the accompanying Circular constitute an important landmark in the administrative history of Egypt. It was probably not possible for Lord Dufferin to have taken any other course than that which he actually adopted. At the same time, it may be permitted to doubt whether he fully understood at the time that he was not merely making a minor administrative change, but that his orders really constituted little less than a revolution. No Courts of Justice had at that time been established. What, therefore, Lord Dufferin really did was to throw the Egyptian executive authorities into the water and urge them to swim without the support on which they and their predecessors since the days of the Pharaohs had mainly relied. It can be no matter for surprise that a sudden reform of this sort met with only a modified success. I allude to this point, as it is highly illustrative of the results which may ensue from premature endeavours to thrust Western ideas on an Eastern people. The main results of the sudden abolition of the "courbash" were two-fold.

In the first place, it is to be observed that it is essential to the well-being of the population of Egypt that the mud left in the canals by the overflow of the Nile should be periodically removed. The necessity was even greater in 1883 than it is now, for at that time the British

engineers had not yet set to work to improve the irrigation system. Forced labour was employed; the whip was plentifully used. One of the results of the sudden abolition of the "courbash" was that the people refused to work. I well remember that at one time it seemed that the alternatives would be presented to the Egyptian Government and its British advisers of either allowing the fields to remain uncultivated, or else of permitting the people to be flogged in order to save them from starvation. It was only the very remarkable skill shown by Sir Colin Moncrieff and his assistants which enabled the Government to tide over the period of transition—a period which, I may observe, I think caused me greater anxiety than any other during my lengthened Egyptian experience.

A further result which ensued from the immediate abolition of the "courbash" was that life and property became insecure. Of all the Egyptian Ministers with whom I have had to deal, none, probably, had a greater respect for the law than Nubar Pasha, who assumed office about a year after the issue of Lord Dufferin's famous Circular. Nubar Pasha, however, found it necessary to appoint what were termed "Commissions of Brigandage"—in other words, to introduce martial law. At that time, I may observe, Egyptian affairs generally were in a condition which may, without exaggeration, be described as chaotic. My own time was fully occupied in struggling against the bankruptcy which then threatened the country, and in dealing with the affairs of the Soudan. Moreover, the policy of the British Government then was to interfere as little as possible with the Egyptian administration. The speedy evacuation of Egypt was contemplated. Complaints were frequently being made in England against the alleged excessive employment of Europeans. Scarcely any Europeans were employed in the provinces, with the result that these "Commissions of Brigandage" went on for some considerable time before I heard of the true nature of their proceedings.

Towards the close of 1887, however, M. Legrelle, a Belgian Judge, was named to the office of Procureur-Général. His researches threw a good deal of light upon

what was really going on in the provinces. By the spring of 1889 I had learned enough to convince me that some active interference was absolutely necessary. Instead of making any *ex post facto* statements, I think it will be desirable to refer to the correspondence which took place at the time. Annexed to this Memorandum will be found a number of despatches which passed between the Foreign Office and myself in the years from 1887 to 1891. Some people in this country appear to think that one of the dangers which attend the administration of Egypt is, that the Egyptians may be maltreated by the British officials. I can only say that I have never had any difficulty on this score; but, more especially in the earlier days of the occupation, I have had considerable difficulty in preventing the Egyptians from maltreating each other. The facts are sufficiently stated in the despatches annexed to this paper. Incidentally, moreover, allusion is made to the circumstances which led up to the first appointment of the special Tribunal for trying offences against the army of occupation. It was not till the early part of 1891, when Mr (subsequently Sir John) Scott was appointed to the post of Judicial Adviser—an appointment which led to Riaz Pasha's fall from office—that the spirit of the policy initiated by Lord Dufferin in 1883 was really carried into effect.

Since that time various improvements have been made in the system of justice, but the point to which I wish to draw special attention now is, that gradually the lawless portion of the community in Egypt began to understand that a principle which, so far as they were concerned, was entirely novel, had been introduced into the administration of justice. It was, that no one could be punished for a crime unless he was proved to be guilty. Further, they came to understand that proof, which would satisfy the Law Courts, was extremely difficult to obtain, and that in the large majority of cases, even when guilt was proved, the punishments were far from being severe. The result has been that, in default of adequate proof, a large number of persons accused of crime, who were unquestionably guilty, have, during the last fifteen or twenty years, escaped punishment. Hence, it cannot be doubted, a considerable disrespect for the law was engendered.

A great many explanations have been given of this state of things, and a great variety of remedies have been proposed. It has been stated that the judicial system is too precise a copy of that existing in France, and that it would be desirable to introduce the Indian Code. It has been alleged that the Judges have at times gone too far in the direction of rejecting police evidence, which is, in fact, always tainted with suspicion, more especially in Egypt. Some, such as Mr Edward Dicey, have thought that all our difficulties in Egypt arise from employing too large a number of Englishmen. It will be seen, however, from the papers attached to this Memorandum that Nubar Pasha, who was certainly the most competent of all Egyptians to deal with a matter of this sort, was given a free hand to introduce a system of justice without the employment of Europeans, and that the result was a complete failure. I note, on the other hand, that Mr Flinders Petrie, who can speak with considerable knowledge of Egyptian affairs, thinks that the difficulties are due to not employing Englishmen enough. The Egyptian Administration is in fact far less anglicized than that of India. Almost the whole of the executive staff in the provinces, and by far the greater portion of the judicial staff, are Egyptians. I am not prepared to say that better administrative results would not be obtained if more Englishmen were employed. On the other hand, for obvious reasons, on which I need not now dwell at length, I think it would be very undesirable to go too far in the direction of anglicizing the Administration. In fact, my view is that there is probably a certain amount of partial truth in the divergent views put forward by those who at times endeavour to generalize on Egyptian affairs—often, I must be allowed to say, on somewhat imperfect information ; but the main difficulty which, in connection with the subject now under discussion, we have to meet does not mainly depend upon what system is adopted ; neither, supposing that system to be honestly carried out, does it depend entirely on the individuals who are the instruments of its execution. Our difficulties are inseparable from the transition period from a reign of arbitrary government to that of law. It may, indeed, be said with a certain amount of truth

that the judicial system is, perhaps, half-a-century in advance of the ideas and standard of civilization of the people. But I would ask those who urge this plea what remedy they would recommend. Are we to go back to the abuses of the past? Surely not. In that case there is only one course to be pursued. It is that which the Government has been steadily pursuing for some years past—namely, gradually to reform the system where experience has shown that reform is necessary, to educate the people, and to wait patiently for the result. I should, however, add that during the period of transition, which will certainly last for many years, it is very desirable that punishment, more especially in exceptional cases, should be prompt and severe. This, I think, apart from the fact that officers of the army were concerned, and from the further fact that the recent Pan-Islamic agitation has caused some general unrest in the country, is the main justification for the promptitude and severity of the punishments recently inflicted on the rioters at Denshawai.

Passing to another point, I wish to observe that, in order fully to understand the reasons which led to the issue of the Decree of 1895, it is necessary to say a few words upon the legal status of the army of occupation, a point, I may observe, which appears in recent discussions to have attracted rather less attention than it deserves.

This matter has frequently come under consideration, but, so far as I can gather, the highest legal authorities are not able to lay down confidently any very precise principles for the guidance of the Executive Government. The law on this subject must necessarily rest to a great extent on precedent. There are numerous precedents for the temporary occupation of a foreign country, leading up eventually to its annexation. There are also precedents for a temporary occupation followed by the speedy withdrawal of the foreign force. There may possibly be a few precedents which fall under neither of these heads, as, for instance, the temporary occupation of Rome by the French army. But, so far as I am aware, history—and, therefore, the text-books on international law—may be ransacked in vain without finding any precedent for a prolonged occupation under circumstances such as those which exist in Egypt.

British law and the King's Regulations provide for the case of offences committed by or against British soldiers in the United Kingdom, in India, and in the Colonies ; but they afford no guidance in respect to the matter now under discussion. I understand, however, that, in so far as any precedent exists at all, it points very distinctly in the direction of allowing the authorities in command of the army of occupation to deal with offences committed against its own members. I can scarcely doubt that, did any Continental nation hold the same position in Egypt as that held by the British Government, this would be the course which would be adopted.

In the early days of the occupation, therefore, the question not infrequently arose as to whether offences committed against soldiers should be tried by the ordinary Criminal Courts, or whether the individuals concerned should be tried by court-martial. The military authorities naturally inclined to the second of these alternatives, and urged, with some reason, that the procedure of the Egyptian Courts was very dilatory, and that, as indeed actually occurred, the punishments awarded to those who had committed offences against soldiers were very lenient, whereas the soldiers themselves were tried by court-martial, and very severely punished for offences against civilians. On the other hand, many, including myself, were very reluctant to allow courts-martial to deal with offences of this description. In 1895, therefore, a compromise was effected. For all ordinary cases the ordinary criminal law was to be put into action ; but a discretionary power was left to the General Officer in Command and the Diplomatic Representative in Egypt to apply to the Egyptian Government for special treatment in certain exceptional cases. These cases were to be dealt with by a special Tribunal.

I may say that the main object I had in view in advocating the creation of this special Tribunal, was to allow of prompt and severe punishments, but to give the fullest guarantees that no arbitrary or unjust act should be committed by composing the Tribunal of the best judicial elements to be found in Egypt.

I should add that certain obvious objections may be



urged against special Tribunals of any kind. Indeed, many high legal authorities in Egypt are of opinion that it would be preferable to do away with the special Tribunal, and to try cases of offences committed against the members of the army of occupation by court-martial. It is possible that, from a purely technical point of view, this procedure is more defensible than that which is now adopted. On the other hand, it appears to me that, both as regards the composition of the Courts and linguistic knowledge, greater guarantees of justice will be given by the continuance of the present system than by introducing trial by court-martial.

Since its creation, the Tribunal has only been called into existence twice, namely, once in 1897, and again in connection with the recent affair at Denshawai. There have been one or two other occasions on which the assembly of the special Tribunal has been discussed, but the cases never appeared to me to be of sufficient importance to warrant exceptional treatment, and these cases were, therefore, left to be dealt with by the ordinary Law Courts.

I am quite prepared to admit that, by the light of the experience which we have now gained, the Decree of 1895 should in some respects be revised. I am unwilling to state in detail the precise nature of the changes necessary until, after my return to Egypt, I have had full opportunity for discussing the matter with the Egyptian Ministers and their British advisers. I may, however, allude to one or two points of special interest.

Under Article 4 of the Decree, sentences are carried out at once ; there is no appeal from the decisions of the special Tribunal. I am strongly of opinion that in these cases the sentences should be promptly executed ; but I think that the decision of the Tribunal should be confirmed by some superior authority. I am not at this moment prepared to say precisely what procedure should be adopted in this matter, but I propose to consider the question carefully on my return to Egypt.

As regards public executions, I may say that, at my instance, public executions, when ordered by the ordinary Law Courts, were abolished in Egypt some two or three years ago. In common with most of my own countrymen,

I am opposed to public executions, but I think that in some very special cases they may be necessary. I should, therefore, be unwilling to take away altogether from the executive authorities a discretionary power of permitting them when ordered by the special Tribunal.

As regards flogging in general, the correspondence published with this Memorandum will show the arduous campaign in which, in common with others, I was engaged for many years in Egypt in order to ensure the abolition of this punishment. I have been frequently urged, both by European and by native authorities, that the Law Courts should have power to inflict sentences of flogging in some exceptional cases, as, indeed, is allowed by the law of England. I have, up to the present time, always refused to listen to these arguments, as, apart from the general objections to all flogging, I was afraid that if it were allowed in virtue of a judicial sentence, there might be a relapse into the illicit practices of former days. The very competent Judges who were members of the Tribunal interpreted the Decree of 1895 in the sense that the infliction of flogging on the Denshawai rioters was legal. I would propose, however, that the terms of the Decree should be amended in the sense of, for the future, only permitting punishments of the nature of those sanctioned by the Penal Code.

I hope the papers which are now published will give the British Parliament and the British public some insight into the very great difficulties which attend the maintenance of public order and tranquillity in Egypt. I fear that the discussions which have recently taken place in England have not been of a nature to diminish those difficulties.

I have one remark to make in conclusion. I have, with a short interval, passed nearly thirty years of my life in an earnest endeavour to raise the moral and material condition of the people of Egypt. I have been assisted by a number of very capable officials, all of whom, I may say, have been animated by the same spirit as myself. I do not say that we have done all that we could have wished. Mistakes may possibly at times have been committed, for which, I venture to think, the very difficult nature of our task constitutes a sufficient apology. There

still unquestionably remains much to accomplish. Nevertheless, I think we may lay claim to a very fair measure of success. I wish very strongly to dwell on the point that further advance must be gradual. There is no royal road to progress in Egypt. Any attempt to prematurely force Western institutions and Western ideas on the people can only have one result, namely, to produce a reaction, and to defeat the object of those well-wishers of Egypt in England with whose general aspirations I believe myself to be in perfect accord, although I may occasionally differ from them as to the time and method of giving effect to the principles which they advocate.

(Signed) CROMER.

20, MANSFIELD STREET,  
*July 12, 1906.*

## IX.

### MEMORANDUM ON THE TAXATION OF NATIVES IN NORTHERN NIGERIA, BY SIR F. D. LUGARD, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., LATE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

(Extract)

1. The Mohammedan population of Northern Nigeria had from time immemorial been accustomed to pay certain tithes in accordance with Koranic Law, and had imposed taxation upon their pagan vassals. Residents of provinces were directed to enquire into the methods of taxation in vogue in their provinces, and to submit reports. These were necessarily very imperfect, but they revealed the fact that the original system had been extraordinarily complete and well organised, and that it had attained a high development,—embracing death duties, complicated taxes on traders, class taxation on special industries and crafts, special taxes upon lucrative crops, market dues, and an almost endless variety of other imposts in addition to the tithe on the staple crop paid by Mohammedans and the tribute claimed from pagans. They revealed further

that the original system, which appeared to have been singularly fair and well apportioned, had, to an extent which varied in each province, become debased by oppressive additions, by the system of collection, which consisted either of "farming-out" taxes to individuals who paid a certain sum for the privilege, and made all they could by extortionate demands from the taxpayers, or by the appointment of taxgatherers (named Jakadas or Ajele), who, in many provinces, lived on the people, and exercised a very oppressive tyranny. The gross amount received from the taxpayers was frittered away among these collectors and a host of persons who held titles at the capital, but these offices were for the most part sinecures, while the net amount which ultimately reached the Emir or Principal Chief was devoted primarily to the support of an army used for purposes of slave-raiding, or for punitive expeditions against pagan tribes (with which the acquisition of slaves was closely connected) and secondly, to the maintenance of a crowd of slaves and parasites who absorbed the power which properly belonged to the holders of State offices, and to the territorial chiefs who held districts in fief from the Emir. Finally, the residuum which remained to the Principal Chief was squandered in the maintenance of a large hareem, and in the purchase of scents, embroidered robes, and such articles of luxury, and no part of the vast sums wrung from the peasantry was devoted to works of utility, or to any object for the benefit of the people who paid the taxes.

2. The Government of Northern Nigeria was, by the circumstances of the case, placed in a difficult position in this matter. Prior to January, 1903, no really adequate steps for the amelioration of these abuses could be taken, for the Emirates of Sokoto and Kano still defied the Government, and the minor Emirs in the south (who had nominally submitted to the control of the Administration) waited sullenly to see which of the two were to be the ultimate rulers of the Protectorate. They more than doubted the ability of the Government to conquer the Hausa States in the north, and until this was proved, even those who were inclined to accept British rule dared not too openly declare themselves. Meanwhile their power over their subjects was gone, their prestige had been

broken, and their armies no longer existed for the enforcement of their arbitrary demands. The peasantry refused to pay their taxes, and every month which passed was injurious to the ultimate settlement of the country, in that it appeared to prove to the peasantry that no power now existed which could maintain order, and enforce just and recognised obligations and taxes. The inclusion of the Northern Hausa States under British control became, therefore, a most imperative necessity, for if it were deferred the remainder of the country would have lapsed into a state of defiance of all recognised authority, from which its reclamation would have been a task of very great difficulty. In 1902 Bornu and Yola were brought under control, and early in 1903 Sokoto, Kano, and Zaria submitted. At the end of 1903 (on my return from leave) a scheme was tentatively begun, and the revenue realised in the financial year 1903-04 was £8255. In June, 1904, the first Land Revenue Proclamation gave legal effect to a system under which the Government would share in the taxes, and this was superseded early in 1906 by a more elaborate proclamation, under the title of the "Native Revenue Proclamation," and based upon fuller knowledge of the conditions. In my covering despatch to the Secretary of State I thus described the object of the new ordinance:—"The essential difference between this proclamation and the one it supersedes, is that the former proclamation was limited to land and produce (including livestock), whereas this includes all forms of taxation known to the country, and makes any taxation not authorised by it illegal and punishable. While the former proclamation was only a tentative one, with the object of securing to the revenue a certain proportion of the taxes on land and produce levied by the native chiefs, and did not in any way touch the nature of those taxes or restrict the power of chiefs as to the extent to which they might tyrannise over, or extort from, the peasantry, the object of the present proclamation is to lay down limits to taxation by native chiefs, to define and legalise the various taxes, and to place them under the supervision of the Administration, and at the same time to assign an adequate portion of the revenue so collected to Government."

3. In order to obtain sufficient information upon

which to frame legislation and instructions to Residents, not only were the reports from different provinces carefully studied, but the High Commissioner, during the year 1904, and early in 1905, himself visited every province (except Sokoto, where no taxation had previously existed). The Northern States had, at that time, been so recently incorporated under the Administration that little information had as yet been forthcoming. As a result of this preliminary study a lengthy memorandum was drawn up (April, 1905), in which the various taxes existing in the different provinces were summarised, and full instructions were given to Residents as to the general policy to be pursued. On the enactment of the Proclamation of 1906 an additional memorandum (No. 21, of April, 1906) was circulated, giving more precise instructions in accordance with the more precise nature of the proclamation, and in order to meet the necessities of accounting and audit (so far as was possible), which are laid down in the financial instructions for Crown Colonies and Protectorates. By the light of the actual experience of a complete year I am now revising these memoranda with the object of meeting the actual difficulties experienced by Residents, of explaining various matters which have been misunderstood, and of giving fuller and more complete instructions regarding the necessary returns, &c., which are required to enable the High Commissioner on the one hand to keep in touch with the taxation of the Protectorate, and to promote uniformity, and, on the other hand, to render the accounting and audit easier and more effective.

4. The system thus introduced may be briefly summarised. In the first place, it has been my desire, while promoting a general uniformity in matters in which it is essential that a common policy should prevail throughout the Protectorate, to give as large a latitude as possible to the varying conditions of each Emirate. As years go by these divergencies will tend to disappear, and a single uniform system will be developed, but too drastic a change is, above all things, injudicious in Africa, and amongst a people so conservative of tradition as the population (and especially the Fulani rulers) of Nigeria. The inauguration of British rule is beyond doubt the right moment to

introduce important changes which are essential, for at no later time would it be so easy to introduce them, but all that is non-essential can best be introduced gradually.

The first essential was that so far as Government is concerned the innumerable petty taxes should be amalgamated in one or more single taxes to which legal sanction should be given by an ordinance of the Government. This involved a truly colossal task, for it meant that each Resident should visit every town and village in his province, and by the help of the native authorities should assess its tax-paying capacity. This has been the task of the past year, and as will be seen from the enclosure, very great progress has been made. The basis upon which this assessment has been carried out varies very greatly in different provinces (*vide* enclosure), but generally speaking it is framed upon the former scale of taxation shorn of its later extortions and unauthorised additions. The rulers (who share in the tax), are naturally ready to give all information, and this can be checked by the information derived from the former collectors, from the former fief-holder, and from the village itself. Finally, since the village may have increased or decreased in wealth and importance, the Resident himself exercises an original discretion as to the final assessment. Where taxation had not been formerly imposed (as in the Sokoto Province, the Fulani of Yola, and pagan tribes not under Fulani rule, but which have submitted to Government), the Resident fixes the assessment at his own discretion, subject to confirmation by the High Commissioner. In provinces like Kano, where it has not yet been possible for the staff to visit and assess every town, the authorised taxation of former days is temporarily accepted and enforced. As time permits this will be verified, and where necessary amended by the staff, but in this province the system is reported as extraordinarily fair, well organised, and complete.

## X.

REPORTS...ON FINANCES, ADMINISTRATION,  
...OF EGYPT IN 1911.

From Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received *April* 13.)

CAIRO, *April* 6, 1912.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit my report on the progress made in the various Departments of the Egyptian Government during the year 1911.

My predecessor, Sir Eldon Gorst, gave the best years of his life, and devoted his great ability to promoting the welfare of this country. He filled with marked success the posts of Controller of Direct Taxation, Under-Secretary for Finance, Adviser in the Ministry of the Interior, and Financial Adviser ; and when Lord Cromer left Egypt, after his long and arduous career in this country, Sir Eldon was naturally chosen to take his place in this Agency, where he worked indefatigably until his death. So many tributes to his memory have already been paid, both here and at home, that it would be superfluous in this report to dwell further on Sir Eldon Gorst's eminent services.

After an absence of eleven years from Egypt, where I had served so long in military and semi-military capacities, it gave me great personal pleasure, on my return, to have the opportunity of renewing my association with many of my old Egyptian friends, and I was able to realize, better perhaps than those who have been continuously working in the country, the progress and changes which have taken place. There is no doubt that His Highness the Khedive and his Ministers, as well as the officials in the various Government Departments, are rightly entitled to be congratulated on the success of their efforts to improve the condition and increase the prosperity of the people. That there is still a great deal to be done is only natural in a country like Egypt, though



the task has been rendered easier than it was in past days by the wise counsels that have prevailed, resulting in the placing of the finances of the country on a stable and prosperous footing. The sound judgment and energetic determination displayed both by Lord Cromer and Sir Eldon Gorst in dealing with financial matters have been of valuable importance to the welfare of the country and its future development.

Almost simultaneously with my arrival in Egypt, the whole political situation in the Near East was rudely disturbed by the totally unexpected action of Italy in declaring war against the Turkish Empire and proceeding to invade Tripoli and Cyrenaica. It was not surprising, in view of the geographical proximity to Egypt of these two districts, the close relationship existing between the people of Benghazi and the Egyptian Arabs, and the bonds of common religion and ties of trade and commerce, that an extremely warm feeling of sympathy should have been aroused in this country for the Mohammedan combatants. The excitement caused by the war was widespread and deep, but notwithstanding the mischievous efforts of some of the more irresponsible native newspapers, the people of Egypt have displayed the most praiseworthy self-restraint, and have devoted themselves to quite justifiable and generous efforts to relieve the distress and the suffering caused by the war, and to the equipment and despatch of Red Crescent Hospitals to succour the wounded. Egypt was declared neutral, and that neutrality has been strictly maintained by Egyptians, who have thus shown an admirable devotion to duty, law, and order, in spite of the intensely sympathetic and religious feelings raised by the long struggle which has been going on so close to their frontier.

I am glad to be able to report that political feeling in other respects has lately been much calmer, and that the consideration of practical reforms for the good of the country has apparently become more interesting to the majority of the people than discussions on abstruse political questions which are unlikely to lead to any useful result.

On returning to Egypt after a long absence I have been forcibly struck by the fact that the formerly

homogeneous body of intelligent Mohammedan inhabitants who constituted a collective community based on fixed social laws is now split up and divided into parties and factions of a political character. Whatever the value of a party system may be in Western political life, it is evident that its application to an intensely democratic community, the essential basis of whose social system is the brotherhood of man, combined with respect for learning and the experience of age, is an unnatural proceeding, fraught with inevitable division and weakness.

The development and elevation of the character of a people depends mainly on the growth of self-control and the power to dominate natural impulses, as well as on the practice of unobtrusive self-reliance and perseverance, combined with reasoned determination. None of these elements of advance are assisted in any way by party strife. Calm and well-considered interest in political affairs is good for both the governed and those who rule, but fictitious interest, generally based on misrepresentation and maintained by party funds and party tactics, does nothing to elevate or develop the intelligent character of an Oriental race.

In the early part of 1911 some excitement prevailed amongst the Coptic community, and the excellent relations that had existed for so long between them and the Mohammedans were strained. It was a regrettable situation, due in a great measure to misunderstandings which, I am glad to say, have now disappeared. The Copts have acted in this matter, as I expected they would, in a manner that deserves entire approval. They willingly gave up any idea of holding another Congress; the Moslems, on their side, with equal public spirit and desire for the common good, practically followed the same course. I feel sure that an era of peace and concord has now been established which must be beneficial to all, and which I hope will prove lasting.

The future development of the vast mass of the inhabitants of Egypt depends upon improved conditions of agriculture, which, with educational progress, are the more essential steps towards the material and moral advance of the people. The newly formed Agricultural Department of Government is doing its best, whilst learning by

experience, to impart instruction and advice to cultivators, and by itself establishing experimental farms scattered through the country, to give ocular proof of the truth of their precepts. The fellah remains the same as he has always been, one of the best and most hard-working types of humanity, somewhat conservative, like most cultivators, and hardly realizing the changes that have taken place around him. It is difficult for a people who have through many ages always striven for more water for their cultivation, to realize that too much of a good thing may be detrimental. It is, however, an incontestable fact that a considerable proportion of the irrigation water now supplied is not only wasted, but does actual harm to the crops. Owing to the fertilizing Nile flood, the land, though in some places waterlogged, remains as good as it ever was, ready again to return abundant results to careful cultivation. Certain defects have, however, temporarily reduced the productive qualities of the soil. Not only the urgent necessity for drainage works, to which I refer more fully later, but the want of cattle for ploughing in the Delta have been much felt. There has been a decrease of a quarter of a million animals through disease during the last seven years, although the cultivated area has increased by a similar number of feddans. Other factors which have reduced the yield are the too frequent rotation of cotton crops and the want of space allowed between the plants. When these shortcomings have been successfully rectified, we may confidently look forward to the return per feddan being as good as it was in years gone by. A more careful selection of cotton seed is also very necessary, and new types are required to replace the old, which have deteriorated. To provide these, cotton breeding has been energetically taken up, and will I hope in time produce new and improved varieties. The poorer cultivators have in the past found it difficult to obtain good seed, as they have been obliged to deal with small merchants, who, though charging highly, often sell seed of a very inferior quality. Government now supplies the fellah with better seed for planting, so as to ensure his obtaining the article he requires.

With undrained, damp soil and the indiscriminate destruction of bird life in recent years, the cotton pests

have increased enormously, and commit frightful ravages on the crops. A Commission is now sitting, under the presidency of Prince Hussein Pasha, and experimenting to discover some practical means of destroying these insects. It is hoped that by the introduction of parasites which in other countries keep down the numbers of the cotton-worms, or by the application of some poison innocuous to other forms of life, means may be found to reduce, if not entirely to do away with, this scourge. Legislation to protect bird life is now being passed, though too late, I fear, to save many of the useful species that used to be so common in the country. And lastly, it is hoped that with a better drained and therefore drier soil the conditions under which the cotton-worm now flourishes may disappear.

The monumental work of the raised Aswan dam will be completed next May, and the immense benefits accruing by the increased irrigation of the country will repay the expenditure many times over. Other completed improvements include the giving of Seifi (summer) water to Upper Egypt, and the abolition of the basin system, which for so long has restricted the full yield of the land. Now that abundant irrigation water is assured, no effort should be spared to enable the inhabitants of Egypt to obtain the fullest advantage from their magnificent soil and climate, and the question of drainage, which has long been discussed, becomes one of vital importance. Measures are about to be taken to carry out a large and comprehensive scheme for drainage in the provinces of Behera and Gharbieh, and proposals for this purpose have been submitted to Sir William Garstin and Mr Webb, whose technical knowledge and long experience of the country are unrivalled. The projects have been approved, and will be carried out without more delay than is necessary for such large works. Shortly stated, the result aimed at is the lowering of the water in the drains in those portions of the Delta to a depth of from  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 metres below the surface of the soil. Elaborate experiments in the Domains show that if this result is achieved, the yield per feddan in many parts will probably be doubled.

The indebtedness of the fellah has always been a source of grave economic anxiety. It is hoped that the spread

of education in the elementary schools may, without inducing him to leave the land, teach him to be more careful in his monetary transactions, and that an extension of savings banks to the villages will give him the means of practising thrift, and enable him eventually to clear himself of debt. It is also hoped that by establishing cotton markets through the country, where means for accurate weighing under Government control will be provided, and where the price of cotton will be daily posted, the possibility of the fellah being defrauded by the small merchants to whom he sells his cotton will be prevented, and that he will thus be able to realize a better pecuniary result from his labour.

The deleterious system of mixing different varieties of cotton, which does so much harm in reducing the prices of Egyptian cotton, as well as the want of efficient ginning machinery and arrangements, are receiving attention.

In 1910 an important and very interesting experiment was commenced, viz. : the handing over of local education to the then recently constituted Provincial Councils, funds being provided by a percentage on the land taxes. The Ministry of Education has been careful not to interfere with the manner in which the various educational schemes prepared by the Provincial Councils have been carried out, although it has been ready to give advice and assistance when asked to do so. The Councils took up the work with enthusiasm, and undoubtedly, under their supervision and control a great impulse has been given to education. This new departure has introduced a much-needed elasticity and diversity into the system of instruction and has enlarged the field of free education. Time and scope must be given to enable their efforts to develop and crystallize, and it is premature at present to give any definite opinion on the result while the experiment is still in a somewhat indeterminate and provisional stage.

As might have been expected, a considerable amount of divergence is apparent in the policy carried out by the different Councils. In some there has been a tendency towards providing secondary education, instead of the very necessary elementary vernacular industrial and agricultural schools which are so much required in the provinces. It is satisfactory to see that girls' schools

figure in the programme of some of the Provincial Councils, though, chiefly owing to difficulties in providing teachers, progress in this direction has not been so great or so rapid as might be wished. The Provincial Councils have at present 45,173 boys and 5500 girls in the elementary schools, besides 10,000 boys in higher schools. One of the most hopeful features is the evidence of a desire to adapt the teaching to everyday needs, and to reduce thereby the large proportion of illiterates in the country. There is no doubt that illiteracy places the fellah at a serious personal disadvantage in his mutual relationships in life, and impedes at every step the economic and social development of the country. When the conditions of life were still simple, illiteracy was not perhaps felt as a serious drawback. Modern changes have, however, brought the agriculturist, trader, and workman increasingly into contact with the more highly educated sections of the community, thus making larger demands on their intelligence and capacity, and placing them amongst surroundings in which their illiteracy is an ever-growing disability.

Valuable elements of national advancement can be obtained from even a little learning, in addition to the discipline which the character and the intellect undergo thereby. One of the worst features of the elementary education hitherto supplied has been that it was restricted so largely to the cultivation of memory. An instruction that is merely "bookish" leaves some of the most useful faculties of the mind undeveloped. Manual exercises train the eye to accuracy in observation, the hand to skill in execution, and the mind to a sense of the importance of truthfulness in work. They cultivate habits of diligence, neatness, and attention to detail, and quicken the general intelligence.

What seems most required for progress in this direction is to evolve the best type of rural school, adapted to the special practical needs of agricultural districts, and when this has been done we may confidently hope to see a considerable increase in the number of boys educated. It must not be forgotten that any hasty or unthought-out development of education in rural districts, unless it is carefully adapted to rural necessities, may imperil the

agricultural interests on which the prosperity of the country so largely depends. A rural exodus in Egypt would be an economic and social disaster of considerable magnitude. To avoid this contingency, a half-time system of education allowing of labour in the fields for the remainder of the day, with holidays fixed in accordance with agricultural necessities, seems the best solution.

A closer co-ordination of the educational work of the Provincial Councils with that of the Ministry of Education will undoubtedly follow if we are to obtain the best results from this local system. Such co-ordination would, however, in no way imply unification, but rather co-operation in educational work. The Ministry would supply, as it does now, advice and assistance, and when required, direct supervision. It would probably remain in charge of the secondary education and higher technical schools, while the Provincial Councils would take charge of the elementary vernacular schools, commercial schools, agricultural schools, higher primary schools, normal schools for elementary teachers, and other institutions of a similar character.

The Government have shown their confidence in this new system of local education, and their desire for its success by a grant of £E. 100,000 to assist the Councils in their work of building and equipping schools, and if the latter follow experienced advice and are not led away by projects of too ambitious a nature, there is little doubt that in a few years the widespread illiteracy of the fellah will be a thing of the past.

The Provincial Councils have been so taken up with educational development that their other duties to the community have been somewhat neglected. They must not forget that they have also to look after and provide for the general improvement of the conditions of life of the inhabitants of their provinces. I have little doubt that later these responsibilities—including the improvement of communications and bridges, the establishment of markets for cotton, the filling up of insanitary birkets in the villages, and possibly the clearance of subsidiary drains, with many other similarly useful undertakings, all of which are matters of the greatest moment for the well-being of the people—will become an important part of their work and engage their serious attention.

Before leaving the question of education, I should like to draw attention to two interesting developments in the educational policy of this country. One is the commencement of a system of commercial education. Many positions in civil life both honourable and lucrative have hitherto been practically closed to Egyptians educated in their own country by their lack of knowledge in this respect.

The other, which, though decided upon in principle, has not yet been actually put into force, is the institution of a proper system of civil service examinations for entrance into the Government service. It is hoped that this reform will both raise the intellectual standard of the officials and remove any suspicion of favouritism which, however unjustly, may have existed.

The Legislative Council has been working well, and I think its members are fully imbued with an earnest desire to improve the condition of the people. How far, however, owing to the manner of their election and their numbers in the Council, they represent effectively the well-considered wishes of the inhabitants of all classes appears to me to be open to question and to require careful study.

My predecessors have so often and so fully pointed out the clog to the progress of Egypt caused by the Capitulations, that it is almost unnecessary for me to refer to this hindrance to the advance of the country imposed by foreign Powers. It is hoped that some alleviation of the tutelage in which the country is still held may be the outcome of a protest made by Egypt at the last International Sanitary Congress, which was well received by the experts assembled in Paris.

The condition of the Mixed Tribunals has attracted considerable attention of late. These Courts, as has been frequently pointed out, constitute an *imperium in imperio*, and I apprehend that inherent defects in the fundamental principles of their organization are the main causes of recent developments in the institution which have given rise to so much comment.

There can, indeed, be little doubt that these Courts are no longer adequate to deal satisfactorily with the large volume of civil and commercial business which



comes before them, and I hear constant complaints on this head from the commercial community. This is scarcely surprising, in view of the steady increase of arrears during the last few years, both in the Cairo Tribunal and the Court of Appeal. The remedy usually suggested for the present unsatisfactory state of affairs is very simple, and merely consists in an increase in the staff of judges. I am not, however, myself convinced that such an increase in the existing number of judges as the Egyptian Government could reasonably be asked to make would prove an adequate corrective of the defects so much complained of. The real remedy is to be sought in the adoption of certain essential modifications in the existing organization of these Courts, such as an increase in the number of benches by means of a reduction in the number of judges required to form a chamber. Unfortunately the difficulty of obtaining the necessary agreement of all the Powers to certain measures of reform proposed by the Government has hitherto proved insurmountable. I greatly fear, therefore, that in spite of the efforts of the many capable judges who compose these Courts, little substantial improvements in their general efficiency and output can be looked for under existing circumstances.

As regards the Native Tribunals, considerable progress has been made since I was last in Egypt. The number of summary Courts has been substantially increased, and the institution of Merkaz Tribunals has brought justice very much nearer to the doors of the people, though in this respect I consider a further extension might be made. The work is undoubtedly heavy, but the arrears are nowhere large, and justice is in general administered by the native judges with efficiency and despatch. Indeed, it frequently happens that foreigners assign their claims to natives in order to get them dealt with rapidly in the Native Courts. Though I am glad thus to be able to record a great advance in the morale and capacity of the native judiciary, there should be no relaxation in the efforts of all concerned to inspire among the whole community implicit confidence in the administration of justice by the native magistrates.

## XI.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON EMIGRATION FROM INDIA.

FRIDAY, 21st May, 1909.

## MEMBERS PRESENT :

LORD SANDERSON (*Chairman*).Sir George Robertson ; Sir J. La Touche ; Mr Cox ;  
Mr Ashley ; Mr Fremantle ; Mr Ellis.Mr R. H. GRIFFIN (*Secretary*).Mr JOHN CATHCART WASON, M.P., called in  
and examined.

*Chairman*.—You are a Member of Parliament for Orkney and Shetland, I think?—Yes.

You have passed a good deal of your life, I think, in New Zealand?—Yes, about 40 years.

The particular reason why we have asked you to be kind enough to come here is because the Governor of East Africa mentioned you as likely to be able to give us valuable information on the subject of the East Africa Protectorate. Perhaps I had better describe very briefly the point to which we have come in our evidence. The East Africa Protectorate, we have been told, is divided into four zones. There is a coast zone ; there is an intermediate zone, which is not very high ; then there come the uplands, which are high and are suited for the residence of white people ; and then there comes another zone beyond, towards the lake, which goes down lower again. Upon the coast zone it seems to be pretty certain that you must have either African or Indian labour, if you are to have labour at all, and that there are a certain number of Indian labourers there already, and a considerable number of Indian traders who have been trading there for a long while, for centuries probably. Then there

comes the intermediate zone, where some fibre factories have recently been started, where only native labour or Indian labour can be employed, and where native labour is said to be deficient ; and then there are the uplands, where there is native labour and where it is stated that Europeans can permanently reside. Can you tell us your views generally upon that subject ?—We will take the question of the fibre factories first. I should say you very fairly describe East Africa by dividing it into four zones. I have been twice there, not for sporting purposes, but simply semi-social and political purposes.

Might I ask you, do you own property there ?—No, none.

You have gone as an observer ?—As a political student. With regard to the coast zone, there does not seem to be much labour of any sort there, and I should think that that is where Indian labour would be by far the most usefully employed. The question of the fibre factories seems to have reached rather an acute stage in what you describe as the intermediate zone. When I was there last December I made a good many inquiries among all sorts of people, and it seemed that the companies had started those fibre factories without making any preparation for the cultivation of the material, that is to say, they were occupying themselves and their plant entirely with the raw material. Of course when the material was near the plant then they managed to do fairly well, but as they had to go further afield for their raw material (and this fibre is very bulky stuff) it required a considerable amount of additional labour, and then the labour troubles began there. They were very serious. I do not mean that there was anything approaching a riot ; but there was a very serious deficiency of labour at the time I was there, and the Governor had to go down there especially, with Mr Macdonald, to make special inquiries to see what could be done with regard to the fibre factories. There are two very distinct parties there, and there is no doubt that the object of one section of the community was to bring a certain amount of pressure to bear upon the Government to send them labour from elsewhere ; on the other hand, that was extremely unpopular among another section of the community.

*Mr Ashley.*—Elsewhere in East Africa?—In East Africa. That was very unpopular among another section of the community.

*Sir George Robertson.*—What did the other section desire?—To leave things alone.

Was Indian labour an alternative to the other plan?—They did not object to the Indian labour; they only objected to the Government using any power they had got to take African labour there from elsewhere.

*Mr Ellis.*—Because they did not want to lose the labour for their own plantations, you mean?—I think only partially. I think there is a very general feeling there among a large section of the people that the native labour should not be exploited for the benefit of manufacturers or white settlers. I think there is a great preponderance of feeling—good feeling—among many of the settlers with regard to that. On the other hand, of course, there are some who are desirous of seeing the native labour exploited.

*Sir George Robertson.*—If the labour were employed for the manufacturers there would be a shortage for the settlers?—I did not put it in that way.

I was asking you the question if it is so?—No, I would not put it in that way.

*Chairman.*—There are not many settlers there in that intermediate zone?—There are very few; but still they would have to come from where the settlers were—up in the Kikuyu district, but none of them put it on that ground.

They put it on general grounds?—Yes.

*Mr Cox.*—On humanitarian grounds?—Yes.

*Mr Fremantle.*—Was it proposed to import labour from the Kikuyu district to the fibre district?—They were only making a general demand for labour. They did not specify where. There was another large tribe there—the Wakamba; and the Kavirondo also go about taking work.

*Mr Ellis.*—The more vocal part of the settlers are always urging that the Government should take steps to make the native work, are they not?—I think that was so a short time ago, but I think, as far as I can see, that that feeling is dying out. •

*Chairman.*—There appears to have been some sort of attempt to induce a certain number of free immigrants to come there from India with their families, and the Protector of Immigrants, I think, went over to India for the purpose, but it failed. Did you hear anything of that?—I did not hear anything of it.

Did you also visit the uplands?—Yes, I have been there twice.

What is your view of the condition of things there? Is there sufficient native labour there without anything further?—If there is not native labour there is nothing. The Indian labour there, I think, would be extremely objectionable in many ways.

That has been the general view: that it would not be desirable to have Indian labour there, and one of our witnesses told us that he thought even that the Europeans could succeed in doing labour there in the higher parts, 6000 feet above the sea?—They are doing so.

They are working?—They are doing a certain amount of labour.

*Sir George Robertson.*—Do you mean that they plough or tend stock?—They are very much occupied in over-seeing.

Not manual work?—I do not mean to say that they dig post holes, but they get natives to dig the post holes and they will do a lot of the fencing themselves.

Compared with Canada, for instance, they do not work in the same way?—No, they could not work in the same way.

*Mr Fremantle.*—Might I ask why you consider it objectionable to have Indian labour on the uplands?—I think it exceedingly undesirable to import Indian labour where you have a number of native races of a lower type. I think it would render our task of administration extremely difficult there.

It is a similar case in the West Indies, is it not?—I could not tell you. I have not been there.

*Sir George Robertson.*—It has been explained to us very often that the value of importing the Indian is that he, by example, teaches the inferior races thrift and industry and continuous work. You do not agree with that?—I do not at all agree with that. I do not think

that it is at all the feeling in the Transvaal, but I am only speaking by hearsay. I know there is a very strong feeling against the Indians, I should say, throughout the uplands.

*Mr Fremantle.*—We want to know the grounds of that feeling?—I think the feeling principally would be that the object of the Indian in going there—the Indian is not fond of working—would be to exploit the native African for his own advantage.

*Sir George Robertson.*—The coolie?

*Mr Cox.*—That is the trader.

*Chairman.*—I think their experience has been principally of the Indian as a trader and not as a labourer?—The only Indian that they have there at the present time is the trader.

*Sir J. La Touche.*—Your remark does not apply to agricultural settlers?—I was speaking of the agricultural settlers.

You were speaking more of the traders than of the agricultural settlers?—Practically there are no Indian settlers. At least, there are a few round the town of Nairobi for growing market produce, but there are very, very few Indian labourers round in the uplands.

If they confined their energies to agriculture there would not be the same objection, you think, amongst other settlers in the colony?—I do not think they are wanted there at all. It would be extremely undesirable to encourage them to go to the uplands.

*Mr Fremantle.*—Would you mind telling us what you mean by “exploiting the native”? How would the Indian trader set about it? Does not he meet a want in the way of communicating with the less civilised races?—Do not let us mix up two things, the Indian trader and the importation of Indian labourers. You have taken the two together.

I think the ground of the objection to the importation of Indian labourers is that in the course of time a great many of them do become traders. That is the case in Natal, I think?—Yes. Then, of course, there is the question of intermarriage with the natives. It is an exceedingly undesirable matter to mix the breed.

*Mr Ellis.*—Why is it undesirable?—From a stock-

breeder's point of view, the only point of view which I know very much of, it is extremely undesirable to mix the races, to mix breeds of that sort.

*Mr Fremantle.*—My question is whether the objection of the colonists to Indian labour coming in, is not because they are afraid the Indian labourer will become a trader and therefore compete to some extent with the Europeans?—They are doing that now; they are competing as traders in Nairobi; in fact, a large portion of the trade is carried on, as I daresay you know, by Indians in and about Nairobi; and they cut the ground very much from underneath the white trader's feet. They work cheaper, and settlers often prefer to go to them.

That is from the point of view of the white traders; but from the point of view of the country, is it not a good thing that there should be Indian traders who will go to out-of-the-way parts where an English trader cannot go?—I was rather taking the question to mean as to an importation of Indian labour there, I think the feeling amongst all classes would be against that.

We want to know the grounds on which the feeling would be against that?—One ground is, that I think it is generally thought that it would make the administration of the country very much more difficult if you had a number of Indians dealing and, as I said, working the native African for their own purposes and their own ends. I do not think the native African would get as much justice from an Indian as he would from a white settler. I do not think he would be cut down so low in his pay and his comfort by the white settler.

*Mr Ellis.*—So that the objection of the white settlers to the Indians is a purely philanthropic one, based on the fear that the natives will be ill-treated by the Indians?—It is, perhaps, hardly correct to say purely philanthropic, but I think it is a very sound, businesslike view, which, after all, is the basis of all philanthropy.

*Sir George Robertson.*—You think that, as a fact, there would be considerable hostility to Indians being imported into the place?—I think so.

*Chairman.*—Of course, from the point of view of policy it is not desirable to import a large number of people against whom there is likely to be a strong feeling, neither

for their sakes nor for the sake of the people there?—Might I say that East Africa is a very large place, and I have only been speaking of the uplands.

I think the uplands are about one-sixth part of the total Protectorate, or something of that kind?—About that, I should think. Then when you got on the Lake zone, one saw the Indians themselves working, and working exceedingly well, and they had got several very flourishing little plantations there.

*Mr Fremantle.*—On the other hand, is it not very difficult to treat the uplands differently from the rest of the country? You cannot have a self-governing upland and a Crown colony all round it?—No, I do not think you can do anything very much except allow the Indians to go as indentured coolies on the coast zone. I think in other places you must leave the thing alone.

*Sir George Robertson.*—Is there plenty of labour in the uplands at the present moment?—I should say plenty.

*Chairman.*—There are a considerable number of Indians at the present moment who have come over on engagement, for I think three years, to work on the railway. That is really the only systematic introduction of Indians at the present moment?—I think so.

A good many of them go back, but they come back again, and a certain number I suppose settle, and I suppose some of those are the people who you say have made settlements towards the Lake?—I could not say for that. It is very likely.

But there are a certain number, I presume?—I think a large number are settled there. There is a large number of Indians at Port Florence on the Lake—a large settlement of them.

I understand you to say that you would see no strong objection to a considerable importation of indentured labour on to the Coast strip, and on to the intermediate strip?—On the contrary, I think it would be extremely desirable.

You would not object to their settling there?—No, on the contrary.

The tendency of the agricultural Indian labourer, I understand, is to save and to acquire a little plot of land, and to hold stock which he gradually increases, and some



of them become traders. But your view would be that as regards the uplands it would not be desirable that they should be introduced, or that they should become land-owners there?—That is my view.

*Mr Ashley.*—You would, in fact, by ordinance, or by law, forbid them to hold lands in the uplands?—Well, that is rather a strong point. I certainly would do that, if it became a very serious question; but I do not think it is pressing sufficiently seriously now.

*Mr Fremantle.*—You would do so owing to the feeling against them, not because you consider yourself that it would interfere with the development of the country?—If they came there in very large numbers, I certainly think steps ought to be taken to stop their holding land there; but I do not think there is any evidence that they are coming into the uplands in anything like a large number.

The question is whether the uplands should be open to them or not?—The uplands are open to them now; there is no restriction on them going into the uplands.

They are not allowed to acquire land in the uplands?—They acquire land in the towns.

*Chairman.*—I take it, as it stands at the present moment, land cannot be acquired or transferred in the uplands, at all events without the consent of the Government, to anybody?—Yes.

Therefore the Government have the opportunity of stopping any acquisition of lands by Indians there. That I fancy is really the present state of the case. There is no ordinance against it, but the Government can always stop it?—That is so. There is no ordinance.

*Mr Cox.*—I take it your point of view is this, that there are certain portions of the Protectorate which are eminently suited for Indian settlement. There is one portion of the Protectorate which is eminently suited for white settlers, and you think it is only fair that the portion where white settlement is possible should be kept for white settlement?—I think so.

The Indians should be allowed to go elsewhere?—Yes, that quite fairly represents my view.

*Sir George Robertson.*—Do you think that these uplands are likely ever to become a white man's country?—I think so.

You think so from your experience in different parts of the world?—I think it would be a country for small men.

Do you think the white man will be able to live there and bring up his family, and that his children will live there?—Yes, quite.

Without being sent away to other latitudes to recruit?—I cannot see why he should not live there. The climate is very healthy.

*Mr Fremantle.*—You said it would be a country for small men, but is the small man now welcomed there?—The small man, I think, is the only man as a rule to make a living there—the man who has a few hundred pounds capital to start with.

According to their official publications they require a man with £1000 in his pocket, who would hardly be called a very small man?—I thought it was between £300 and £400. I am not questioning that, but I should think a man with £300 or £400 there would do quite well.

*Sir George Robertson.*—And would have good prospects of settling there with his family?—Would have good prospects of making a living.

*Mr Cox.*—You are familiar with the various climates of New Zealand, because we know you can get a great variety of climates in the North Island and the South. Which part of New Zealand would you compare the climate of the uplands to?—None; there is no comparison anywhere in the world.

It is hotter than any climate you get in New Zealand?—I would not say that, but it is a different climate. There is no climate in the world, I should think, like it.

Like New Zealand?—No, like the uplands of East Africa.

I was comparing it from the point of view of a man being able to live there, and bring up his family there, without sending his children home to recover their health?—I admit it is not a certainty; it is only my opinion, which I give for what it is worth. There is no possibility of drawing a comparison between this climate and that of any country in the world, except possibly that of the Himalayas.

*Sir George Robertson.*—Even your small settler would

not be able to do the manual work on the farm himself ; he would want black labour ?—He would do a good deal himself.

He would want black labour also ?—He would want black labour also. Take a settler in New Zealand. He would dig his own post holes and put his own fence up. In Africa he would have to get the natives to dig his post holes, and he would do the other part of the work ; but his time would be quite taken up in supervision.

He would have to have a large number of black labourers ?—No—a considerable number ; I would not say large, it would depend on the size of his farm.

Supposing he had a 500 acre farm, how many black men would he require ?—That would entirely depend on how he cultivated it. If he only kept a small stock of milch cows he would not require more than a dozen or 20. If he cultivated his land for sugar, coffee, or cocoa he might want some hundreds.

He could grow cocoa and coffee ?—There are beautiful plantations of coffee there now, employing an enormous quantity of labour.

*Chairman.*—It is a very attractive country, is it not ?—A very charming country.

The natives are good workers, you think ?—I think exceedingly good workers. They are extremely industrious people.

*Sir J. La Touche.*—Would there not be a difficulty about indentured labour in the coast land from the fact that there are no employers down there ?—There are very large concessionaires there. I object very strongly to concessions in the uplands. The only way in which they could get to develop the coast line was by concessions, and I understand very important concessions have been granted to fibre companies for sisal\*.

*Sir George Robertson.*—That is where they want indentured labour ?—They are going in for that very largely, and it is for that that the indentured labour is wanted. These other fibre factories you alluded to are not sisal, they are native fibre.

Is the nature of the soil such that the coolie, after he

\* A kind of hemp.

fulfilled his indenture, could get a profitable holding there for himself as a free settler?—I could not tell you, I do not know the coast line at all.

*Mr Ashley.*—Still, round Mombasa, if I recollect rightly, there are some quite flourishing native settlements, close to Mombasa on the coast?—Not to any great extent, as far as I know; but I do not know the coast line at all.

*Mr Fremantle.*—You say there are Indian market gardeners round Nairobi. What harm do you think it would do, supposing they were multiplied by one hundred? Do you not think it would be of use to the people?—I do not know where they would get a market for their produce.

Supposing there was a market for their produce, what harm do you think it would do?—I am very strongly of opinion that we should not have any more Indians there in the uplands than we have at the present time. One reason is, as I told you before, that there is the feeling among all classes of white men, both settlers and officials, that it would very seriously hamper the administration having to deal with them.

Is not that partly due to prejudices? I understand the greater part of the European population have come from Natal and South Africa, where there is no doubt a great prejudice against the Indian?—I went there without any preconceived prejudice against the Indian; I have no prejudice whatever against him, and I certainly sympathise with that view. I know we have discouraged the Indian very strongly in New Zealand, and I know in Australia the Indian is very strongly discouraged.

That is a different thing altogether; that is a white man's country?—Not more so. Australia only very partially so. There are many portions of East Africa infinitely better for white men, where you would have a far better time as a white man than in many parts of Australia.

*Mr Ashley.*—In Australia you have not a black race?—That is so; that makes the prejudice less unreasonable.

I take it your opinion is this: that here is a fine new country of which part is eminently suitable for white people, and part eminently suitable for Indians; why not divide the country, and let the part which is suitable for whites remain for the whites, and the part suitable

for Indians remain for the Indians?—I think that quite fairly expresses my view.

*Chairman.*—Have you anything further you can tell us, or any opinions to give us, that would be of use to the Committee?—Do you mean generally upon East Africa?

Upon the subject of the reference to the Committee. We must not ask you for anything beyond that, but if there is anything further you wish to say in explanation of your views, we shall be very glad to hear it?—I think that the Committee is fully aware of my views.

The witness withdrew.

## XII.

### MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON MINES.

THURSDAY, *2nd May*, 1907.

#### PRESENT :

LORD MONKSWELL (*Chairman*).

Sir Lindsay Wood, Bart. ; H. H. S. Cunynghame, Esq., C.B. ; W. Abraham, Esq., M.P. (Rhondda) ; F. L. Davis, Esq. ; T. R. Ellis, Esq. ; J. S. Haldane, Esq., F.R.S. ; Robert Smillie, Esq.

S. W. HARRIS (*Secretary*).

Mr DAVID HANNAH, called and examined.

*Chairman.*—You are a mining engineer and agent to Messrs D. Davis & Sons, Limited?—Yes.

Have you had 35 years' experience?—Yes.

You took your first-class Manager's certificate in the year 1879, and you have been appointed by the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners' Association to give evidence for Glamorganshire?—Yes.

Have you had any experience of mining outside Wales?—Not outside Wales.

You first of all go into the question of coal dust, and you say that it would be difficult to define clearly what is meant by a dusty or non-dusty mine. Have you any suggestion to make as to a definition?—I have no suggestion to make. It is very difficult to define when it changes from one to the other.

Have you any idea what amount of dry dust in a mine would be dangerous?—I have not.

It has been suggested to us that a very thick cloud of coal dust raised by an explosion would be less inflammable than a thinner cloud of dust. The theory, I understand, is that only a certain portion of the dust mixes with the oxygen, and explodes, and the remainder of the dust acts somewhat in the way of smothering an explosion. I do not know whether you have any experience of that?—I should not think that would be so.

So far as your experience goes, it is not so?—The thicker the cloud of dust the more dangerous, in my opinion.

And the further it would be carried on?—Yes.

I suppose you only say that, not from any detailed experience, but as a sort of general idea?—That is my opinion.

You have not thought the question out, I suppose?—Well, that is my opinion.

Perhaps you have not had your attention called to that theory?—Not to that theory.

You say that explosive dust may be found in all parts of a mine. I suppose in some parts of a mine it would be more explosive than in others?—Yes.

Where do you say the most dangerous part of the mine would be as regards coal dust?—First of all on the engine planes.

On the haulage roads?—More particularly in the engine planes with mechanical haulage than on horse haulage roads.

Next, the horse haulage roads?—Yes.

Do you think on a horse haulage road the dust would be more explosive than in travelling roads for men where the horses did not go? It has been suggested by some witnesses that horses kick up a lot of shale in the roadways, and that that mixes with the coal dust and renders

it less explosive than it otherwise would be?—All our travelling ways to the faces are horse haulages.

Do you think that the dust on the horse haulage roads is as explosive as the dust, we will say, on the roof and sides of any approach, or the faces?—They would be all horse haulage roadways. Of course the distinction is between engine planes and horse haulage roadways.

There are no roads where only men can go along in your mine?—There are none for coal-getting.

The effect of using horses, I suppose, is to mix a certain amount of shale with the coal dust?—That is so.

And that renders it less explosive?—Yes.

It is on the ground?—On the ground; and what is kicked into the air gets deposited on the roof and sides.

And that is not pure coal dust, but it would be mixed with shale?—Yes, mixed with shale.

Therefore not so explosive as on the engine planes?—That is so.

Then you say there are various reasons for causing an explosion, for instance, if there was an accumulation of gas by coming into contact with a naked light—by sparks produced by a collision of falling pieces of rock—by sparks caused by rock or ironstone falling on trams or rails—and by detonation or great heat given off in firing the explosive?—That is so.

Then you go on to say that under peculiar conditions of dust and atmosphere it may be possible to produce an explosion by the flame of a naked light, where fire-damp is not present, or where there is no shot-firing. Have you had any experience of that?—I have not, except what I have read of certain collieries where that has taken place.

You have no instance you can verify in South Wales of that happening?—No.

In every case where there has been an explosion, there has been either fire-damp, or if not fire-damp, the explosion has been caused by a blown-out shot, or something other than a mere flame of light?—That is so.

*Mr Wm. Abraham.*—But there has been a case in South Wales where no one knows what was the cause of firing?—The Chairman asked with regard to a flame or naked light starting an explosion from coal dust alone.

I think there are instances where falling ground has produced a spark which has produced an explosion.

*Chairman.*—Without any gas at all?—I could not say.

That would be extremely difficult to tell?—Yes.

Where you have falling ground in a very fiery mine, the probability is there may be a little gas released?—That would be so.

So that you cannot say of your own knowledge there has been any instance where an explosion has been started in the entire absence of gas otherwise than by a blown-out shot, or by some fairly violent explosion?—No, I cannot say that.

You say that an explosion would be much intensified by the presence of coal dust, or by strong currents of fresh air?—Yes.

You mean the strong current of fresh air would increase the volume of oxygen, and consequently chemically increase the force of the explosion by reason of there being more oxygen there to combine?—Yes.

I think we all agree that the purest and the finest coal dust is the most explosive. With regard to the fineness of the coal dust, do you find that there is any great difference in the explosive qualities of very fine coal dust?—I do not know that I do, but I am strongly of opinion that the finer the coal dust the more explosive it would be.

You say you get explosive dust from the working faces. There is not so much danger of explosion near the working faces, is there, as further away?—No.

But still there is a certain amount of danger if you fire shots in the working faces?—There may be a certain amount of danger.

You say the most dangerous form of dust is that blown from the top of trams?—Yes.

How would you deal with that?—The way in which we deal with it at present is this—we water the journeys on engine-planes before they start out.

Your coal does not deteriorate from being watered? There is no objection to watering the coal?—I think it would deteriorate to a certain extent if it was thickly watered; but the trams carry a large quantity of coal



and the watering they receive is simply on the surface so as to lay the dust on the top of the trams.

Is it watered from time to time as it goes along the engine-plane?—There is one spray at the start, at the commencement of the journey, and it is not watered more than that once until it gets to the pit bottom.

How long would it be on the journey?—About five or eight minutes; it depends on the distance.

One watering under those circumstances probably is quite sufficient?—Quite sufficient, I think.

I suppose if you had an enormously long engine-plane to deal with, it might be well to water it more than once on the way. However, that is not so in your mine?—No.

You say another cause of the accumulation of this very dangerous form of coal dust is that sometimes it escapes through the trams. I understand we have here a model of the latest tram?—Yes.

Do you think it would escape to a dangerous extent through that tram?—I do not think it would.

How long have you had that tram in use?—For 10 years.

That is practically the only tram you use?—We used to have trams that were not so closely sheeted, but during the last 10 or 12 years we have had them closely sheeted in that way, so that we have pretty nearly done away with the trams with the bars, or what are called screen trams.

So that although it has been raised 2 feet above the top still very little dust shakes out?—Very little dust shakes out. What there is is generally blown from the top of the tram; there is not much escaping through the bottom.

Notwithstanding that it is only covered on three sides. The fourth side is open with the exception of two bars?—Yes.

You have these bars for the convenience of loading and unloading?—Yes.

It would be very inconvenient if you had all four sides covered?—It would be.

If you had 2 feet above you could hardly cover it on the top?—No.

If you did cover it on the top it would no doubt very

much decrease the amount of coal dust deposited on the engine-plane ?—With a spray watering I do not think it would make very much difference.

You think the spray watering prevents the dust shaking out from the top ?—Yes.

That would depend a good deal, I imagine, upon whether the engine-planes ran smoothly or not ?—Yes ; the smoother the engine-planes of course the less dust there would be.

That is a matter you look after ?—Yes.

And if you find the engine-planes run in a jolty way you attend to that immediately ?—Yes. It is to our advantage to get the roads to run as smoothly as possible, because the coal is not so much shaken about and comes out steady on the trams.

You would have to pick up a certain amount of coal which would be deposited on the floor if the roads were bad ?—That is so. If the roads were bad there must be some deposited on the floor.

So that it is in every way desirable that the roads should be kept in a very good state of repair ?—That is so.

Then you say the dust may escape from the surface of the pit. How near are your screens to the pits ?—About 20 yards.

Do you think that is a sufficient distance ?—It is very difficult to get them otherwise. The valleys are so very narrow it is difficult to get the screens away from the pit.

So that when you open a new pit it would be difficult to have more than 20 yards ?—Yes, very difficult. In our valleys and most of the Glamorganshire valleys it is the same.

As you are obliged to have the screens so close to the pit, are there any means of preventing the dust going down by means of fans which would carry the dust away from the pit mouth ?—I think the system of watering on the top of the pit may be adopted, but I do not know whether it would be practicable to have a fan there or not. When the coal is being tipped on to the screens, it might be possible to spray the coal before it is tipped.

Do you do that now ?—We do not do it now.

You think it might be done ?—It might be done, but

there might not be a very high pressure of water on the top of the pits, as there is at the bottom.

Could you introduce sprays on the top of the pit, or at any point down the pit?—There might be a system adopted of spraying the tram before it is tipped; but it could not be a continuous spray because the men engaged on the screens in loading the coals from the screens to the trucks of course would get thoroughly wet, if it was a continuous spray. But when the tram was being tipped, if the coal was sprayed with a little water before tipped and then stopped, I think it might be of some use.

Supposing you were to adopt the system of spraying either at the top of the pit or near the bottom of the pit, or any part of the pit, so that any coal dust that went down into the pit would have to go through a spray of water, how would that do?—I may say our shafts are very wet now. I do not think it gets very far in from the pit bottom at present. Owing to the wetness of the pits there is constantly lots of water dropping down the shaft. The shafts are 350 to 400 yards deep.

You do not think there is any or very little deposit of dry dust coming from the bottom of the pit?—There may be a little, not much.

Nearly all your pits are as deep as that which you have given, I suppose?—They vary from 280 yards to 460 yards.

And they are all damp?—Yes, all damp.

You say that the coal dust in the working faces is usually of a coarse character, and not subject to the same atmospheric conditions as that of roadways. You mean there is not so much ventilation, or what?—The coal when being wrought is coarser in quality and not subject to the same atmospheric conditions as the dust back on the engine-planes.

What do you mean by atmospheric conditions?—I think when the coal dust has been subjected to the atmosphere it tends to pulverise and oxydise it and make it more dangerous.

You mean the coal dust becomes more dangerous the longer it remains in the mine?—That is my opinion.

The action of the air somehow makes it more liable to become inflammable?—That is what I think.

Independently of its being very fine or not, I suppose. Of course it gets more or less fine. The coarse dust is blown into the rest of the mine by the ventilation from the working faces ; and as it is blown into the mine, I suppose it would tend more or less to pulverise and become finer ?—Yes.

In that way also it would become more inflammable ? —Yes.

We should like to have your opinion about machine-cut coal, as there have been various views expressed upon that subject. You say that machine-cutting produces much finer dust ?—Yes.

That I suppose is certainly so. We have heard, on the other hand, that if you collect the dust at once from the machine and damp it there is no danger. As I understand it, the dust from the coal-cutting machine in some cases is immediately dealt with as it comes from the coal, and is somehow damped or deposited so that it will not do any harm. That is perhaps a rather difficult and delicate process ?—I think it is rather difficult to do that. The machine that we use is called the “ Pickwick ” coal-cutting machine, which has a revolving bar that goes in 5 feet underneath, and cuts it, and the cut is 5 inches thick. The revolving of the bar produces very fine small coal in its process. In the case of hand-cut coal, you simply put the pick into the coal and draw it down ; but the machine cuts the coal up into very fine particles.

Could you have any means of watering by taking buckets of water in, and immediately laying it on the dust ? —The fine coal dust is at the end underneath the coal about 5 feet in. You could not get at it to do that.

You would have to spread it by means of a pipe ?—And you would have to use it under great pressure if you did that.

Is it your opinion that the coal-cutting machines are a source of danger ?—I would not say that, but of course the coal dust produced is very much finer in the case of machine-cut coal than in the case of hand-cut coal.

So that you produce in the face much the same thing as you find in the haulage road : you have fine coal dust ? —It would not be so fine in the face as it would be on the haulage-road.

Not even with the coal-cutter?—No; because what I consider to be the dangerous dust on the engine-plane and horse haulage road is what blows in the air and becomes deposited on the roof and sides.

Would not that dust float in the air?—I do not think it would.

It would not be fine enough for that?—No, it would be too large.

So that it is not so fine as the finest dust?—Not so fine as the finest dust.

Still, it is a good deal finer than the dust which would be naturally produced by a man getting the coal by means of a pick?—That is so.

Are you disposed to think that the introduction of the coal-cutting machine is a success, and that you will go on with it?—It is more successful in certain parts of the country than it would be with us. In the steam coal in South Wales cutting by machinery is not quite a success. In consequence of the thinness of the seams it makes it very expensive in South Wales to get the thin seams cut at a reasonable price. We have simply tried one of the machines to see what the effect would be.

You are not sure whether the result is satisfactory or not?—Not yet.

Can you suggest any precautions which ought to be taken where the coal-cutting machines are used?—I cannot suggest anything more than is being done at present.

What is being done at present?—We have watering in some cases, not very far from the faces. We do not water the faces.

You water close by?—In some cases we do.

So that the very fine dust would not penetrate very far away from the face?—Yes.

It would be stopped by the water?—Yes, the fine dust produced now is in the cut underneath the seam of coal, and it is when the coal is brought down and filled into the tram that the dust in the cut is exposed.

And the ventilation carries that about to some extent?—Yes, to a very slight extent.

## XIII.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE  
DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE  
INTO AND REPORT UPON BRITISH FORESTRY.

TUESDAY, 6th May, 1902.

PRESENT :

Mr MUNRO-FERGUSON (*Chairman*).

Sir J. F. L. Rolleston, M.P. ; Mr E. S. Howard, C.B. ;  
Professor W. Schlich, C.I.E., F.R.S. ; Colonel Frederick  
Bailey, R.E. ; Professor J. R. Campbell, B.Sc. ;  
Mr J. H. Lewis, M.P. ; Mr George Marshall ; Dr W.  
Somerville.

Mr REGINALD H. HOOKER (*Secretary*).

Mr JOHN T. MAXWELL (Scottish Local Government  
Board), called, and examined.

*Chairman*.—You belong to the Scottish Local Government Board?—I do.

You have given us an interesting statement on the valuation of woodlands on which I will ask you one or two questions. Have you any official definition of woodlands?—I have no official definition of woodlands. In the statement which I have prepared I have dealt with ground under wood, whether as plantation or as woodland, which has been grown for the purpose of cutting.

Ground under wood may appear, I suppose, as shooting, or grazing, or as woodland?—It may appear as shooting, woodland, or, in some instances, as grazing. It does so in the valuation rolls. The valuation roll may contain an entry of an estate as a woodland or as a plantation. I cannot say what distinction the assessors draw between woodland and plantation. I am not aware of what the strict definition is.

The same area of land covered more or less with trees might be put under three separate heads of grazing, or

shooting, or woodland in the valuation roll?—I would rather not answer that question. I do not feel quite in a position to do so. It might depend to some extent upon the individual assessing.

There is no official definition to guide the assessor in classing a piece of woodland as plantation or as grazing or as shooting?—I am not aware of that.

Woodlands which are grazed and shot over are rated at their grazing and shooting values?—Yes, on both.

Therefore mature wood in a plantation which was grazed would be itself unrated?—Mature wood which was grazed?

Mature timber in a grazed plantation which might be worth possibly a good deal of money would not be rated: merely the grazing would be rated?—The grazing value would be rated, not the actual value of the mature wood. That is perhaps the only exception to the general law of valuing in Scotland. Subjects in Scotland are valued as nearly as possible at their actual value—that is to say, the rent they bring, or, if unlet, the rent which the assessor considers would be a fair and equitable rent for the subject. Twenty years after planting a wood is, of course, much more valuable than it was when first planted; but still the value put upon it by the assessor twenty years after planting, or thirty years after planting, is exactly the same—the grazing value—as it was the first year of planting.

On the other hand, wood, we will say, fifteen or twenty years old, which could not be grazed and was worth nothing, is rated at its full grazing annual value?—Yes. What the assessors do is to take the ground as if there were no wood upon it at all, and rate it at what it would bring in for grazing value—supposing there were no wood upon it.

The wood itself, therefore, as a subject pays rates whilst it is worth nothing, and pays no rates when it becomes mature?—No. That was settled by a case in Court.

It might be then worth a good deal?—That is so.

The wood when it is worth nothing as wood has to pay rates because a grazing value is charged when no grazing could be carried on. When it is matured, possibly worth

a good deal of money, and the wood is grazed, the grazing pays the rates, but the wood pays nothing?—That is so.

Have you had any complaints in regard to the system of local taxation of woodland?—The Local Government Board, so far as I am aware, have had no complaints.

Has your attention been called to the recent report on the incidence of local taxation in Scotland?—By the Royal Commission on Local Taxation?

Yes.—I have read that report.

It does not contain any reference to the woodlands?—Not any special reference, I think.

It makes no change?—I think not.

In dealing with the improvements of local rates you describe very clearly the incidence of taxation as applied by the Parish Councils. You said 10 per cent. is possibly being given off land; 20 per cent. off houses, and 33 per cent. or even more off railways. In some cases the deductions are much larger than those figures, are they not? In the case of the Highland line, for example, it is only paying rates on buildings?—That is not exactly because of large deductions, but because of the method of valuation. The railway valuation is made by the assessor of railways, and he has a special method, according to the profits, I understand. It is because a value is not entered on the valuation roll. It is not because of very large deductions, but because of the railway assessor's value of the subject.

I mentioned the point to show that these deductions, however they are made, involve heavier rates on other subjects?—Clearly.

You say that in 799 parishes, agricultural subjects are rated upon three-eighths of the annual value, but that woodlands are rated on the full annual value?—That is so. Woodlands are universally excluded, as I said, from the term "agricultural land and heritage."

Having had no complaints, you have not heard any expressions of opinion as to whether that is generally regarded as an equitable arrangement?—No, I have heard no expression of opinion.

Again, on the subject of deductions, where the agricultural rate is insufficient to meet the five-eighths to agricultural occupiers, the parish would have to raise a



rate to meet any such deficiency?—Yes. The occupiers would have to raise that rate.

The occupiers would have to raise that rate?—I am speaking of parish rates only just now. There is a distinction with regard to county rates.

Would part of the additional burden required to make good that deficiency be for the woodland?—Yes. If you will allow me I will state very briefly the method by which that deficiency where it exists is raised. Suppose a parish has to produce £500 of assessment, £250 of that amount would be raised from owners by an uniform rate. The other £250, less the amount of agricultural rates grant, would be raised from occupiers upon the occupiers' assessable rental, agricultural subjects being rated upon three-eighths only. Now, if the amount of the agricultural rates grant did not equal the amount of the five-eighths relief to agricultural occupiers, the deficiency would have to be spread over the whole of the occupiers. That is, a higher rate would fall upon occupiers than upon owners to make good that deficiency. Thus, in a parish the rate upon owners might be sixpence and the rate upon occupiers might be sevenpence, or even eightpence, ninepence, or tenpence per £, depending entirely upon the amount of deficiency and the value of agricultural land which was relieved of the five-eighths of its rental.

But all woodlands would be rated to make up any deficiency, to meet the deduction of five-eighths?—That is so, woodlands among other subjects.

You say that woodlands are rated upon the full gross rental. Is it not rather on the full net rental?—In county rates upon the full gross rental; in parish rates upon the gross rental under deductions mentioned in the 37th Section of the Poor Law Act. Parish rates are levied on the net annual value; county rates are levied on the gross, as appearing in the valuation roll.

But the county rates would be levied on the unimproved pastoral value of the land under timber?—Yes.

To get the rent of that you would deduct the cost, if it was part of a sheep farm, of the shepherds; therefore it would be the full net rental?—All the county rates are levied upon the value in the assessor's roll. It is for him to determine what shall come off.

Woodlands, so far as the incidence of the rating is concerned, are more heavily rated than agricultural land. They have no deduction under the Agricultural Relief Act?—In the great majority—

They are liable to make good any deficiency under that Act?—That is so. We would have to limit that however to those parishes which have no classification of occupants for rating purposes. In county rating woodlands always pay upon the full rental. In certain classified parishes, however, woodlands are rather more favourably treated. Indeed, in a number they are treated as favourably as agricultural land. In these parishes, of course, they are not worse off with regard to rates than agricultural land.

That is a very small percentage of parishes in Scotland where they do receive any favourable treatment?—Very small indeed. I have an example here.

I think you have given them in your statement?—Yes.

*Dr Somerville.*—I suppose there are cases in Scotland where the woodlands are handed over to the agricultural tenant to work for his own advantage?—I have had no experience in these matters, and cannot answer that.

You are not prepared to speak of the English system?—No. I can only speak to the rating of the Scottish system. I am not up in the English system.

I suppose then that the general principle that guides the rating of woodlands in Scotland is that an assumption is made that the return to the owner, when his land is planted, shall be just the same as the return when the land was under pasture?—Yes.

And if land unusually suitable for forestry is utilised, then the rating on the owner will be relatively very favourable, but if the land that is very unsuitable for planting is put under wood, then the owner, I suppose, will suffer somewhat?—That would follow naturally.

This then places, as it were, a premium upon good selection for the purpose of forestry?—Yes.

I suppose that in the case of woodlands it is the unimproved pastoral value that is taken as the basis?—It is practically the value of the ground before it was planted.

Unimproved?—Unimproved. The term of the Act

is in its "natural state." "Where lands and heritages consist of woods, copse, or underwood, the yearly value of the same shall be taken to be the rent at which such lands and heritages might in their natural state be reasonably expected to let from year to year as pasture or grazing lands."

Supposing in a case a landlord has a field of 20 acres which is under grass and is let only at £20 a year, and he makes up his mind he will put those 20 acres under trees, would the rateable value remain at £20 a year?—Yes.

But still the grass field before it was put under trees may have been drained, limed, and manured, and improved in a great many ways, to bring it up to the pastoral value of £1 an acre, and the £1 an acre is no longer the value of unimproved land, but is the value of highly improved land. So that I suppose the woodland rate subsequently would remain as it were on highly improved land, and not on land in its natural state?—I should say that would be a question for the assessor to settle when fixing the value.

In other words, we must not, I suppose, take this term unimproved or natural condition as being invariable, because this same land which as a grazing field was worth £1 an acre may in its natural and unimproved condition be worth only 2s. 6d. an acre?—I am sorry I cannot speak from that point of view.

We have already had before us the case of an area of comparatively matured woodland which is used for the purpose of grazing, and assuming that the unimproved value of this land is 2s. 6d. an acre, and further assuming that when the comparatively matured wood is pastured by sheep it is let for 2s. 6d. an acre, then it has been said that the trees on this area escape taxation. Apparently the wood escapes taxation, does it not, if the land is let for 2s. 6d. as grazing land, and it is carrying a stock of timber worth £20 or £30 an acre; then this timber is not being assessed?—It is not being assessed if the land is worth for grazing purposes as much with the timber upon it as it would be if there was no timber there.

There are, I believe, plenty of cases where a certain

amount of timber on the land does not interfere with the pastoral value?—Yes.

But, as a matter of fact, is it not the case that the timber after all has not escaped, because during the 30, 40, or 50 years, when the wood was enclosed, and no sheep were on it, the land then was assessed also at its unimproved pastoral value, and yet was returning no income at all to the landlord because it was not being grazed? Is it, therefore, not a fact that after the wood is thrown open to grazing it is then, as it were, bearing the rate which had been put on before it was opened?—I do not quite follow that question.

I will just take a specific example. We have an area of ground which in its unimproved condition is worth 2s. 6d. an acre. This area of ground is planted with trees, and during the first forty years no stock are allowed into the wood, and, therefore, the return to the owner, if any, comes from timber and the shooting. He at that time is assessed on a basis of 2s. 6d. an acre. After 40 years we will assume that the wood is thrown open to stock, and it may be to grazing, and is let, we will assume, at 2s. 6d. an acre. Now from the fortieth year onwards the landlord is really getting 2s. 6d. an acre from the grazing of this particular wood; but the area would be carrying timber worth £40 or £50 an acre, and that timber appears to be escaping assessment because the landlord is paying only on the 2s. 6d. he is getting from the pastoral tenant. I want to know if you agree with me that although the timber appears to be escaping assessment it has been really paying rates during the first 40 years when the landlord was receiving no pastoral rent?—Clearly.

Therefore, I think, although it may perhaps appear to be the case that woods which are grazed are escaping assessment so far as timber is concerned, that that timber has already, during the time the wood was enclosed, paid its fair share of rates and other things?—Yes, in the example you have just mentioned.

*Chairman.*—In your experience have you found that the practice of assessors differs very widely or differs at all in different counties in fixing the rates which woodlands should pay?—I cannot say I have. Of course there will be differences, but I think on the whole they are not great.

The Inland Revenue officers, who are the assessors in 24 out of 33 counties, should at any rate act upon the same principle.

They are assessors for the Inland Revenue Office?—Yes, they are also local assessors in these cases.

What is the local assessor usually by profession; is he a land valuer?—Sometimes he is a solicitor. Twenty-four out of the 33 county assessors are officers of Inland Revenue. The remaining nine have other professions. I think in one or two cases they are solicitors.

I understood you to say that the Inland Revenue officers or other assessors employed assessors?—No; the Surveyor of Income Tax may, under the Act of 1857, also be the local assessor, in which case no charge is made upon the local body for salary of assessor.

Then these valuations are made either upon the returns sent in by the landlord or by the men who have perhaps very little experience of the value of land?—I understand that in some counties, at any rate, the Inland Revenue surveyor may have the assistance of an expert in land to assist him in valuing—in Perthshire I believe that is the case—in which case the cost of the expert is borne by the county authority, the county council.

It seems rather desirable, does it not, that these valuations should be fixed by men who know something of the value of the land?—I am not aware that the number of complaints or appeals would justify any change.

I am not suggesting that there are any complaints. The fact that 24 out of 33 counties have employed the Government assessor would tend to show that in these cases they do not think it was necessary to employ anyone else?—They can employ whom they please as the assessor.

You think, on the whole, the values are properly fixed?—I have no reason to believe they are not. Of course, there are two appeal courts, an appeal to the committee of the county council or of the magistrates of burghs, and from that to the two judges of the Court of Session.

If you appeal to the county authority, you are appealing to practical men?—Yes, you are appealing to practical men.

## XIV.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE  
THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON  
SIGHT TESTS.

FRIDAY, 21st October, 1910.

## PRESENT :

The Right Hon. A. H. D. ACLAND (*Chairman*).

The Lord Rayleigh, O.M., F.R.S. ; Sir Arthur Rücker, F.R.S. ; Mr Raymond Beck ; Captain Thomas Golding ; Professor Francis Gotch, F.R.S. ; Mr Norman Hill ; Mr Edward Nettleship, F.R.C.S. ; Mr T. H. Parsons, F.R.C.S. ; Professor J. H. Poynting, F.R.S.

Dr WILLIAM WATSON, F.R.S.

Mr S. G. TALLENTS.

*Secretaries.*

Mr W. T. DUNLIN called and examined.

*Chairman.*—We are very much obliged to you for coming, and especially for coming at such short notice. It is a great convenience to ourselves. I understand you are secretary of the Joint Arbitration Committee at Grimsby?—That is so.

What is the function of that committee?—To arbitrate on all the collisions, which are very numerous out of the port of Grimsby, between steam fishing vessels only.

Then you are chairman of the Navigation Board?—That is so.

Is that a laborious function too ; is there a great deal to do?—No. We issue certificates to the candidates independently of the Board of Trade certificates, and it is also a tribunal for misdemeanours of captains and mates of vessels, apart from the law courts. We deal with them according to their certificates.

Does your Board meet pretty frequently?—The Navigation Committee meets on Wednesday and Friday evenings of each week.

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And you generally have cases before you?—Yes, constantly.

Then you help the examiners of skippers and second hands with regard to the candidates?—The Board of Trade?

Yes.—Yes. For 20 years I held that position in conjunction with Mr Alward, who resigned two years ago ; but I now do it along with Captain Ellery.

So you are perfectly familiar with these tests?—Yes. I have been a skipper for a number of years, and have been used to the lights there ever since they have been in existence.

Has your experience been chiefly confined to sailing trawlers?—My experience has been both with and without steam. I have also been a surveyor for the annual surveys of vessels and for the insurance, for a number of years, though I do not hold that position to-day.

Well, with your knowledge of the tests which are now applied according to the Board of Trade Regulations, will you give us your opinion of them? Will you tell us what you think about them?—Respecting the eye test or the lights test?

Well, shall we take the vision test first?—I have a statement here which I am desirous of reading, though it was made out in a hurry. But I will read it if you like.

Do just as you please. But will you take the vision or the colour first?—I will take the vision first. In dealing with this question of light tests it is necessary to arrive at a satisfactory understanding, and to dismiss from our minds the present methods employed for testing, and turn to the actual conditions which a seaman must be capable of interpreting in his calling whilst at sea. These in brief are, I take it, to distinguish the various white and coloured lights, and to distinguish the flags of the Commercial Code. I will deal with these in their order of importance. With regard to lights, the lights at present in use are white, red, and green. Now it must be admitted by all persons here, that in this regard the main test should be with illuminated glasses of white, red, and green, shown from a lantern in a darkened room. Next, the question as to the effect of atmospheric conditions on these lights should be provided for, that is, under conditions of fog, haze, mist, rain,

falling snow, &c. I claim that these conditions should be simulated as far as practicable in the test room, and when a man has satisfactorily proved his ability in this respect, no further test would be necessary. At this point I would suggest that the Board of Trade take into serious consideration the advisability of defining those shades of red and green which prove of most value under all weather conditions, as at present there is no fixed shade of either colour, and any glass manufacturer is allowed to supply any shade of red and green that suits his particular fancy as is evidenced by the numerous shades of side lights in vogue at present. To revert to weather conditions, I acknowledge the difficulty to be met with in simulating snow, hail, or sleet : these can be ignored. But fog, mist, and rain can be simulated at little expense by providing a simple apparatus, which would, by means of falling water or rising steam, reproduce the conditions and effect of fog, mist, or rain on the lights in question. This, in my opinion, should complete the test, and if carried out on these simple lines anything further would be quite unnecessary. With regard to flags, that is a minor consideration entirely ; as, were a man to state correctly the coloured glasses, little fear need be entertained as to his ability to name the flags from a colour point of view, because the shape and arrangement of the colours in the flag practically decides its name. However, should it be considered advisable to include this in the examination, then let the Board of Trade provide a small book to each examiner, with the various coloured buntings inside, and let the candidate name the colour of each bunting, white, black, red, blue, yellow—five pieces in all—but by all means cut out from the examination the wool test, with its innumerable shades and matchings, which serves to little purpose apart from the discomfiture of the candidates concerned. I should like to add in conclusion, that in all my experience at sea on the various fishing grounds, where our boats are practically surrounded all the time by white, green, and red lights, I never found a man to make a mistake in the naming of a light. I should like to put it to the nautical gentlemen here present—did they at any time in their sea experience ever know a light to be misnamed ? We have in Grimsby a model called the ruroscope for teaching our men the



rule of the road at sea, which consists of a steamer electrically lighted and controlled by a steering wheel. (*Handing copies of booklet to members of the Committee.*) The various lights actually to be met with at sea are then switched on from a cabinet facing the man, simulating exactly the sea conditions. The red, green, and white lights in their correct relative positions tell him exactly what description of vessel is approaching. The steering wheel is in the man's hand, the steam whistle on his left, and the telegraph on his right, and he must act precisely as if he were at sea in charge of the bridge. This is a step in the right direction, and supersedes the old method of coloured balls which, to say the least, are a great strain on the imagination. I have known fishermen, who have finally failed as colour-blind, when brought before this model, name every light or combination of lights correctly.

Is this in use in the Grimsby Technical Navigation School?—Yes; it is patented by J. Smith.

Do a certain number of employers insist on their passing this test?—That is a part of the test. We insist upon them passing that test. That is at the school. It is under the Board of Education at Grimsby now.

And are they put through that test in preference to the Board of Trade test?—Well, they have to go through that in their examination. That is, all students at school have to go through that, and they pass that before ever they go to the Board of Trade examiners.

They pass this when at school?—Yes.

Is this for lads?—Yes, and for skippers and mates too—skippers and mates principally.

Will a skipper go through this test every few years?—No.

Only once for all?—Yes, only once; and when he is graduating up for mate or skipper.

Then he goes through this, and he may have to go through the Board of Trade test afterwards?—Yes, he goes through the Board of Trade test afterwards.

Do you consider this ruroscope a better test?—Yes, by far. I do not know whether you saw the letter sent up to this Committee expressing my views on this wool-test. I denounce it entirely.

I saw, in a general summary of your evidence, that you

thought the skeins should be abolished and white, red, and green lights substituted?—Yes, screened lights in a room, and not to graduate from a simple light colour to the extreme red or green.

Does the ruroscope fulfil the conditions?—Yes, all we require. Everyone who sees it praises it.

What about the conditions of fog, and so on? Does it attempt to do that?—No, it does not. But we think we might do something towards it, by simulating steam and such like things, to see if it altered the man's opinion as to the light, when he saw it under those conditions.

You think something of that sort might be done?—Yes, and at a very small cost.

Then with regard to the flags, you think it might be reasonable to have bunting?—Yes.

You would not have any wool test?—No. I would have bunting, and they should name the colours of the bunting.

Would you have a considerable variety?—I should have all the colours that the different nations use.

And if a man could not name the colour fairly well, you would fail him?—I do not know that I should fail him as long as he knew the red, green, and white. But you will notice what I said in my statement respecting the shades of green and red. They differ terribly. We think a shade ought to be national, if not universal, because there are so many. The lamp makers, or glass manufacturers, put what shade of red or green they like. Some of them are nearly blue, and consequently they are not so easy to distinguish, as if they were a proper green or red.

There ought to be a standard?—Yes, I consider there should be.

When a captain is buying, does he order according to the fancy of the purchaser?—No, he does not fancy at all. He orders a set of lights for his vessel. He may glance at them. If they are green and red, he takes them as a matter of course. But the Board of Trade will pass them. The Board of Trade surveyors do not say anything about it. But we know there is a lot of difference in the shade of the green and red.

Do you think that is a source of danger—the variation of the colours?—Well, as far as a source of danger is

concerned, I never found it to be one in my practical experience.

Why is it you lay such stress on it being a standard colour?—Because there is so much difference in the shade of red and green lights.

But why do you think it is so important we should have a standard colour?—Because we do not know what it may lead to. We do not know how far the imagination of the glass manufacturer will lead him to have a shade. There ought to be a standard shade.

You think it might become dangerous?—Yes.

That is the reason?—Yes, that is the reason.

Then you say that the wool test has led to the discomfiture of candidates who really were all right?—Yes; you will see that I have said in my paper that they have been failed by the Board of Trade. I do not put them through that test. That does not come under my ken. But with the examiner that examines them there, I have known them to fail; and we have taken them on the lights, and they have named the lights as they were.

On the ruroscope?—Yes. But I have also taken them to the lights. I have had them in a room, and the lights lighted; and when the sail has been moved, they have named the colours.

Do you think that is enough?—Yes, we think it is ample.

Do you think there is any general feeling of discontent as to the present methods?—Yes; they denounce this method entirely in our place.

But I suppose there are not a great many instances of men going about, who have been failed by the wool test, and are known generally to be all right, and not colour-blind?—No, I do not know of many. I have known it to be so, but not in many cases; it is very rare. I never knew a man name a light wrong at sea in my life.

Are you inclined to think that tests are unnecessary altogether?—No, they are not. When a light is put before them, we test them with a red, or a green, or a white. I am referring to a light, and not to skeins of wool.

Do you know men who are purely colour-blind from the point of view of ordinary glass?—I have never come across one yet that was colour-blind with a light.

That shows that in your experience it is extraordinarily rare?—Yes, it is very rare.

And yet you think there ought to be some test to cut out the possible man?—Yes.

There might be such men, although you have not known them?—Yes, that is so. I have been to sea from the time I was a boy, and I am dealing with men to-day more than when I went to sea. I might say, in my occupation as secretary to the Arbitration Committee—such a statement as I am going to make might seem extraordinary to a nautical man—that in one year we had 980 collisions. To take the evidence of that list would mean about three collisions a day. I take all the evidence, both at night-time and day-time, and I have a varied experience.

And you never knew a collision that you thought had anything to do with mistaking the colour of the lights?—No, not one.

And you never knew a man who had been failed with the light test?—Not with lanterns, but I have with the wools.

But the ruroscope has never failed a man?—No, not one.

And the wool test has?—Yes.

Have you anything to say about the pure question of eyesight, apart from colour altogether?—No. I am not an eye specialist in any way whatever.

You know what we call form-vision?—Yes.

*Professor Gotch.*—You are aware that there is a new form test which is more severe than the old one?—I understand so, though I have not seen it yet.

And that it will cut out a good many candidates? I only want to know your opinion as to whether you consider that it is absolutely a bar to a seaman to have to depend on glasses, whether binocular or otherwise?—I do not hardly grasp what you mean.

Supposing you had a man who could not see properly without the use of glasses, spectacles, would you consider that to be enough to cut him out?—No. I consider myself fit to go and take charge of any vessel to-day. Of course, I should want my glasses on. There are plenty of captains and mates, too, that have to use glasses.

. *Chairman.*—If you were using binoculars, would you

use binoculars with your spectacles on?—No, I should take my spectacles off. I always do in that case.

*Captain Golding.*—You stated that there is no standard, or, rather, that the standard colours for red or green lights are not observed, and that they vary in colour. Are you positive of that?—I am positive there is not a real standard.

*Captain Golding.*—I should like to ask if we might put in as evidence the Board of Trade Regulations with regard to instructions to surveyors, because Sir Walter Howell said distinctly that all vessels had to conform to it.

*Mr Raymond Beck.*—Was it not in a very wide range?

*Captain Golding.*—I asked Sir Walter Howell the question myself.

*Mr Raymond Beck.*—I understood him to say there was a range in the standard.

*Captain Golding.*—I understood him most distinctly there was a standard. Except in the case of green lights with a yellow illuminant, you had light green; and if electricity was the illuminant, you had a darker green.

*Mr Nettleship.*—Was there not more than one shade of red? I have an impression there was a certain range.

*Dr Watson.*—I have had a set of these standard glasses. The surveyors are provided with two red glasses, and the ship's glass must lie somewhere between them. In the green glass there are two greens, and in the case of an oil lamp it must be somewhere between those; and there is a third green which has to be used in the case of an electric light. So that the surveyors are provided with standard colours, and all ships' colours are supposed to lie between those. Each standard has a certain range, and it is defined by the two glasses.

*Mr Nettleship.*—There is no absolute standard. There is a certain standard.

*Dr Watson.*—There is a limit.

*Captain Golding.*—Might we not have a copy circulated to us?

*Dr Watson.*—It is printed in the appendix to Sir Walter Howell's evidence.

*Chairman.*—Whatever it may be, you consider the limits are too wide?

*Witness.*—Yes. I would like to say, in answer to

Captain Golding, with respect to the surveyor, I know him well, and I knew his predecessor, and I have served continually with him as regards insurance. There is the red light and the green light. But if you go on another vessel, you would see another shade of red or green. There has been no complaint. I consider the range is too wide.

*Mr Raymond Beck.*—Have you personally taken part in the examination of this ruroscope?—I have not taken any part. I have seen the candidates before the ruroscope. I have been in the room, but have taken no part in it.

Is it your opinion that a candidate going through the instruction, or going through the course, would at once be detected, if he had any difficulty in distinguishing the red or green light?—Yes. If you will look at his position there, and the instructions in the book, you will see that must be so. The lights are put before him. He is at the wheel; there is a ship in front of him and there is a light shown, a red or green light, as it may be, or both, and he must alter his helm to clear those lights, either the port helm or the starboard, as the case may be. If he made a mistake, of course, he would know there would be confusion and collision, and he would fail over it every time. But this ruroscope is not in the examination room; it is in the school.

*Chairman.*—Is there any other point, beyond what you have been good enough to represent to us, which you would like to bring before us?—No. If there is any question you would like to ask me, and I am able to answer it, I shall be pleased to do so. But that is, in brief, all I have to say about the lights.

Does the introduction of steam trawlers affect the question at all, as compared with what the conditions used to be?—In what particular?

Does the rapidity of the movement of boats and ships affect it?—Yes. The old sailing vessels were not so quick on each other as are the steam boats to-day; and steam trawlers are very smart little craft, and they have to be very smart in handling them, especially amongst a fleet.

The requirements are, therefore, in this matter more necessary?—Yes, more necessary than they were before. Although we have no fleets out of Grimsby, there are four fleets out of Hull, and they are always at work fishing in

the North Sea, and the fish is sent direct to London. I should say those fleets would number just over 100, or just under 100 each. They congregate together under an admiral, and they have to manœuvre the vessels amongst each other by night as well as by day.

*Mr Raymond Beck.*—Do they still make use of rockets for the purpose of manœuvring now?—Yes. The admirals do that, in order that the other vessels should be able to distinguish which way he is going to shoot his nets, whether it is to the east, or the west, or the north, or the south. The carriers also have the rockets to send up, when they think they are in the vicinity of the fleet at night, so that the admiral may be able to answer them. Each has a particular rocket.

*Professor Gotch.*—How many certificated officers are there on an ordinary fishing trawler?—We are issuing a third-hand certificate to-day. That is issued from the Joint Arbitration Committee. I proposed it, and it was carried. I issued 363 for servitude, and now the third-hand certificate is issued from the Navigation Committee.

How many would there be certificated on an ordinary fishing trawler?—There would be the third hand, the mate, and the captain. The captain and the mate have the Board of Trade certificates. With regard to the third hand, the Board of Trade have not done that yet.

But you propose to give it in your certificate?—Yes, or else they cannot take a vessel.

Does that mean some sort of colour-test?—Yes. He would not be allowed to take charge of the vessel, unless he could describe the lights.

*Chairman.*—Do you put him through your own test?—Yes.

And give him a certificate accordingly?—Yes.

*Chairman.*—We are very much obliged to you for your kindness in coming here.

## XV.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO AFFAIRS  
IN SOMALILAND.

No. 1. From the Acting Commissioner to the  
Secretary of State.

(Received 1 *September*, 1913.)

[*Answered by No. 2.*]

COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, BERBERA,  
*19th August*, 1913.

SIR,

I have the honour to report to you, in detail, on the action fought on the 9th August at Magalayer, in the Dul Madoba District, beyond Idoweina, between the Camel Constabulary and a dervish force estimated at some 1500 riflemen. It will be necessary for me, in the first place, however, in order thoroughly to explain the situation, to recount some past history, after which I propose to set forth the circumstances which actually led up to the engagement.

2. You will have gathered from previous despatches which I have had the honour to address to you since I took over temporary charge of the Protectorate on the 2nd June of this year that I was far from easy in my mind as to the wisdom of retaining longer the Camel Constabulary in its advanced position at Burao, in view of recent signs of a renewal of dervish activity, and the prevailing uncertainty as to developments. As you are aware, the changes in the political situation in this country are of almost daily occurrence, and follow after one another often with startling rapidity. With a marauding band several thousands strong established within our own borders, it is quite impossible accurately to foresee all eventualities. I repeat, then, that I had misgivings, but nothing sufficiently definite to act upon. The Commandant of the Constabulary, Mr R. C. Corfield, a specially selected officer with great political experience of this country gained in former days, had considered that no



danger attached to the occupation of Burao by the Camel Constabulary, and, after the fullest consideration, it had been decided to establish the corps at this point. It has been based on Burao, without incident, since the 16th of January of this year.

3. The necessity which arose a year ago for the formation of this constabulary force and its subsequent history, has already formed the subject of voluminous correspondence. I do not consider, therefore, that this matter requires recapitulation at my hands *de novo*. Should any statement of the sort be required, I venture to submit that it would be more properly, and more ably, made by Mr Byatt, who has a far more complete knowledge of all the circumstances. Moreover, at the time when the Camel Constabulary proceeded up-country, and while it was effecting all its initial success, I personally was away from the country on leave, *i.e.* from November 4th, 1912, to March 31st, 1913, and I am not, therefore, in a position to write on the subject with authority. I can only speak generally to the fact that, while employed on its proper duties—till overtaken by this disaster, in other words—the corps in its short career had more than justified its existence by restoring, in a period of little over eight months, complete peace and order amongst the friendlies after two years of undesirable confusion. To have withdrawn the corps at this juncture, therefore, on the ground of indefinite reports without some strong reason in support, such as the actual imminence of danger, appeared to me to be an unwarrantable action to take, especially as it is only from this centre, Burao—in the opinion of those best able to judge—that the friendly tribes of the Protectorate can be properly controlled, and deterred from continuing their appalling internecine warfare of the years 1911 and 1912, when left by Government to their own devices. I do not see any good purpose in concealing the fact that during this period it is estimated that about one-third of the male population of the friendly tribes of this Protectorate was exterminated in inter-tribal fighting. Placed, then, in the predicament which I have explained above, I decided—being the officer temporarily responsible to His Majesty's Government for the welfare of the Protectorate—to proceed in person to Burao, to consult

with Mr Corfield, and to form my own conclusions on the spot. I communicated to you my intention of so doing in my despatch of the 25th of July. With a view to a full consideration of the situation from every aspect, I selected Captain G. H. Summers, Indian Contingent, King's African Rifles, as the most senior military officer at my disposal in the Protectorate, to accompany me to Burao in charge of my small escort of 20 regular troops.

4. I arrived at Burao on the 6th August, and two days afterwards a report was received by Mr Corfield that dervishes were severely raiding the friendlies in the district between Idoweina and Burao, their operations extending to within two or three miles of Ber. Now, upon that very morning I had been listening in durbar for four hours to the representations of the friendlies—representations to the effect that, unless Government would come to their assistance and protect them with an adequate force, their annihilation at the hands of the dervishes would be complete within a year or two. I admit, therefore, that at first I was sceptical as to the imminence of the danger represented as pressing at 1.30 p.m. of the same day. The dervishes had not attacked the locality in force for two years. That they should have selected this very time, when I happened to be present, to arrive on the scene from the haroun, 170 miles distant as the crow flies—and I need scarcely say that we can get no reliable information, of course, of dervish intentions in advance—appeared to me to be too extraordinary a coincidence to be credited. However, after a discussion on the situation with Mr Corfield, I adopted the view that some action was obviously indicated, even though I still regarded the information as likely to be without foundation in fact, and supplied by the friendlies merely to impress me with the extreme seriousness of their plight. I accordingly ordered a strong reconnaissance by the Camel Corps in the direction of Ber to ascertain the facts, and instructed Captain G. H. Summers, Indian Contingent, to accompany the force with a view to forming his own conclusions and advising me later on the military situation, before I decided on future action.

5. The Camel Constabulary moved out from Burao at 3 p.m. on the 8th instant at the following strength :

Commandant—R. C. Corfield ;

Assistant Commandant—C. de S. Dunn ;

Attached—Captain G. H. Summers, Indian Contingent;

Rank and file (including followers)—116.

The pony section proceeded in advance. Mr Corfield appears to have received information on the road near Ber that a large dervish party had, in truth, arrived, and were making Idoweina water, 30 miles south-east of Burao, their rendezvous. He thereupon decided to proceed rapidly in this direction, and at 9 p.m. arrived at Der Keinleh, within four miles of Idoweina. At this point shots were heard, and the lights of the dervish fires were seen illuminating the sky. Illalos sent forward to reconnoitre returned to report the enemy assembled in force. Friendlies who subsequently joined the Camel Constabulary estimated the dervish numbers at 2000 riflemen with 150 horse.

6. Had the Commandant at this juncture fallen back and reported to me on the situation, a valuable service would have been rendered, even though some risk had been incurred. My standing orders to him, communicated to you as an enclosure to my despatch of the 23rd of June, and duly approved by your despatch of the 18th of July, gave, as you are aware, no discretionary powers whatsoever in the matter of engaging the dervishes, or even proceeding on these extended patrols ; and, as regards this, clearly defined the position of the Constabulary. Moreover, there is a record in this office that copy of your despatch of the 24th of January was duly forwarded by Mr Byatt to the Commandant for his perusal and guidance. Contrary to orders, however, the Commandant decided to engage the dervishes, and to place his force in such a position as to intercept on the morrow their line of retreat with their stock into the Ain. I need scarcely comment on the hazardous nature of such an undertaking with the force at his disposal. In fairness to Captain Summers, also, it must be recorded that he made a grave representation to Mr Corfield as to the rashness (in his opinion) of his decision, from both a political as well as from a military point of view, considering the nature of the instructions given, and the issues involved. For the reason, however, that military action had never been contemplated, orders

had not been given for Captain Summers to assume command.

7. The night of the 8th instant passed without incident. The Camel Constabulary moved out from Der Keinleh at 5.30 a.m. on the 9th instant, and, marching rapidly to Magalayer, cut the dervish line of retreat with their stock into the Ain. At 6.45 a.m., the Constabulary was severely attacked by a force numbering, at a conservative estimate, 1500 riflemen. From native sources of information it would seem that the numbers even exceeded this figure, approximating rather to 2000 men. The full details of the fight which ensued, and the dispositions, &c., are supplied by Captain Summers and Mr Dunn in reports which are being forwarded to you to-day under separate cover. At 7.15 a.m., Mr Corfield, fighting gallantly, was shot through the head, and died instantly. The bodies of his interpreter, Haji Jama Geili, a well-known and loyal servant of this Protectorate, and his two personal servants were found during the action lying close beside him. The dervishes evidently made three desperate assaults on our position, coming on in waves, and altogether advanced to the attack eight or nine times. There can be no doubt they were fully determined to annihilate our small force. More or less continuous fighting lasted for over five hours, from 6.45 a.m. to 12 midday, during which time Captain Summers was wounded three times. Mr Dunn providentially remained unscathed under constant fire. Soon after midday it became apparent that the dervishes had practically exhausted their ammunition supply. Had it not been so, nothing in human possibility could have saved the Camel Constabulary from being completely overwhelmed, and the annals of the Protectorate from a repetition of the history of Gumburru. It is fortunate, also, that there were no spearmen with the dervish force. A party of 200 spearmen could undoubtedly, at this point, have carried the zariba by assault, and killed every man at his post. It can well be realised that our small party had by now reached its limit of endurance. Probably 300-400 rounds of ammunition per man had been fired. There was no shade and the heat was intense; nor had they any water.

8. The maxim gun was put out of action by rifle fire,

and did not jam, as previously reported, after firing little more than three belts. It lacked a shield. Of the team of five serving the gun, one man was killed and three were wounded. Consistently heavy dervish fire was directed against the maxim gun position, and it was here that most of our casualties occurred. On one occasion hand-to-hand fighting ensued, and a dervish was shot by Captain Summers actually within the zariba. Most of the fighting, in fact, in this action of Dul Madoba (Black Hill) was of a most desperate character, and firing at short range was general.

9. As to the conduct of the Somalis in the action, they more or less lived up to reputation. Some of the Camel Corps behaved with conspicuous bravery, and others—to my regret that I should have to say so—thought more of their own safety than that of their officers and comrades, making good their retreat through the thick bush, and finally rejoining the force between the zariba and Idoweina water when the fight was over. As an extenuating circumstance, however, for these men, it can truly be said that with insufficient training this Constabulary force was suddenly called upon to endure the most severe test—a test, indeed, which might well have tried the morale of highly-trained and disciplined regular troops. It was never intended that the Corps should have been put to such a use. Moreover, dread of the dervish name has undoubtedly eaten deep into the heart of every Somali in this country, and this fact, in my opinion, greatly adds to the creditable performance of the small band of some eighty men, who stood their ground with their officers and fought bravely\*. I need scarcely say that the

\* *In Zariba—*

33 killed.

16 wounded.

28 survivors at the end of the fight.

—  
77 rank and file.

Some 8 or 10 men fell out on the road and returned, owing to the unfit state of their camels, thus never coming into action.

At a court of enquiry convened at Sheikh, and sitting on the 13th and 14th instant (under presidency of the Acting Commissioner) 24 men were found guilty of desertions in the face of the enemy and were dismissed from the Corps with ignominy.

friendlies, some 300 in number, who advanced with the Camel Corps to attempt to recover their stock, disappeared at the first shot, and were not seen again, excepting a few individuals, who returned to the scene after the fight was virtually over.

10. At 3.30 p.m., having ascertained that the dervishes had drawn off, Mr Dunn began his retirement on Burao. Some sixty of the riding camels and horses had been killed in action, and, in addition to the wounded, some of the men were exhausted, so that Mr Dunn lacked sufficient transport. He succeeded, unaided, however, in bringing out the remnant of his party, Captain Summers, and all the wounded, and the maxim gun ; and I consider that throughout the engagement this officer's conduct has been most highly meritorious. It is deeply to be regretted that it was found impossible to remove Mr Corfield's body. He was, therefore, buried on the spot, but, if considered desirable, it may be possible later to take steps to recover his remains.

11. The casualties on our side are as follows :

Force engaged	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Remarks
Officers .. .. 3	1	1	—	R. C. Corfield killed Capt. Summers wounded.
Rank and File C.C. 109	27	19	3	
Followers .. .. 7	5	1	—	One deserter.
Total .. 119	33	21	3	

These figures, showing practically 50 per cent. of the force, bear testimony to the severity of the fighting. On the dervish side the losses number, at the lowest estimate (that formed by the two officers), 200 men killed on the spot ; while 30 more bodies were found subsequently by our Illalos at Olesan, where the dervishes encamped on the night following the engagement. It is estimated by the same party, who observed the dervish withdrawal into the Ain from the summit of Burdab, that they carried, mounted on camels, something like 100 wounded. The

dervishes captured from us four riding camels, but no rifles nor ammunition. Native information confirms the belief that the dervishes, likewise, were severely shaken by the severity of the action.

12. The history of the dervish movements from the time they left the haroun at Tale till the time they returned to Olesan, in the Ain, with their looted stock has been furnished to me by a captive dervish boy. To embody the information, however, in the report under submission would prolong it to undue length. I shall, therefore, prepare it in memorandum form with a view to subsequent transmission, if required. The estimates of the numbers of the dervish party, given by both friendlies and the captive dervish boy, agree very closely, and I do not think that the figures are greatly in error. They are as follows :

2000 riflemen—counted up to this number as the war party left the haroun.

150 horsemen—subsequent movements unknown.

100 spearmen—remained during fight with captured stock.

---

Total 2250 men.

It is estimated by the captive, who is an exceedingly intelligent lad, that this force comprises just about one-half of the Mullah's active following. The party was led by Ow Yusuf Abdillah Hassan, the brother next in seniority to the Mullah himself.

13. To return to Burao, and to my own part in what, I fear, can only be accounted, from the Government point of view, as a regrettable incident, I received a first intimation of the imminence of the engagement at about 9.30 a.m. on the 9th instant, by a communication addressed to me by Mr Corfield, when halted for the night at Der Keinleh. He reported the dervishes then in force three miles distant, and warned me of his intention to attack on the following morning. It is apparent to me that he considered any other action impossible, for the sake of our already much-shaken prestige in this country. I noticed at Burao that the difficulty of his position weighed heavily upon his mind.

The situation was now, of course, beyond my control. I took all precautionary measures possible at Burao, with the small resources at my disposal, anticipating the return of the force in disorder, and I then awaited events. At 4.30 p.m. two mounted Constabulary men galloped in and reported verbally that the Camel Corps had been heavily engaged by the dervishes, and had sustained a very severe check ; and that there were very many casualties : that one officer and about thirty men only remained in action, and that this small remnant was unable to fall back without assistance. The dervishes remained in the field, but they, too, were severely shaken. As we know now, this account was exaggerated, and of an unnecessarily alarmist nature. A subsequent messenger despatched to me never arrived at all. I therefore forwarded to you my first telegram\* acquainting you with the situation, as represented to me, and at 6 p.m. moved out to the assistance of the party with my personal escort of 20 rank and file of the Indian Contingent, and about one hundred spearmen and seventy riflemen, whom I had been able to collect together in the time. I could not have hoped to have arrived on the scene (nearer 40, than 30, miles distant as it transpires) before well on in the morning. I therefore called for and secured two Somali volunteers, mounted men, to ride through to Mr Dunn to inform him that I was coming to his assistance as quickly as possible, but advising him, owing to the weakness of my reinforcements, to withdraw under cover of darkness if he found it possible to do so, otherwise to stand firm till I could arrive. In effect, as has already been shown, the remnant of the Camel Constabulary had started their retirement several hours previously, under Mr Dunn's command, and I joined up with them at 2 a.m. some 18 miles south of Burao, on the Burao-Bohotleh road. We thereupon returned to Burao.

14. Subsequent to this time I have kept you fully informed by telegraph of all my actions and intentions. On return at 6.30 a.m. on the 10th instant, I gave public notification in Burao bazaar that I intended to withdraw within twenty-four hours, and advised traders and Somalis alike to move out of the danger zone. They did so with

\* Not printed.



alacrity. I hear to-day (August 19th) that dervish scouts have arrived at Burao and that parties of them have also returned to Idoweina. These reports may, or may not, be true. I moved Captain Summers and all the wounded, together with most of the Government stores, on the night of the 10th towards Sheikh : and followed with Mr Dunn and the main party and all the remaining stores on the following morning, the 11th instant, on the expiry of the prescribed time limit. No panic of any sort occurred, and the retirement throughout was carried out in good order. All Government property was removed from Burao, including camel-fodder and so forth. Early on the morning of the 12th the two parties rejoined at Sheikh. Captain Summers and the wounded had stood the journey well, none having fallen out by the way, and they were here handed over to the care of the Senior Medical Officer, who had arrived from Berbera overnight. At 10.30 on this day, the 12th instant, Lieutenant Kingdon arrived at Sheikh in accordance with his instruction, with 130 rank and file of the Indian Contingent and occupied the fort, which is in good repair and is a strong position. I remained for three days at Sheikh to deal with pressing matters and to watch the situation, and then rode through to Berbera, with a small escort, arriving here on the 16th instant. The brief occupation of Sheikh having now practically effected its purpose in staying the stream of refugees and diverting it as far as possible in the direction of Hargeisa, where there are many rich Somalis and where there is no danger of attack whatsoever, I intend to withdraw the troops at the end of the week (about the 22nd or 23rd instant), by which time all the wounded will have been removed. Captain Summers proceeds to Aden to-day to catch the homeward bound P. and O. of the 21st instant. In Berbera itself nothing out of the ordinary has occurred. The townspeople have kept quiet, and Lieutenant Barker, R.N., the Acting District Commissioner, and Mr Powell, the Treasurer, are to be congratulated on having displayed coolness and good judgment from the time when the first news of the disaster to the Camel Corps was brought into town. Needless to say, there have been the wildest rumours afloat as to the death of all the officers with the Camel Corps, and my own capture,

at the hands of the dervishes : and many others, equally without foundation in fact. All necessary precautions appear to me to have been taken for the defence of the town, and the general situation is, and has been, since the time of our evacuation of Burao, well in hand. The reinforcements of 300 troops from Aden arrived at Berbera on the 12th instant.

15. In conclusion I wish to say that it is with feelings of the greatest reluctance and the most profound regret that I should have had to lay to the charge of a dead man and a gallant officer that he acted in a hazardous manner without a full sense of his responsibilities. I have considered it my duty, however, to place before you a perfectly candid and frank statement of the whole occurrence. A rash act has involved the Government of the Protectorate in a severe set-back, and, under the circumstances, in a politically disastrous withdrawal from Burao. For this, Mr Corfield, who had previously done such excellent work, has paid the penalty with his life. It can only be said that he allowed his attribute of personal bravery, and the complete confidence he had in the men under his command, to outweigh his better judgment. The action of Dul Madoba should never have been fought. But once committed to the action—and, in this matter, no responsibility can attach to them—the outstanding feature is the gallant conduct and the prolonged and determined resistance offered by Captain G. H. Summers, 26th Cavalry, and Mr C. de S. Dunn, Somaliland Camel Constabulary, with a small body of men against odds never less, from the beginning, than fifteen to one. I desire, therefore, to bring to your personal notice the names of these two officers for any recognition possible at the hands of His Majesty's Government. My recommendations for monetary awards to the rank and file of the Constabulary who distinguished themselves in action will be forwarded to you at a later date.

I have, &c.,

G. F. ARCHER.

No. 2. From the Secretary of State to the  
Acting Commissioner.

DOWNING STREET,

5 September, 1913.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your two despatches of the 19th ultimo\*, and to thank you for the clear and connected account with which you have furnished me of all the circumstances relating to the recent action between the Camel Corps and a dervish force on the 9th of that month.

2. It is evident that the whole responsibility for this ill-advised and disastrous action must rest with the late Mr Corfield. He has paid the penalty with his life, and I have no desire to dwell on this aspect of the matter. But I am compelled, if only in justice to the other officers concerned, to record my opinion that the disaster is due to his complete disregard of the instructions issued by His Majesty's Government, by Mr Byatt, and by yourself.

3. I fully endorse your remarks with regard to the conduct of Captain Summers and Mr Dunn, and I request that you will convey to the latter officer my warm commendation of his coolness and courage during the action, and of the dispositions which he made for withdrawing his force after the engagement. I shall cause Captain Summers to be informed of my appreciation of his services on his arrival in this country.

4. While I learn with regret of the unsatisfactory conduct of part of the Camel Corps, it is clear that the remainder are entitled to the highest praise for the gallant manner in which they withstood the attack of a vastly superior force. I note the names of those who have been specially commended, and I shall await your further representations.

5. It gives me great pleasure to convey to you my unreserved approval of your own proceedings as reported in your despatch. You pass lightly over the action which you took on receiving the first intimation of the disaster.

\* No. 1, and another not printed.

The information then given was fortunately inaccurate, but it is clear that in acting upon it, and in proceeding with your scanty escort to the succour of the survivors, you were consciously accepting the gravest personal risks with but little hope of a successful issue. I shall take an early opportunity of submitting your name to the King for appointment as a Companion of the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George.

I have, &c.,

L. HARCOURT.

No. 3. From the Acting Commissioner to the  
Secretary of State.

(Received 6.8 p.m., 8th September, 1913.)

#### TELEGRAM.

As it is possible that an unfounded native rumour may be transmitted to the Press, I have now received definite information that Corfield's remains have not been disturbed by the dervishes. They have been re-interred in a deepened grave by a party specially sent for the purpose, and all traces of the spot have been obliterated. The exact locality of it is, of course, known to us.

The same party report that they counted 377 dead dervishes at the scene of the mishap, and 18 more on the road to Olesan. This information is confirmed from another independent source, and the figures given in the eleventh paragraph of my despatch of August 19th\* should therefore be altered. The number of dervishes wounded is unknown.

The final return of casualties to the Camel Corps stands at 36 dead, 21 wounded, no missing.—ARCHER.

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#### INDEXING

In connexion with a series of letters, index is the term employed to denote a formal arrangement showing at a glance the date, sometimes also the place of writing, the

correspondents, the gist of each letter separately. Like the précis, the index seeks to express the contents as concisely as possible ; but the matter of the whole series is not, as in the précis, woven into a connected narrative—each letter is kept distinct. In spite of this difference, the method of indexing is, to a great extent, the same as the method of constructing a précis. In fact, when an index and a précis have both to be made, the index forms an excellent preparation for the précis.

The following is a copy of the instructions and model given in an examination. The model is typical of what is required to be done.

“ Having read the accompanying Correspondence, make an Index of the several letters and other papers, with the exception of that already indexed below.

AN ENCLOSURE *is to be treated as a portion of the letter in which it is enclosed, and not to be separately indexed.* The Index should contain the date and place\* of each letter or document ; the names of the persons by whom and to whom it is written ; and the subject of it. The merits of such an Index are—(a) to give the main subject of each letter or document, omitting everything else ; (b) to do this briefly, distinctly, and in such a form as readily to catch the eye.

#### SPECIMEN OF INDEX.

Number	Date and Place	Correspondents	Subject
I	13th October, 1908. London.	Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor of Transvaal.	States† that he has received a communication from the British Indian Committee, complaining of the treatment of Indian prisoners in the Transvaal, and asks for particulars by telegraph.

\* The place is sometimes not asked for, and sometimes is not shown on the documents.

† Sometimes “stating.”

It is unnecessary to repeat the detailed instructions already given (pp. xii, xiii) in regard to constructing a *précis*, as far as these apply to index-making. It is sufficient to remind the student to begin by reading all the letters, or a sufficient number of them, to find out the important points in the correspondence. Jotting these down, or marking them, he will then proceed to draw up the index in strict accordance with the model. Note the four columns—the first for number of the letter, the second for date and place, the third for correspondents, the fourth for subject. Be careful not to number an enclosure separately. That is, suppose letter Number 5 contains an enclosure, do not call the enclosure “6,” but “Enclosure in No. 5.” Do not state the subject of the enclosure twice. That is, do not put the subject of the enclosure under the covering letter, but in its own place.

In dating, follow the model exactly, and give the date correctly. If the place of writing is not mentioned, it is not likely to be asked for in the index.

As in the *précis*, so in the index, the designation of the correspondents must be consistent. Do not call the same person at one time “The Earl of Crewe,” and at another time “His Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies.”

The matter in the fourth column should be put as concisely as possible. You may be limited to a certain number of lines. Whether limited or not, be brief. Examine the specimen given below: and you will see how you are expected to restrict your statement. The introductory verb may be in the 3rd person of the present tense, as “reports,” or in the present participle, as “reporting.” This introductory word requires careful attention. Find in what relation the writer of the letter stands to the person he addresses, and you will discover whether you are to say “advises” (“advising”) or “submits”

("submitting") or "commands" ("commanding") or "entreats" ("entreating"). Here is a list—not a complete list—of suitable verbs :

admit	concur	inquire	remind
advise	declare	instruct	reply
agree	decline	intimate	report
announce	decree	invite	represent
appoint	define	mention	request
approve of	demand	nominate	review
ask	deny	order	sanction
assure	desire	press	state
authorize	direct	promise	submit
beg	discuss	propose	suggest
command	enclose	refer	urge
communicate	forward	refuse	warn
complain	inform		

INDEX OF CORRESPONDENCE printed above, pp. 2—19.

Number	Date	Correspondents	Subject
1	15th March, 1907.	"Daily Mail" telegrams.	Announcing* the flogging of negroes for insult of white women and the existence of unrest among the na- tives.
2	15th March, 1907.	The Secretary of State to The Acting Commissioner.	Requesting full report on the matter announced in No. 1.
3	16th March, 1907.	The Acting Com- missioner to The Secretary of State.	Denying the report of native unrest, giving detailed ac- count of the flogging inci- dent, and urging im- mediate appointment of European police.

\* Or "announce."

Number	Date	Correspondents	Subject
4	18th March, 1907.	The Secretary of State to The Acting Commissioner.	Sanctioning the appointment of twenty European police.
5	19th March, 1907.	The Acting Commissioner to The Secretary of State.	Announcing arrangements for trial of persons accused of flogging negroes, and reporting native unrest.
6	19th April, 1907.	The Acting Commissioner to The Secretary of State.	Reporting annoyance of Colonists' Association at Secretary's statement that many of those present at the flogging were armed.
7	23rd April, 1907.	The Acting Commissioner to The Secretary of State.	Transmitting a message from the Colonists' Association complaining of the action of the local administration and of the Secretary's statement in the House of Lords, and asking for a Commission of Enquiry.
8	9th April, 1907.	The Acting Commissioner to The Secretary of State.	Giving an account of the result of the trial, the Crown <i>versus</i> Grogan and others, and estimating its effect on the natives.
5 Enclosure in No. 8.	2nd April, 1907.	Extract of Judgment.	Containing the sentence on Grogan and others.
9	1st May, 1907.	The Secretary of State to The Acting Commissioner.	Asking information as to injuries of natives and nature of insult.



Number	Date	Correspondents	Subject
10	3rd May, 1907.	The Acting Com- missioner to The Secretary of State.	Replying to No. 9.
11	18th June, 1907.	The Secretary of State to The Governor.	Reviewing the whole inci- dent, approving of the action of the local ad- ministration, declining to appoint Commission of Enquiry, and deprecating such acts of lawlessness as likely to provoke a native outbreak.

For practice in Indexing, use the Précis exercises numbered I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII and XV.

END OF PART II

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